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1 Legalising Land Rights, Yes But How?
An Introduction
Jan Michiel Otto & Andre´ Hoekema1
In the Face of Two Paradigms
In this volume of essays the authors reflect on legal means to improve
the position of the many smallholders in the developing world who live
and work on land that they do not officially own. From quite different
perspectives they explore how to provide more tenure security through
better land law. The authors recognise that for rural development an
appropriate land law is necessary but not sufficient. They also realise
that ideas about what precisely constitutes an appropriate land law
have for too long been informed by two contradictory paradigms,
namely the ‘install full private property’ paradigm and the ‘leave cus-
tomary law undisturbed’ paradigm.
The essays in this volume demonstrate that the full private property
approach, which has come to dominate international and domestic
land policies over the last decades, has major drawbacks. It has often
done little good for rural smallholders as it neglected existing land
management and land use practices which were embedded in local cir-
cumstances. The main assumption on which it rests – legal institutions
can protect the poor man’s legal rights – has unfortunately proved to
be a gross overestimation of state capacities for effective and just land
governance.
On the other hand, the authors do not trust approaches which re-
commend ‘leaving customary law undisturbed’ either. Proponents of
such approaches have tended to perceive rural communities as cultur-
ally distinct and tied to their land with collective landholding as the
centrepiece of their arrangements. They favour rigorous legalisation of
collective holding of land, by which the land is declared collective and
inalienable. In the face of large-scale dispossession of local commu-
nities by state and corporate actors, this approach is often advocated as
the only effective way to protect existing land rights.
A Leiden-Based Research Project Featuring ‘Third Ways’
This book is the result of a Leiden-based research project on legali-
sation of land tenure. The project already resulted in a volume with
studies from eight countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America entitled
Legalising Land Rights (Ubink, Hoekema & Assies 2009).2 Both
volumes show a tremendous variation in local circumstances as well as
in the nature and historical background of land policies and their
relation to the development concepts and land laws prevailing in each
of the countries under review.
This heterogeneity strongly suggests that policy-makers and scholars
need to find out empirically under what circumstances particular kinds
of legal innovation would be effective or not, both in terms of their
responsiveness to needs and practices of the people involved as well as
in terms of a legal instrument which enables agricultural growth with-
out jeopardising legal protection of rural communities. This volume
features a number of land law regimes that have taken practices of
unregistered land tenure seriously and that have tried, where and when
the need arose, to build new state law on this very basis, all by thor-
oughly participatory methods. We identified in these regimes a ‘third
way’ of legalising land tenure, or rather a bundle of various ‘third
ways’. These ‘third way’ experiments not only build upon practices on
the ground but also try to legally remedy deficiencies and fill some
legal gaps. In doing so they fit in neither of the two paradigms we
mentioned above.
A First Introduction to the Chapters
All five authors in this book try to draw practical lessons from their
respective experiences with developing legal protection for the rural
poor in case holding land ‘informally’ really turned out to be insecure.
All agree that the number of such cases has been growing fast in
recent times, and that therefore the need for formalising or legalising
land rights has increased. And they ask: ‘very well, but how?’
John Bruce explains that introducing full private individual property
plus titling and sophisticated registration of land parcels and titles
cannot be the ‘silver bullet’, as suggested by Hernando de Soto in
2000. Yet, he endorses De Soto’s views to the extent that formalisa-
tion of land holdings under certain circumstances may benefit the
poor directly. Bruce, looking back at about 50 years of attempts at
legalising land rights in developing countries, shows how to adapt
land laws better to local circumstances. Lorenzo Cotula comes to simi-
lar conclusions from a slightly different angle. He discusses the
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strong pressures on unregistered land tenure arrangements caused by
large-scale buying of big tracts of land by both foreign governments
and multinational enterprises. Cotula shows that local smallholders
although resorting to national and international law, often lose their
land. How to go from here, is explained by Liz Alden Wily. She dis-
cusses the ‘learning by doing’ approach she used in Tanzania. In a
truly bottom-up fashion she gathered local people and government
officials together in a common effort to design a legal regime that
provides land and resource (forest) management rights. Paul van der
Molen, cadastral registration expert, also contributes to our search for
the way ahead. He looks at the problem of how to reorganise public
records for registration of kinds of land rights outside the full private
property ambit, like land rights granted to communities as such, and
also specific use rights of individuals such as the ‘secondary rights’ of
women and pastoralists. Finally, Andre´ Hoekema raises the question:
‘If not private property, then what?’. He discusses experiences with
two new land laws through which land management and land use
rights are granted to communities (Mozambique and Tanzania) and
one new land law securing the position of individuals (Ethiopia).
Based on the strong and the weak points of these three recent laws,
he provides a checklist which could be useful for any legalisation
effort.
The Changing Picture: Why Smallholders Urgently Need Legal
Protection
Until recently3 many law and development experts hoped that creating
legal certainty would do away with the problem of unregistered, ‘lawless’
landholdings of many rural smallholders. By establishing legal cer-
tainty, it was hoped, they could speed up rural development all over the
world. Individual full property or freehold rights, titles and strong
forms of public registration would bring about this legal certainty, cre-
ate land markets and offer farmers the opportunity to invest and
contribute to rural economic growth.
Meanwhile, counter-movements of community organisations, NGOs,
academics and some politicians have maintained that such unregistered
landholdings do not necessarily constitute an impediment to rural de-
velopment. Their advocacy has made much sense, especially when such
holdings have been well protected and managed by local communities
who practice local types of law4 and authority called customary law,
adat, indigenous law, or people’s law. Such tenure arrangements are of-
ten called ‘communal’. They may provide a fair amount of tenure secur-
ity and offer holders locally effective rights to use land as they see fit, to
LEGALISING LAND RIGHTS, YES BUT HOW? AN INTRODUCTION 9
reap the fruits of investments, to engage in some kinds of land transac-
tions and to keep the land in the family. Many such smallholders with-
out official legal position may expect that ‘a person’s right to land will
be recognized by others and protected in case of specific challenges’ (as
the FAO 2002: 18 defines tenure security).5
With all due respect to these communities and their potential, the
last few decades have witnessed new economic and social develop-
ments which have undermined such local land tenure arrangements at
a quicker pace than before. In many areas, and particularly in isolated
places, people now face both internal as well as external challenges pre-
viously unheard of. As for the internal threats it suffices to refer to the
interrelated processes which have changed rural community life almost
everywhere: individualisation, marketisation, population growth, migra-
tion, state formation, mass communication and transportation, educa-
tion, women’s emancipation, democratisation, and juridification. All of
this has contributed to intra-community tenure insecurity and conflicts
about land.
The external threats stem largely from business interests and state
intervention. Rural areas are now increasingly incorporated in national
and global economies and smallholders are pressured to make place
for large-scale agribusiness, whether for food, timber, or biofuel pro-
duction. Moreover their local tenure arrangements have often been af-
fected by government efforts to replace them with new laws that
should foster rural development. These included invasive agricultural
policies, imposing heavy duties on peasants. Many of these govern-
ment efforts have not been successful. However, under such conditions
communal tenure arrangements have often lost their stability and co-
hesive character. Moreover, where communal land tenure arrange-
ments are not recognised or are not functioning (any more), small-
holders often cultivate land that is formally classified as state land. Of-
ten they lack official titles or other means of protection against the
usurpation of their plots for large-scale agriculture, irrigation, mining
business and infrastructural works. They run the risk of being branded
as squatters on their own land, or at least regarded as people who can
easily be evicted without an adequate compensation for the loss of
‘their’ land. In view of these external threats, there is indeed an urgent
need to legally empower these smallholders so that they do not just
rely on continued protection by unregistered customary arrangements,
even if their communities still seem resilient.
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Two Types of Land Tenure Legalisation, and of Legislation
To grasp the full spectrum of legalisation of unregistered land tenure
arrangements, we should, to begin with, distinguish two types, i.e. the
communal type, and the individual (or family-based) type. The commu-
nal type refers to community-based arrangements in which the (usually
unregistered) right to manage and control the land – and often the
right to rent out the land to outsiders – rests in the hands of a collectiv-
ity, a corporate actor, represented by for instance a village head, a chief
or another community leader. Rights to use and exploit the land, some-
times also the right to bequeath, are in the hands of individuals and/or
families.6 Such community-based land tenure arrangements regularly
lack official recognition.7
But not everywhere customary law functions in such ways, and not
all customary law embodies communal land tenure arrangements.
This brings us to the individual type of unregistered land tenure
arrangements. Such individual rights may concern communal land,
privately-owned land, or, as is very often the case in the developing
world, land which has formally been declared to be state land. Such de
facto ways of individually using and exploiting state land are often not
recognised nor legally protected. In some places such individual land
use practices are reminiscent of age-old customary practices, whereas
elsewhere such individual tenure can be a recent phenomenon, for
instance resulting from large-scale land invasions, allocations to private
companies or public use, or other drastic state measures.
As a consequence of these two existing types of land tenure, the
efforts of countries who have engaged in experiments to define, title
and record customary rights and give these legal status,8 reflect two
corresponding types of legalisation. The first focuses on the group or
community level, and the second on the individual or family level,
according to the specific context. In the first case, groups and commu-
nities are the potential subjects of rights and in the second case indi-
viduals. This distinction runs through all the present-day efforts of le-
galising land tenure.
In both types of arrangements the search is for ways to provide real
tenure security for the smallholders. In the communal type of legalisa-
tion, the legislator first has to dress up the nature and competences of
a management and regulatory local agency out of the contours of
locally existing entities like a ‘village’, a ‘community’, a ‘tribe’. Next,
given the role of this entity, rules of use, heritance, transactions etc,
must be recognised and defined.9 Thus, issuing of new land law at the
same time calls for the creation of new, or amendment of existing,
management authority over land. This state-imposed change of locally
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existing institutions of land management authority may give the legali-
sation an ambiguous character: on the one hand there is recognition
and state-sanctioned legal support for local authorities (often for the
first time ever), on the other hand local institutions are regularly chan-
ged to such a degree that – if the changes are implemented at all –
these institutions change into something that might be far away from
the original. This in its turn may cause certain problems of legitimacy
and effectiveness in the actual functioning of the new regime.
In the individual type of legalisation, the legislator primarily defines
the nature, scope and conditions of the use rights as well as the ways
of registering and public recording of these rights. Regarding the land
management authorities, often no more seems to be needed than some
changes to already existing state land management agencies and/or de-
centralised public entities.
Capturing both types of land tenure legalisation in our study, our
proposed definition of land tenure legalisation would be as follows: ‘a
process whereby possession (including use) and management of a tract
of land are incorporated into a national legal system – either directly,
or indirectly through recognition of community-based rights and
authorities – whereby the rights and obligations of the individuals and
entities concerned are defined.’
Land Tenure Legislation in Context
Both paradigms mentioned in the first section, namely ‘install full pri-
vate property’ and ‘leave customary law undisturbed’ have put their
marks on more than a century of designing, implementing and evalu-
ating land policies and land laws in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Much can be learnt about this history on a country by country basis
from our previous study mentioned above (Ubink, Hoekema & Assies
2009). In the country chapters of that study we can also see how a
third paradigm, which we might summarise as ‘state and party for the
people’s development’, came to dominate land policies and laws in
countries as diverse as China, Ethiopia, Mexico, or Indonesia, during
certain periods. In the remainder of this introduction, we will roughly
sketch this historical Werdegang of land tenure policies and law, from
the colonial era until today. The overview will pay some attention to
trends in foreign aid. For, land policies in most developing countries
have been informed not only by domestic considerations but also by in-
ternational and transnational assistance. This book is mainly based on
the experience of the authors of this book as partners in such projects.
Prior to this historical overview, we will first look at some recurring
themes concerning the broader context of land tenure legalisation. First
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we will briefly look at the importance of some ‘governance’ issues, next
at ‘land policies’, and finally at some underlying ideologies and theories
aiming at economic and social development. Thus we try to provide a
context which should help to understand the background of land ten-
ure legalisation, especially how the long struggle between ‘legal central-
ists’ and ‘legal localists’ has evolved over time and seems now to be
leading into ‘third ways’.
Swinging Pendulums of Governance
Since the World Bank’s 1992 report on good governance and develop-
ment, the concept of governance – and especially ‘good’ governance –
has taken centre stage in development policy, both internationally and
domestically. The concept refers to the role of the state in development
processes, and covers aspects of politics, administration, law, and state-
society relations. All of these aspects are manifest in land policies in
developing countries, both in past and present. In the late colonial era,
European and domestic businesses were able to extract much profit
from their control of land and agricultural labour. When after World
War II most developing countries gained their independence, colonial
governance was succeeded by national regimes who tried to build the
nation and promote development by exercising strong, centralist and
authoritarian leadership. Employing such top-down approaches govern-
ments initiated ambitious programmes for unification of land law, land
registration, as well as ‘land reform’ inspired by socialist models.
Over the years this style of governance has caused much resistance,
and led to demands for political participation, economic freedom,
democratic decentralisation, human rights and rule of law. Around the
globe, recent decades have seen the emergence of strong business com-
munities, decreasing distributive capacities of the state, and a rise of
civil society organisations representing weakened social groups. Since
the demise of the Soviet Union international and national development
policies are clearly focused on market efficiency rather than social jus-
tice. This is to some extent an ideology by default, born out of the re-
cognition that ‘big government’ and ‘legal centralism’ of the 1960s and
1970s have not been able to deliver.
Whatever the position is on the broad spectrum between the poles of
centralisation and decentralisation, policies cannot be carried out with-
out a sound public administration, an effective civil service. Also the
realisation of Hernando de Soto’s ambitious plans would fully depend
on the administrative capacities needed to run an efficient land admin-
istration. Similarly, a proper rule of law environment is key to the suc-
cess of any land policy.
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Land Policies and Land Tenure Law in a Broad Sense
There is still one other important matter which deserves mentioning.
This book speaks mainly about the legalisation of unregistered land
tenure. We might seem to suggest that this is the single most impor-
tant and effective recipe for strengthening the position of rural small-
holders. It is not. Rather, it is one of a dozen or so interrelated policy
options concerning land management. Here, we cannot do more than
touch upon some of them briefly. They include the definition and allo-
cation of the various rights to land. Measuring and mapping land
raises another set of issues. Then there is the issue of land use plan-
ning, which calls for balancing many different interests, and its imple-
mentation by land use licensing. Here intersectoral relations are key:
besides balancing the needs and demands of agriculture, forestry, en-
vironmental protection, industry, mining, energy, housing, and public
works, to mention just a few, coordination with other spatial planning
and environmental management policies is necessary. Land acquisition
policies for public and private interests, enabling state agencies and
corporate actors to acquire land without a painstaking process of expro-
priation is also an important issue.
Then there is the issue of land reform, in the sense of redistribution
of land to the needy. There are many different models of land reform.
In the 1960s the popular model consisted of seizing land from large
private landowners on the basis of certain land ceilings (maximum) for
redistribution to landless labourers, tenants, or smallholders, who
would form cooperative societies. Today, there is more interest in the
privatisation of state land. Some experts and donors now promote the
allocation of much smaller plots as a feasible way to support the rural
poor (Prosterman 2009). Recent studies show trends of large-scale dis-
possession of smallholders throughout Asia (Li 2009). In as far as ur-
ban areas are unable to employ and absorb them, solutions require
changes in access to land in rural areas.
The resolution of land conflicts has also become a major policy con-
cern in itself in most developing countries. Different types of conflicts
(within families, between communities, between communities and the
state, between communities and enterprises) are often difficult to solve,
and have the potential to develop into larger conflicts threatening stabi-
lity and security. Whatever land rights are allocated, other factors are as
crucial for small farmers to benefit from their land, including water,
seeds, fertiliser, agricultural extension, access to markets, market infor-
mation, transport, and fiscal incentives. This calls for integrated agri-
cultural support policies and infrastructure. Obviously, the scope of this
book does not permit us to further elaborate on this, nor to go deeper
into land policy issues concerning the urban poor.
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Underlying all of these related elements of land policy and law, two
more ideological questions stand out: who controls the land, and how
is land actually perceived? Often the issue of who actually owns and
controls the land in a country – the state, private individuals, or collec-
tive entities – is highly contested. And if the answer is ‘the state’, then
which national or subnational agency (or agencies) is mandated to
issue rights and licences concerning land? This question of land con-
trol matters as much for agricultural land as for urban land, peri-urban
land, forest land, or marginal land, and often has severe consequences.
Finally there is the question of whether land is perceived primarily
as a commodity, an economic asset to be traded in an open, dynamic
land market, or as the indispensable socio-economic foundation of
communities and their livelihoods. In the first case, land assets should
be legally fixed in order to – following De Soto’s views – be trans-
formed from dead to living capital, to allow land holders to capture ris-
ing land values and to use their possessions as collateral to gain access
to credit.
For others, however, land tenure systems incorporate an extensive
set of social relations from which people take their identity and that
serve their needs for securing their livelihood. Through the inherent
practice of reciprocity people are encouraged to see their individual in-
terests in the light of the needs of others and the community as such.10
The latter view emphasizes livelihood security and local food produc-
tion.
Economic and Social Policy Theory: Efficiency versus Social
Justice?
Much of the international debate on land governance today is con-
ducted by development economists, as part of their general concern
with economic development. Their work shows more attention for land
as a marketable commodity than as a secure livelihood.11 The focus on
community-based local economies, as was once promoted by politicians
like Gandhi and economists like E.F. Schumacher, the author of Small
is beautiful, seems at first glance no longer fashionable among develop-
ment economists these days. Yet, a closer look at De Soto’s work reveals
a strong focus on the actual importance of ‘local contracts’ and ‘extra-
legal relations’. Taking that seriously, requires development economics
to focus on actual costs and benefits of farmers in their local contexts,
bringing psychological, social, cultural and political considerations as
much into the picture as rational choice calculations.
Today’s development economics are heavily indebted to the work of
Douglas North (1990) who forged the neo-institutional turn, underlin-
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ing the fact that economic behaviour such as selling or renting out a
plot of land (or deciding not to do so), – like any other behaviour – is
influenced by ‘transaction costs’ – the costs of participating in a mar-
ket. These costs, in their turn, are influenced by ‘institutions’, i.e. pre-
vailing norms, rules, rule-applying organisations, and their practices.
Jean Ensminger (1997: 191), who wrote an article in a book honouring
North, concludes that in the field of how to organise land rights, there
is a ‘need for formal institutions to build upon informal institutions’.
This actually calls for an alternative reading of neo-institutional econo-
my, to the end that local communal regimes will be adapted rather
than replaced.
In this vein economists could do more systematic research concern-
ing the extent to which communal tenure arrangements provide small-
holders with guarantees against losing their land, their means of survi-
val and other serious risks. Introducing market-oriented private prop-
erty has often led to uprooting such communal regimes and the social
security that goes with it. In many regions, people have strongly
resisted this, and not come forward to obtain private property titles for
fear of losing this kind of social protection. Platteau (1996) gives a vivid
description of these fears and problems. In an alternative reading of
neo-institutional economics the concept of transaction costs might be
expanded considerably. It should acknowledge the fact that in a great
number of communities around the globe people’s economic behaviour
is influenced by their relations with other community members, by
their sense of tenure security, by their ideas of justice, fairness, and so-
cial welfare. In these communities it is not the theoretically isolated,
economically self-interested person who is the main player in economic
transactions and market behaviour but the social person, in his social
and cultural surroundings, with all of its trust, distrust, solidarity, or
the lack of it. This would help policy-makers to decide when and where
it may be wise to go for private property arrangements and when and
where they could do better by looking for ways to support, recognise
and legalise a communal land tenure regime, or parts thereof.
Colonial Era: an Earlier and More Ambitious Leiden-Based
Research Project
To understand today’s land law regimes in Asia and Africa, one needs
to look at their histories. From the early twentieth century onwards co-
lonial powers were divided regarding the best way to govern a colony,
either by direct rule or indirect rule. In terms of land tenure and land
law policies in the colonies this was reflected in two widely different ap-
proaches, namely ‘legal centralism’ or ‘legal localism’, to which we will
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refer in short as a ‘centralist’ as opposed to a ‘localist’ approach. The
centralist approach of colonial governments was quite popular with the
French, for example in West Africa. They believed that European law
had qualities superior to local indigenous law, assuming a natural evo-
lution from customary forms of tenure to full private property, from
status to contract. Customary arrangements were seen by such colonial
regimes as backward and not offering opportunities for creative invest-
ment and development.12
However, other colonial governments, like the British, were taking
local customary law and traditional authorities more seriously, and
many colonial administrators opposed its replacement by Western con-
cepts of freehold and private property. European legal scholars were
often divided about the issue. In the Netherlands, for example, during
the first decades of the twentieth century this politico-legal conflict
dominated both policy and academic debates concerning laws in the
Netherlands-Indies. The Leiden scholar Van Vollenhoven (1918) and
his Adatrechtschool made a principled and empirically grounded plea
for continued recognition of indigenous law and communal tenure. He
developed the hybrid ‘adat law’ as a conceptual bridge between adat
(custom) and law. Such unwritten flexible adat law differed sharply
from the positivist notions of law, prevailing in Europe. Van Vollenho-
ven’s view was eventually accepted, and enacted into Dutch colonial leg-
islation. So, in the 1930s adat law became well embedded in the laws,
case law and legal education in the Netherlands-Indies. A sophisticated
system of inter-group laws (intergentiel recht) was also developed to set-
tle cases which involved members of different adat law communities.
In other colonies similar debates raged (Mommsen and De Moor
1992).
From ‘Big Government’ of 1960s to Structural Adjustment in
1980s
The centralist style of postcolonial governance which prevailed since
the 1960s led in the area of land law to national codification, land ti-
tling and registration in the name of development, national unity, and
legal certainty. Thus national governments worked to marginalise com-
munal customary land tenure and community-based traditional autho-
rities. Donors generally supported this trend, the World Bank’s 1975
Land Reform Policy Paper being a perfect illustration. Especially through
the donor-supported ‘structural adjustment’ of developing economies
in the 1980s, central governments now began to strongly promote pri-
vate property and the development of land markets as the informing
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principles of rural land law policies – albeit with some important ex-
ceptions like Ghana and Senegal.13
But once again ‘localists’, NGOs representing indigenous commu-
nities as well as academics, legal anthropologists and others, entered
the scene in the early 1980s, emphasising the tragic failures of central-
ist approaches. Arguing that private property was actually the new-
comer in land policies, they called for attention and respect for conti-
nuing local indigenous practices and arrangements (Coldham 1978,
Shipton 1988). As they have argued, existing ‘customary’ land tenure is
rooted in the social life of rural people, permeating their social relation-
ships.14 In fact, state-led reform of land tenure relations – whether
socialist or market-based – has caused much resistance and avoidance
and left rural areas in many countries with a most unruly pluralism of
state law and a variety of local tenure arrangements, which people con-
tinued to adhere to.
Against this background, localists continued to plead for commu-
nity-based tenure arrangements as the basic framework to foster (rural)
development. However, a serious, balanced international debate about
land, law and development did hardly take place, due to the conflict be-
tween underlying ideologies and the fact that both sides have in fact
been using different concepts of law.
1990s Good Governance and Rule of Law Promotion
Since the 1992 World Bank report on governance and development,
rule of law promotion has risen to unprecedented prominence in do-
nor policies. In this so-called ‘‘‘new’’ law and development movement’
(Rose 1998)15 the focus was obviously on effective legal rules and insti-
tutions. Following current development economics, policymakers were
of the opinion that ‘good’ governance referred to policies that facilitate
the operation of local and global markets. In the area of land law this
initially meant individual rights, titles and registration. Thus rule of
law and good governance concentrated on ‘that part of the economy of
a developing country which can be integrated in the global market
economy’ (McAuslan 1997: 43). Still in line with the structural adjust-
ment policies of the 1980s measures were aimed at downsizing the
state, improving legislation, legally protecting the investments of pri-
vate entrepreneurs, and strengthening courts to solve conflicts in
reliable ways.
However, during the 1990s a growing number of development econ-
omists and other policy-makers reappraised the role of the state and
law in development policy. In the words of Stiglitz, the former chief
economist of the World Bank ‘the choice should not be whether the
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state should be involved but how it gets involved’ (Stiglitz 1998: 25).
Support started to grow for the suggestion that serious social problems
like poverty, inequalities and discrimination had to be tackled by the
state, which had to make a comeback. In this line of thinking, the con-
cept of development itself was also defined more broadly; it had to not
just cover economic growth but also social justice and sustainability.
Consequently, the belief in ‘one-size-fits-all’ type of solutions begun to
shrink. Meanwhile, Amartya Sen’s (1999) definition of development as
freedom became widely accepted (Newton 2004: 7).
During this period, Bruce and Migot-Adholla (1994) published their
evaluation of the strong and weak points of various land law reforms
in Africa, promoting what they called the ‘adaptation paradigm’. This
new paradigm for land law reform suggested that different land use si-
tuations and contexts need different approaches to law reform. Besides
state-led registration of individual private property in some areas, and
leaving customary law undisturbed in other regions, there would also
be areas where what we have called ‘third ways’ are preferred. In the
1990s Platteau (1996: 74) also argued convincingly for building land
laws on local, customary practices of regulating and managing land;
that is, in as far as desirable, for he also demonstrated awareness of
the deficiencies of local customary arrangements, and of situations in
which customary law has no local legitimacy any more.
2000s and 2010s, Mixed Donor Policies, Towards a Paradigmatic
Consensus?
During the last decade international and domestic development poli-
cies, in particular on land law reform, have shown an amalgamation of
the different strands of thought discussed above. It seems that donors
and governments have come to realise the many pro’s and con’s of all
‘silver bullet’ approaches, whether old-style land reform, exclusive focus
on state, structural adjustment and privatisation or decentralisation.
Nowadays, pro-market legal reform programmes go hand in hand with
complementary programmes to promote access to justice, legal em-
powerment, and justice for the poor. Programmes for training parale-
gals at village levels are reminiscent of the community development
projects of the 1970s with their basic health workers and agricultural
extension staff. Donors and governments are also open to explore the
potential of ‘non-state justice’ beside regular national legal systems.
Whilst this may leave room for experimenting with ‘third way’ solu-
tions, it has also created a certain ambiguity and haziness, as we may
learn when reading reports which the World Bank and UNDPs Com-
mission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor have published.
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World Bank, FAO, UN-Habitat, EU
The World Bank has now acknowledged that for a transitional period it
is best to recognise customary practices as this extra-legal arrangement
often provides a sufficient level of tenure security (World Bank 2003).
Yet, the bank seems to see such adaptive policy as a prudent road
towards individualised title and rural development through the market.
It assumes a gradual individualisation of land tenure rights and
increased transferability of land. In contrast, international organisa-
tions like the FAO, the EU and UN-Habitat – not to speak of peasant
and indigenous movements – are more inclined toward a structural
approach based on community rights to land, to food security and to
shelter; in short to livelihood security. In their view land seems not
merely an economic asset but also a space for living and/or cultural
reproduction.16 In contrast to the World Bank’s title-based perspective,
the rights-based approach of other institutions allows for a more per-
manent position of pluralist and intermediate options for the legalisa-
tion of land tenure.17 In the rights-based approach tenure security takes
precedent over legal certainty, in a narrow sense.18
UNDP’s Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor
The various reports made by or on behalf of the Commission on Legal
Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP 2008a; 2008b) also strongly stress
the need to target rural smallholders – and urban squatters – and to
take a series of measures to legally empower them. In fact, the Com-
mission was initially expected to promote the exclusive individual pri-
vate property title approach following the footsteps of its co-chairman
Hernando de Soto. Later on the Commission seems to have modified
its position.
For example, the Commission also discusses the problem of how to
protect and strengthen communal land rights of indigenous peoples as
well as the ‘secondary’ rights of women. In the final ‘Agenda for Prop-
erty Rights’ (CLEP 2008a: 65) the Commission suggests community-
based ownership of natural resources (forests, grazing lands, fisheries
etc.) and recognition of traditional institutions to manage and use
these resources. A similar suggestion is to strive for ‘adequate repre-
sentation and integration of a variety of forms of land tenure such as
customary rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, group rights…’(ibid.: 65).
In sum, the report does not promote one single, right way forward.
Just like we set out in previous sections, the Commission also concep-
tualises land tenure legalisation as one element out of a series of inter-
related policies for rural development. Access to justice includes in
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their view ‘non-state, informal justice systems’ (ibid.: 63). So, it seems
the Commission is also inclined to walk ‘third ways’ in land rights le-
galisation.
However, the picture remains ambiguous. The reports remain gener-
al and do not specify how in practice the Commission would seek to
reconcile or combine the ‘install full private property’ paradigm and
the ‘leave customary law undisturbed’ paradigm. For, the reports also
constantly emphasise that smallholders need to be brought to the mar-
ket, thus incorporating ‘the extra-legal economy into the formal econo-
my’.19
So, it seems that tensions between a market-oriented policy based on
titled land as an economic asset and a justice-oriented policy in which
the land primarily serves ‘livelihood security’ is far from resolved. In
spite of the Commission’s declared intentions, in the end it seems to
emphasise the aspect of economic asset far more than that of liveli-
hood. (Otto 2009, Assies 2009: 914)
Towards a Paradigmatic Consensus?
The localist’s promise of community-based tenure security for all
smallholders has its own problems. What to do about discriminatory
practices toward women and local minorities and about unfettered
authoritarian power of traditional leaders? What to do when communal
land tenure institutions are absent and/or do not function well any
more? And how can unregistered community-based tenure arrange-
ments survive anyway under the attack of land-hungry enterprises and
foreign governments?
At present we notice a rapidly growing consensus among interna-
tional and national decision makers, experts in development studies
and in land tenure matters that the way forward should be based on
careful assessments of the very specific local situations within a coun-
try. In this view policies should build where possible on local tenure
arrangements or at least on local needs and potentialities, adopting a
participatory, responsive approach. Regarding the core question of this
volume of how to legalise land rights for rural development, we notice
that ‘third way’ land rights regimes are now springing up in many
countries, particularly but not only in sub-Saharan Africa. Solid evalua-
tions of the effects of such novel enterprise are still rare. Recently scho-
lars like Lavigne Delville and Fitzpatrick have sought to identify best
practices among ‘third way’ experiments undertaken by several coun-
tries. Our previous study with country and case studies (Ubink, Hoeke-
ma & Assies 2009) on national land law and local implementation in a
variety of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America also provides
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insights, we hope, that may help governments, civil society organisa-
tions, donors, and academics, in their search of just land governance
for development.
A Closer Look at the Chapters
Bruce, the practitioner-scholar who advocated the adaptation paradigm
already in 1994, tackles the question ‘does development (…) require full
private ownership?’ head on (see page 33). His answer ‘Not necessarily!’
derives from decades of intensive experiences with formalisation of
land rights for development, particularly the vicissitudes of registration
of a person’s entitlement as a full property right of a Western type. Do
or did all such programmes bring real tenure security and did it boost
development for the poor? The many evaluation studies he draws in
show very mixed results and this in turn leads him to the centrepiece
of his chapter, key questions about the conventional policy of land for-
malisation as private property. Among his questions are the following:
‘Is there a provision for registration of common property, the property
of local communities?’, ‘Is it possible to register customary rights
rather than converting them to private ownership for registration?’, and
‘If the judiciary is corrupt and there is no use turning to the courts,
what is the point of registering property rights?’. These and similar
questions underscore the compelling need to rethink conventional lega-
lisation projects and pay ample attention to other than private property
schemes of land rights, particularly, but not only, to recognition and re-
gistration of communal land tenure.20 In this context Bruce gives us a
well-balanced discussion of De Soto’s book The Mystery of Capital
(2000), reaching the conclusion that the old recipe of introducing full
private individual property cum titling and sophisticated registration of
land parcels and titles cannot be the ‘silver bullet’. In some conditions,
it is, but in many others it is not. But De Soto has the great merit to
have been the first to emphasise the potentialities of land formalisation
for the poor, although in his plea for a particular form of formalisation
he misses out on the many problematic experiences with the type of
programmes he is actually advocating.
Cotula discusses the land law regimes of developing countries, mainly
in (sub-Saharan) Africa, and their socio-economic effects, in a historical
perspective. The sprawling of cities, demographic pressures, trade liber-
alisation and multinational large-scale agricultural and biofuel projects
foster fierce competition in land, making just and effective land law po-
licies difficult but all the more urgent. Particularly in rural Africa,
where private registered property is rare, states often are the formal
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land owning entities, while communal, ‘customary’ forms of land ten-
ure dominate the scene, although often not in an official status. But
this is changing rapidly. ‘There is now greater recognition that land
laws must build on local concepts and practice rather than importing
one-size-fits-all models.’ Basically these new locally adapted land laws
follow two routes: one is to protect customary land rights of the com-
munal type, and make for their simple and quick registration in land
records. The second route is to introduce long term use or lease rights
over (formally) state-owned land.21 In both cases it is crucial to provide
for low-cost and simple registration procedures in a small, accessible
office nearby.
Discussing some of these new land laws Cotula finds important
weaknesses unsolved or not yet solved satisfactorily. Women’s rights in-
cluding their secondary rights, are still in jeopardy; pastoralists – often
overlooked and considered backward – rarely find protection in the
new laws for their grazing needs. Apart from these problems with cus-
tomary arrangements (and ways to legalise these) Cotula devotes con-
siderable attention to the recent developments that affect the land posi-
tion and tenure security of smallholders in Africa, namely national gov-
ernments mainly from Asia investing in African land, as well as an
increase of large-scale multinational agro-investments in cash crops for
export and/or biofuel projects. In this regard he pays attention to in-
vestment treaties and international investments law and arbitration.
Other international impacts on national and local land rights stem
from court cases brought before interregional human rights fora (such
as the Awas Tingi case in Nicaragua). He foresees ‘an increasingly glo-
balised system of property rights influenced by claims based on inter-
linked national, international and local rules’. Some of these interna-
tional tendencies work towards depriving smallholders of their land,
others may strengthen their position. ‘Securing local land rights is to-
day more urgent than ever’, he concludes.
Alden Wily demonstrates that state-imposed top-down design and im-
plementation of land and resource laws in Tanzania had adverse ef-
fects on the ground. In Tanzania state ownership and top-down state
management of forests not only antagonised local communities, the
traditional owners and users of the forests, but also turned them into
forest abusers. She signals the necessity of bottom-up, participative
preparation of land and resources laws for these to enjoy legitimacy
and foster people’s cooperation rather than resistance and sabotage.
Alden Wily’s story about forest use and management relates to the
broader problem of how to deal with commons. More often than not
in new land laws, these collectively held and used resources and their
management regimes at the local level are left out of the picture – a
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striking weakness given the immensity of local common resources in
Africa and beyond. The author sketches the 15-year long struggle from
the mid 1990s by local people, consultants (including herself), and a
few open-minded authorities to arrive at new legal norms for acknowl-
edging possession and conferring management rights on local com-
munities in respect of Tanzania’s rich forest resource. She recounts
how this community-based process and the ‘learning by doing’, which
marked its progress, eventually resulted in the new Forest Act 2002.
One of its main objectives is to devolve forest authority as far as rea-
sonably possible into the hands of ordinary villagers. Alden Wily
shows how this was much fairer than previous legislation which oper-
ated on the basis that forest conservation and management could only
be achieved by removing forests from the customary sector. She also
adjudges the new law as providing a more viable route to sustainable
forest conservation. The critical element in this, she argues, is that
formalisation of village management authority rests upon acknowl-
edgement of customary possession of these areas. If customary tenure
over national forests had ceased to exist, local regulation and responsi-
bility had been impossible.
As for the impact of the new forest law, this new paradigm is prov-
ing a success, improving relations between rural communities and for-
estry officials and demonstrably reducing forest degradation where
communities secure controlling rights over local forests. The main
focus of her chapter is however on the process of making national law.
The chapter is aptly entitled ‘From State to People’s Law’. Alden Wily
proposes that a ‘learning by doing’ approach is essential to modern,
democratic law-making. Without this norms in new land and natural
resource laws continue to be often unjust, irrelevant, unwanted,
ignored or abused in application. A founding issue Alden Wily ad-
dresses is how this more genuinely participatory approach can advance
rightful recognition of customary land interests as rights of real prop-
erty, in the face of increasing appropriation by governments. Although
this chapter was drafted in early 2008, the issue has become yet more
pressing given that the current global land rush affects unfarmed com-
munal lands of rural communities in Africa. Learning by doing, she
argues, involves much more than cursory consultation with commu-
nities. It requires shared state-people experiential work on the law to
overcome unforeseen pitfalls and problems. A learning by doing
approach also challenges all those governments, public officials, con-
sultants and donors who still work with ‘star drafters’ following a one-
size-fits-all approach. So often this approach has been shaped around a
narrow vision of private property as necessarily involving subdivision
and individualisation of resources and registration processes which as
narrowly focus on the farm. It is hard to imagine that consultants who
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have read Alden Wily’s chapter will go on advising a government about
future land law on the basis of a one-week visit, producing a sketch of
the contours of future land law regimes based on a draft already in
their computer when they fly to their new assignment.
Van der Molen, an expert in cadastre and registration with extensive
international experience, explores the various concepts and forms of
registration schemes. In the field of formalising land holding outside
the conventional policy of going for individual private property, one
meets three stages. For one, governments need to engage in the
development – through learning by doing – of specific ‘third way’
holding rights, like the community-based ownership of forests, like
community titles in the hands of traditional communities, or like
individual long-term use or lease rights. Secondly, one needs
accessible, transparent and fast ways to assign such rights to either
individuals or corporate entities, and thirdly, there is need of simple
quick ways of registration, public recording of these rights. It is in this
latter domain that Van der Molen shows us the contours of a ‘third
way’.
The author explains that the conventional cadastral concept is Wes-
tern and not suited to serve the purposes of ‘third way’ policies of land
holding legalisation. There is ‘need to redefine the “traditional Wes-
tern” basic concepts of a cadastre’. One has to see to it that any system
of public recording of rights relates to ‘the prevailing standards and
values in the country’s society (...)’( see page 114). According to him
this means at least expanding and redesigning registration institutions
and operations on three items, namely: ‘The maintenance of records or
registration of social groups with non-individualised membership, the
maintenance of records or registration of the various forms of custom-
ary and non-formal (informal) rights, the maintenance of records or
registration of parcels of land which are not defined using geometrics
and which possess flexible boundaries.’
Let us stress that the first item, the concept of a group with non-
individualised membership, is essential in that in many new land law
regimes communal land and forest tenure gets to be recognised offi-
cially. According to this author registration methods are sufficiently
variable to offer space for registration of this kind of community titles.
As to the second item, how to record a variety of individual customary
rights, like long-term use rights, he shows that this can be done,
including the so-called secondary rights such as the rights women of-
ten possess within customary systems. This is precisely a sore point in
the functioning of conventional registration systems where such rights
are not taken into account and therefore annihilated. Also the third ele-
ment commands attention, as it is crucial to describe and establish
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boundaries of land in simple ways like enumerating natural elements
that constitute the boundaries of some individual or communal parcel.
Van der Molen even offers to this end a ‘migration path for cadas-
tres’, analysing what rights might be registered and why one would do
that, how subjects of rights may be identified, what entity best keeps
the records and how and when the records can be created and kept up
to date.
Hoekema continues the search for weak and strong points in those
present day land law regimes that try to follow a ‘third way’ and do not
automatically go for private individual property and large-scale Western
style registration. He scrutinises a number of such new land laws.
Mozambique is a very advanced case in terms of unconditional grant-
ing of communal land rights to local communities. Even without regis-
tration the law provides communities with rather strong and extensive
legal title to their land. They are free to regulate the use rights over the
land as well as institutionally manage all the land, negotiate with inves-
tors etc. In practice, still a lot goes wrong, promises are not delivered,
but the basic legal set up is a major innovation. In Tanzania customary
law is recognised, also even without the condition of registration, but
in contrast to Mozambique a vast set of provisions regulates land ten-
ure relations. In the relevant laws not much is mentioned about com-
mons, rangeland, woodlands, swamps, and forests. Alden Wily explains
in this volume about the adverse effects of state ownership and man-
agement of forests and how this crooked system after fifteen years of
fighting by local peoples, was replaced by a more successful set-up with
people-controlled management rights over forests. Finally in Ethiopia
the Federal government and some states chose to provide the small-
holders – for the first time ever – with legally backed rights to use and
often also to bequeath land to their relatives, and to confirm land man-
agement authority in the hands of local government organs (the ke-
belle). Typically the commons are left out of this new land law regime.
Hoekema dresses up an extensive list of strong and weak points of
each regime, categorised along three evaluative criteria: does the
regime provide real tenure security? Is there such a degree of legal
empowerment that smallholders, if they wish, can access independent
courts to solve conflicts? Are the local and regional land officials
accountable? Many weak spots are detected among which the vast dis-
cretion awarded to land officials or village authorities to withdraw land
which is not in productive use. Also sectoral laws like mining law, for-
est and water laws, and investment laws are often not coordinated with
the new land law regime. This means that land rights can be annihi-
lated by policies geared towards these other interests, often without
adequate procedure and compensation.
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This author favours recognition of communal land tenure where its
institutions are still resilient, because they normally embody and foster
a morale of reciprocity and solidarity and/or incorporate social and
spiritual values that are part and parcel of the identity of communities.
Notes
1 The authors would like to thank Janine Ubink for her valuable editorial work on ear-
lier versions of the chapters in this book, and Marco Lankhorst for his useful com-
ments on chapter 1.
2 Interest in a variety of ‘third ways’, both in rural, peri-urban and urban regions, in-
spired the research project which resulted in the book Legalising Land Rights. The pre-
sent volume follows up on this interest; this time, however, attempting to sketch in a
more general way the possibilities and the weak and strong points of some ‘third
ways’ of legalisation experiments from various places in the world.
3 The 2003 Land Policy Report written by Klaus Deininger for the World Bank brought
a significant change in this respect.
4 Here the term law is, characteristically, used in a broad sense, including various local,
non-state norms and practices.
5 In many African and Asian countries the overwhelming majority of rural small-
holders do not possess private property or freehold rights, so we will not go into the
question if and how people with private property/freehold rights enjoy tenure secur-
ity, particularly against external threats.
6 We recognise here the distinction made by M. Gluckman (1969: 256-259) between
the estate of management of land on the one hand and the estate of use and exploita-
tion of land on the other.
7 In these experiments often the position of so-called commons or common property
is ‘forgotten’, but this may well change. There seems to be a growing concern for the
rights of people whose livelihood depends to a great extent precisely on access to and
use of these commons. See International Land Coalition 2008.
8 See for countries in West Africa the report by Kandine, Kone´, and Larbi (2008).
9 Fitzpatrick (2005) among quite a few others nowadays, pays serious attention to re-
cognition of land rights ‘at the level of the group’, thus to forms of recognition of the
communal variant of customary law.
10 A persuasive and clear sketch of the working of such a morale of reciprocity is to be
found in the book Dancing with a Ghost (Ross 2006).
11 This is taken from the 2004 IIED booklet Land in Africa: Market asset or secure liveli-
hood?.
12 This evaluation of customary arrangements comes from a report by Golan describing
the discussion in the 1960s among the newly independent Senegalese authorities
where to go with their land law (Golan 1990).
13 See Ubink & Amanor (2008) about Ghana, and Hesseling about Senegal, in Ubink,
Hoekema and Assies (2009).
14 See for example Watts (1992: 161) who deals with The Gambia: ‘rights over resources
such as land and crops are inseparable from (…) rights over people. To alter property
rights is (…) to redefine social relationships’. Or a bit more abstract: ‘Property rights
are always embedded in the institutional structure of a society …’ (Ensminger 1997:
167)
15 The first law & development movement had its heyday in the 1960s and early 1970s
but then disappeared rapidly, at least from donor policies.
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16 In view of the discussion about the pressures on world food production caused by
the large demand for land for biofuel and other purposes, the fact that in many coun-
tries almost all the food is produced by smallholders, makes pro-smallholder policies
a must, if only in socio-economic terms.
17 In 2000 Toulmin and Quan noted the emergence of a new paradigm which does not
prescribe a specific approach to land tenure reform, but is based on ‘pluralism’.
18 The development debate that undergirds the two approaches is summarised nicely
by Joseph Hanlon, when he is talking about the ‘preferred’ agents of development in
the countryside. Hanlon (2002), writing on ‘The Land Debate in Mozambique’ uses
as subtitle of his report: ‘will foreign investors, the urban elite, advanced peasants or
family farmers drive rural development?’ This question hammers home the truth
that any development concept implies socio-political choices, and that these choices
determine the main features of the land law reform chosen.
19 Extra-legal in our conception would mean that a local tenure arrangement is ignored
by national law. We follow here the FAO (FAO 2002: 11-12, Assies 2006: 576).
20 Bruce does not like the term ‘communal’, he fears confusion with ‘collective’. Indeed
as both Cotula and Hoekema explain in their contributions to this book, communal
land tenure is not just about collective holding of land; individual and family rights
are present too. Since in socio-legal studies the terminology of communal land ten-
ure is current, we therefore use that term.
21 In the initial part of this introduction we also distinguished between these two types
of land tenure arrangements that fall under the one label of ‘customary law’.
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2 Simple Solutions to Complex Problems:
Land Formalisation as a ‘Silver Bullet’
John W. Bruce
Introduction
This paper assesses ‘land formalisation’, a ‘silver bullet’ of contempor-
ary development discourse.1 It is one of those ideas which, from time
to time, gain currency as breakthroughs in development thinking and
promise to move us beyond what often seems the hit-or-miss character
of development work. Land formalisation has gained tremendous cur-
rency as a development and poverty-alleviation tool through the work
of Hernando De Soto, the author of The Other Path (1989) and The
Mystery of Capital (2004). It figures prominently as a strategy in the re-
cent Report of the Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor
(2008a: 64-67, 2008b: 62-114), a UNDP-based Commission co-chaired
by De Soto. His Lima think-tank, the Institute for Liberty and Democ-
racy (ILD), has been contracted by USAID and others to conduct diag-
nostic studies of informality and its impacts in Mexico, Haiti, Egypt,
Tanzania, and Honduras.2
Land formalisation has been lauded as providing new insights into
the causes of underdevelopment and a new and promising tool to pro-
mote growth and reduce poverty. This chapter assesses those claims. It
notes that there is less new about the formalisation prescription than
is generally thought. It summarises the main lines of argument for
land formalisation as presented in the earlier land tenure literature,3
and points out some differences between those arguments and the case
made in the writings of De Soto. It next turns to an examination of the
experience with land formalisation projects, long a staple of develop-
ment agencies, and the results of fifty years of empirical research on
their economic and social impacts. It notes the failure of De Soto to
bring this experience to bear to provide a more nuanced and realistic
assessment of the potential of land formalisation. It then asks, first,
why experts in development agencies have not challenged more directly
the oversimplifications in De Soto’s case for formalisation, and second,
why there has been such a dramatic uptake of De Soto’s model in de-
velopment circles generally. In so doing, it hopefully sheds some light
on factors that encourage the embrace of simple solutions to complex
development policy problems. Finally it tries to assess what, when all
is said and done, are the distinctive and important contributions of De
Soto’s work on land formalisation.
The Importance of Land Policy and Law
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which laws relating to land affect
the lives and welfare of the populations of developing countries. Land
underlies and supports much of the life of the planet, providing the
physical underpinning of the environment and productive activities
and playing a major role in their socio-political constructs. Land laws
provide not only rules about property rights in land but also regulatory
frameworks and administrative competences. Through legal enact-
ments relating to land, the state determines the bundle of rights in-
cluded in property forms and the obligations that accompany them.
The rights in those bundles affect landholders’ incentives to husband
or neglect their land. Land laws shape patterns of land distribution and
so give some superior access to development opportunities while tip-
ping others toward poverty. In addition, land and property rights have
deep resonance in cultural and political discourse because land is inti-
mately related to kinship and identity, and its control is an important
basis of power in homes and nations.
Property Rights
The argument for land formalisation begins with property rights, and
the central role they are believed to play in economic development. For-
malisation is a strategy for enhancing property rights. The case for
property rights, summarised briefly, is that:
1 Secure property rights ensure that a right holder who invests will
reap the benefits of his investment, even if this takes some years;
this enhances incentives to invest, and thus promotes increased
land productivity.
2 Property rights which confer broad discretion on the right holder in
use of the land insulate right holders from externalities that can
constrain their creativity in pursuing their propensity to use their
land to better their lives.
3 Property rights, if readily marketable, can be transferred as a com-
modity, and this allows the land market to move those rights into
the hands of those who can use it most profitably.
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4 Property rights which are readily transferable improve access to
credit by allowing the right holders to offer their land rights to len-
ders as security for loans.
Classical economists such Smith, Ricardo, and Mill were convinced the
property rights were an essential underpinning of economic growth.
Smith and Mill considered that private ownership and owner cultiva-
tion were superior, and that tenancy, with its short time horizons and
divided profits, dilutes incentives for investment and good husbandry
(Currie 1981). These understandings have played a large role in form-
ing the land tenure systems of Western market economies. There are
strong modern advocates of property rights among economists, includ-
ing Demsetz (1967) and Feder & Feeney (1981). These clearly represent
the inclination of most economists, though other voices call for
rethinking our conceptions of property rights (Sjaastad & Bromley
2000).
The four propositions above concerning the positive impacts of prop-
erty are not entirely reliable. The theory is basically sound, and much
of its power comes from the extent to which it is borne out by our own
everyday experience as land users and owners. But as always with such
generalisations, the propositions are conditioned on ‘all other things
being equal’, and that is almost never the case. Their predictive value
in a given context will depend on a variety of factors, to some of which
this chapter will return later. That they have continuing power is evi-
denced by the rapid expansion of property rights in land in recent
decades in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Un-
ion, and today’s progress toward fuller property rights in the People’s
Republic of China.
Does development then require full private ownership? Not necessa-
rily. The recent literature recognises that appropriate forms of land ten-
ure are those that ‘mesh’ with the other cogs in the local economic and
social machinery to produce security and development, and that
tenures other than full private ownership work well in some contexts.4
In the end, property rights are socially constructed ways for dealing
with competition for land.5 Private ownership is a bundle of specific
rights and responsibilities, and the sticks in the bundle vary from
country to country. In some countries, such as the US, private owner-
ship has long been firmly established and have almost mystical over-
tones in the political culture, but even those countries recognise the
need to protect a variety of public interests from some exercises of
those rights. To that end, they put in place regulatory systems to limit
their exercise.6
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Informality
‘Informality’ is used by De Soto to describe claims and arrangements
which operate outside the constraints and protections provided by
national law. Many landholders in developing countries use land for
their homes or their fields without any recognition of a right to that
land by the state. The term ‘informality’ has only recently been applied
to such situations and activities outside the formal legal system, in the
work of De Soto. He introduced it in the urban context of Lima, Peru,
to characterise both for land illegally occupied and for business opera-
tions carried on without recourse to formal legal rules and institutions.
The term is broad enough to encompass situations and activities which
do involve illegality (and may even be criminal) and others which are
merely carried on without recourse to legal forms and processes pro-
vided by society for those activities, which may not be illegal.
Even in the situation of actual illegality, use of the term ‘informal’ is
arguably preferable because it is more objective, escaping the pejorative
moral overtones of ‘illegal’. This appears to have been De Soto’s intent.
He argues powerfully in The Other Path (1989: 49-57) for a realistic
acceptance of squatter communities and the formalisation of their
landholdings, however acquired. Later, in his The Mystery of Capital, De
Soto again makes a strong case for formalisation of informal landhold-
ings. He draws upon an example of formalisation of informal holdings
in the early United States. The rule of law, expanding westward behind
waves of early settlers, found ways to regularise the illegal landholdings
they had established through the doctrine of pre-emption. 7
There is a range of situations of land informality. The most significant
are:
1 Landholders whose families have been on the land for generations,
holding it under well-established local custom, though that custom
and even the traditional polity which enforces it are not recognised
by national law.
2 Landholders who consider their land to belong to them by virtue of
their occupying and clearing it, even though this was done without
the consent of the owner, which is often the state.
3 Landholders who may have occupied land illegally, and are under
no illusion as to their legal position, but who hope for and work po-
litically for recognition of their right to stay on the land.
The first category deserves special attention. In the Hegelian concep-
tion of law, which sees law as a monopoly of the national state, these
are simply illegal landholders. But legal anthropology and development
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specialists respectful of realities on the ground have taken a broader
view (e.g. Moore 1986). They recognise that a range of sub-state actors
from tribal kingdoms down to villages and squatter communities man-
age their land through their own normative systems of varying com-
plexity and rigor. The fact that those systems are not validated by na-
tional law does not deprive them of objective reality.8
Customary systems are most extensive in Africa but exist in parts of
Latin America and South-East Asia as well. It is misleading to charac-
terise them as ‘informal’ because they are actually an alternative form-
ality, a sub-national alternative to the formality of the national state.9
The distinction is important for many reasons, but especially because
reform of customary systems often requires not only changing rules
but the profoundly political task of reworking the relative roles of tradi-
tional and civil authorities. Bringing all land under national law has of-
ten been seen as part of the nation-building agenda, with local systems
of custom being seen as particularistic and divisive, indeed ‘backward’.
A notable critique from the 1970s argued that these systems have the
juridical theme of ‘status’ rather than the more modern themes of
‘market’ or ‘plan’, and so were incompatible with development efforts
(Seidman 1978). Customary land tenure systems have commonly been
characterised as ‘communal’ but this is misleading, to the extent that
those systems typically include community, lineage and individual le-
vels of land rights (Bruce 2004a). They were once viewed as relatively
static, but it has been increasingly appreciated that they evolve in
response to economic and other stimuli (Bruce & Migot-Adholla 1994,
Platteau 1996, Cotula 2007).
Development agencies have often frequently funded ‘land tenure
reform’ programmes, conceived as law reform programmes. Those ef-
forts to replace customary land tenure wholesale have usually had very
mixed results, including weaker than anticipated positive impacts and
unanticipated negative impacts. Partial implementation has left norma-
tive confusion and competing claims, based in competing normative
frameworks, in its wake (Atwood 1990, Bruce & Migot-Adholla
1994).10 Recent analyses confirm the continuing difficulty of imple-
menting such programmes successfully (Joireman 2008). Customary
land tenure systems have in fact proved remarkably resilient and some
authors have written of a resurgence of traditional authorities and cus-
toms (Englebert 2006). The basic public policy options with regard to
these systems are either their replacement with Western property
forms, or facilitation of their more gradual adjustment to the new eco-
nomic realities of market economies. The latter option has only re-
cently begun to be elaborated, as scholars have sought to identify best
practices among experiments undertaken in several countries (Lavigne
Delville 2000, Fitzpatrick 2005). The issues involved concern both
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rules and institutions, and they figure prominently in any discussion
of decentralisation of land administration in countries where custom-
ary land tenure is significant (Bruce & Knox 2009). Generalising solu-
tions in this area is questionable given the very considerable diversity
of these customary land tenure systems and their national contexts;
flexibility and creativity are more in order.
Formalisation in Theory
The intention of formalisation is thus to extend the blessing of state-
sanctioned legal structures to citizens who have been operating outside
them. In our case, this means application of national land law to infor-
mal landholdings, or perhaps recognition of existing landholding by
national law. Does formalisation have a particular normative content
for the property rights formalised, or will any national property law do?
That is, how far is a tenure reform element implicit in proposals for
formalisation? In The Other Path, De Soto identifies ‘bad law’ as a pri-
mary cause of informality (1989: 158-172), and stresses that legal re-
forms need to accompany formalisation. He urges drawing on how
things are done in the informal sector to reform law, rather than trying
to force participants in the informal economy to work within the exist-
ing legal structures of the formal economy (1989: 187). Law reform is
equally central to the thesis of The Mystery of Capital (2000: 153-206).
In The Mystery of Capital, however, land formalisation acquires more
specific normative content. De Soto identifies the ultimate benefit of
formalisation of land held informally as the transformation of its land
value into capital ‘with a life of its own’ through the mortgaging of land
to secure loans. Informal land, he urges, is ‘dead capital’ which through
formalisation can be ‘vivified’ and whose value can then participate in
development. ‘What created capital’, he explains, ‘was an implicit pro-
cess buried in the intricacies of formal property systems’ (2000: 46).
How does this implicit process work? The debts secured by mortgages,
as secured rights to payment at a future date, are assets which can be
put to work to finance development. In estimating the amount of land
held informally, what seems to matter is that those parcels are ‘held in
such a way that they cannot be used to create capital’ (2000: 35). He
concludes that third world governments have failed to provide their citi-
zens with ‘the efficiently crafted legal right to have their property inte-
grated into a formal legal system that allows them to use it to create ca-
pital’ (2000: 149). In The Mystery of Capital one still finds references to
the necessity of ‘discovering peoples’ law’, described as ‘the way in
which Western nations built their property systems’ (2000: 163), but
this now appears a tactical device. Since mortgaging land is critical to
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the ability to quicken ‘dead capital’, and this is now presented as the
real promise of formalisation, formalisation appears to have become a
strategy for the creation of private individual property.
How is this concept of ‘formalisation’ different from the ‘individuali-
sation’ tenure reforms supported since the 1950s by several multina-
tional and national development agencies and pursued by many third
world governments? The novelty and appeal of formalisation lie, it is
suggested, not in the novelty of the prescription (affirming informal
land rights under national law and at the same time moulding them
more on the model of private ownership), but in: 1) the identification
of poverty-alleviation as well as growth and outputs of the process, and
2) a more comprehensive understanding of how its benefits can flow
to both land users and the national economy.
The formalisation formulation of the case for property rights reform
is the first that addresses frontally their potential to relieve poverty; ear-
lier discussions usually either assume a benign impact on the poor or
make rather specious ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’ arguments. The classi-
cal argument for property rights and their formalisation is an argu-
ment about impact on growth, which may or may not affect poverty.
The earlier argumentation focuses on positive impacts on investment
and access to credit and, through these, on productivity of land. But
the argumentation in The Other Path and The Mystery of Capital and
subsequent advocacy by the ILD give equal emphasis to the challenge
of poverty-alleviation. They present informality as a disability that pri-
marily affects the poor, and who are most disadvantaged by it. They
note the prevalence of informality in many developing countries, and
the high proportion of poverty within countries found in the informal
portion of the national economy. They urge simplification of formal
systems and lowering legal and financial barriers to entry into them as
a means of economically empowering the poor. These are cogent argu-
ments, though they tend to underestimate the advantages which the
poor (and others) derive from operating informally.
In addition, they stress a potential benefit of formalisation that is un-
derstated in the earlier literature on property rights reform: the impact
of formalisation on land values and the potential for the landholding
poor to benefit directly from the rise in land values. Some earlier studies
note the positive impact of formalisation on land values, which is the
result of the property entering the formal land market instead of being
discounted in informal land markets. But it does not receive much at-
tention, and this is likely because the early studies had an agrarian focus
where such increases were modest. The early apostles of property rights
reform such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill had worked in agrar-
ian economies, and in academia, land tenure has been much more on
the minds of agricultural economists than other economists.
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De Soto’s thinking on formalisation, in contrast, developed in the ur-
ban context of Lima, Peru, where markets were well developed, land
was in high demand, and formalisation could contribute to much more
dramatic rises in land values. The poor, if they hold land, are potential
beneficiaries of such appreciating values, and De Soto clearly favours
the lion’s share of that appreciation going to the poor, as opposed to
the state.
There is another way in which the De Soto description of the
mechanics of benefit generation differs from the traditional descrip-
tion. In The Mystery of Capital, land is dead capital to be vivified by for-
malisation, and transformed into capital through securitisation. Debt
becomes an asset in the hands of the lender and those to whom it is
transferred, and it can fuel other development. This line of argument
was largely missing from the earlier literature, which tended to focus
more exclusively on micro-level impacts on landholders. It addresses a
fundamental problem of economic development: domestic capital for-
mation.
It is an engaging scenario, but it needs to be approached cautiously.
The East Asia economic crisis of 1997 began with a collapse of over-
heated land values in Thailand, where the impact of that collapse trans-
mitted into the larger economy through the banking system. In the
US, the current financial crisis has been triggered by the collapse of
over-leveraged debt assets based on sub-prime mortgages. These experi-
ences suggest caution; the transformation of land values into securities
which are marketable is a very mixed blessing, and can encourage eco-
nomic instability, from which the poor suffer along with everyone else.
While the experiences noted do not deprive De Soto’s argument of its
basic validity, they do suggest a need for a strong regulatory frame-
work.
Another negative impact of informality identified by De Soto and
ILD is that state and local authorities are deprived of a valuable source
of revenue from property taxes, and that, it is suggested, leads to a lack
of basic services for the poor. Again, the potential of formalisation in
this regard is clear enough, but the suggested beneficial result for the
poor embodies a good many assumptions about how taxes will be as-
sessed and how they will be used by governments.
Formalisation has been heavily hyped – for instance, portrayed post
9/11 as the ‘economic answer to terrorism’11 – but there is very broad
and genuine interest in it as a strategy for development and poverty al-
leviation. It has also excited considerable controversy. Some critics
charge that formalisation is a warmed-over version of a privatisation
and growth-first strategy, a well-worn prescription justified on a reason-
ing revised to accommodate the emphasis on poverty alleviation of the
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Millennium Development Goals. They point out that formalisation
brings with it not only opportunities but also risks, exposing the poor
who are to benefit to market forces from which their informality has to
some extent shielded them (Cousins et al. 2005). Some recognise the
basic case for formalisation but urge much closer attention to the cir-
cumstances in which such benefits will or will not accrue to the poor,
the costs and sustainability of formalisation initiatives, and possible ne-
gative impacts of formalisation on some of the intended beneficiaries
(Bruce et al. 2007).
Is it possible to assess the reliability of formalisation’s promises and
risks? Over the past fifty years there has been a series of formalisation
initiatives in the developing world. Many have been studied, and a
good deal has been learned from them.12 In the next section of this
chapter, that experience is briefly reviewed. Unfortunately, De Soto put
forward formalisation largely without reference to this substantial body
of experience and its lessons. A reading of that experience makes clear
that formalisation is in fact quite difficult to implement successfully,
and efforts in this area have often come up short of expectations. The
failure to point out the problems implicit in the formalisation enter-
prise was misleading, and has contributed to the enthusiastic embrace
of formalisation by the development community.
Formalisation in Practice
Land formalisation is the recognition by the state of a property right in
a user in land previously occupied without such recognition, creating
new capacities and opportunities (and perhaps risks) for the right
holder. Concretely, what has to take place to achieve formalisation? The
process can usefully be broken down into three stages:
1 The state by law creates the property right and frames an entitle-
ment to the right;
2 The state realises that entitlement by ‘titling’ a particular piece of
land to a particular individual; and
3 Registration creates an official, public record of the right.
The last step, land registration, is important because the ability to
prove a right is an important element in tenure security. It is also criti-
cal to the operation of land markets, as a potential buyer/lessee must
be assured that the person seeking to transfer a right is in fact the legal
holder of the right. This process thus not only provides greater tenure
security but also lowers risks of engaging in land transactions, thereby
promoting the development of formal land markets.
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De Soto in The Mystery of Capital recognises the critical roles played
by registry systems, which ‘allow description of the economic and
social qualities of any available asset without having to see the asset
itself’ (2000: 54). ‘One important reason why Western formal property
system works as a network’, he notes, ‘is that all property records (ti-
tles, deeds, securities and contracts that describe economically signifi-
cant aspects of assets) are continually tracked and protected as they tra-
vel through time and space’ (2000: 61).
That said, he questions the effectiveness of much of the donor pro-
ject support for property systems in the developing world. He notes
that a large number of those projects had to be terminated early for
poor results, and that ‘[W]ith the exception of some rural Thai property
certification programs, none of these efforts succeeded in turning
extra-legal assets into legal ones. We certainly found no evidence that
assets were being transformed into capital’ (2000: 170). He criticises
the projects for relying too much on mapping, computerisation of land
records and other technological fixes, asserting the priority of legal
transformation (2000: 203-205).
In fact, many of these projects have as their major component sup-
port for land titling and registration, and do transform extra-legal as-
sets into legal assets. De Soto’s dismissal of these projects is critical to
his claim to have discovered the solution to a mystery, but it prevents
him from absorbing the experience under them – which is very mixed
– into his programme for formalisation. That experience is rich in les-
sons, and because it is indeed about land formalisation, it needs to be
examined here.
The primary vehicle used by development agencies to extend formality
to landholdings in the developing world and transitional countries has
been title registration. Title registration was developed in South
Australia as the ‘Torrens System’ in the late nineteenth century, and
was adopted by England and France for many of their colonies in the
twentieth century.13 Title registration records the right itself, based on
an investigation and affirmation of the right by the state, sometimes
with a state guarantee of the registration. The title register is organised
according to parcel files, each parcel having a unique numerical
identifier correlated with a cadastral map showing the parcels.14
Initial registration may be ‘sporadic’, in which case parcels of land
are brought onto the register one by one, at the request of the holder,
or ‘systematic’, in which case all land parcels in a locale are demar-
cated, surveyed, titled and registered at one time. Systematic initial
registration is sometimes legally compulsory, or at least accompanied
by campaign-like suasion, and in most cases the costs are heavily subsi-
dised by the state.15 In systematic land registration, the state goes from
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door to door, providing low-cost tenure security to all; but it is often
also a forced march toward formality, whether or not that is the inclina-
tion of the community and individuals affected.16
The approach was used to stabilise land rights in post-conflict situa-
tions, as early as the start of the 1900s, by the Anglo-Egyptian Condo-
minium in Sudan after suppression of the Mahdiya, and by the British
in Buganda after the Buganda Agreement ended the conflict there;
today, it is playing that role in Rwanda. But most often today, its use is
based on a dual growth and equity development rationale: registration
ensures security of tenure, and so encourages investment, improves
access to credit, and increases land values and productivity. Under this
approach, security of tenure is provided free (or almost free) to all, re-
gardless of their ability to pay. Systematic land registration is often
used to implement land tenure reforms, bringing home to landholders
the new content of their rights effectively, rather than those new rights
remaining simply words on the legal gazette. Often, it has been used
to implement individualisation of land tenure.
Development agencies have typically preferred to support systematic
land registration because:
– It is a potentially effective vehicle for implementing tenure reform;
– It provides security of tenure to both the poor and the wealthy;
– It is efficient, providing major economies in survey costs by doing
all parcels in an area at one time;
– It can be done in a participatory manner, with substantial commu-
nity involvement, and provides important opportunities for rights
education;
– It is, at its best, a public and transparent process, and thus less ea-
sily abused to grab land from smallholders and customary users, a
not uncommon use of sporadic registration.
Systematic land registration is thus a well-established and time-tested
mechanism for formalisation. It has been supported by both multilat-
eral and bilateral donors since the 1950s, notably the World Bank and
USAID. Hundreds of such projects have been implemented, and the
World Bank alone currently has over 25 active projects conducting sys-
tematic land registration, many of which involve elements of property
rights reform (Bruce 2006, Burns 2006). Some are modest local
efforts, for instance registration components in urban development
projects in a national capital, while others are 20-30 year, multi-tranche
behemoths which aim to register all or most land within the country.17
However, concerns have risen about the effectiveness of such
programmes, based on empirical studies going back to the 1960s.
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There are studies that bear out the theoretical connection between land
titling and investment (e.g. Feder, Onchan, Chalamwong & Hongladar-
om 1988, in Thailand, and Alston, Libecap & Schneider 1996, in Bra-
zil), but there are others that report a failure of investment impacts to
materialise. For example, Deininger and Chamorro (2004) found that
registration increases land values but otherwise has little impact on ac-
cess to credit, investment, or productivity. Other studies have also failed
to find expected impacts (most recently, Jacoby & Minten (2005) in Ma-
dagascar). There are a number of broader comparative reviews of evi-
dence of impacts on investment and access to credit by Bruce & Migot-
Adholla (1994) for Africa, by Carter & Olinto (2003) for Latin America,
and, more generally, Feder & Nishio (1996). They suggest that titling
is more likely to be effective where robust financial markets exist and
where there are incentives for investment created by factors such as
proximity to urban markets and good quality land. In their absence,
formalisation may have little impact. Where there are impacts, they
may not be distributed evenly to all land holders. A review by Feder,
Onchan, and Raparia (1988) finds that, where land collateral is per-
mitted and interest rate restrictions are imposed, institutional lenders
prefer land collateral to other forms of security, but the studies they
review also suggest that large-scale farmers with high value land and
more capital are more likely to use this type of collateral than small-
scale farmers. The few studies that explicitly examine impacts on the
poor, such as Carter and Olinto (2003), also suggest that credit and
other benefits may be heavily skewed toward large landholders.
These studies should not be taken as conclusive, one way or the
other. They simply indicate that contextual factors as well as land for-
malisation itself will determine the impacts of the process; the implica-
tion is that the prospects for both positive and negative impacts need
to be examined carefully on a case by case basis before any formalisa-
tion initiative is launched. It should be noted that most of the studies
cited above involve agricultural land, and that we so far have only a few
good impact studies from urban environments. Few would argue with
the proposition that titling and registration increase the market value
of land, since secure, marketable land is going to be worth more than
land held informally. The ‘productivity’ impacts sought in rural impact
studies are less relevant in the urban context, but impacts on mortga-
ging and investment in the land are still critical and deserve empirical
study. One study from Lima suggests that the results of formalisation
may not meet expectations in terms of improved access to formal credit
(Calderon Cockburn 2002). Another study in Lima found that informal
holders once titled had additional time available for productive activ-
ities because they no longer needed to always have one adult present
in the home to defend the plot against land grabbers (Field 2004). And
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a study from Buenos Aires (Galiani & Schargrodsky 2004) found posi-
tive impacts of titling and registration on child health and education.
Studies of urban formalisation will, it seems, make us aware of a wider
range of impacts than those examined in earlier impact studies.
A recent study of impacts of titling in informal urban and peri-urban
areas (Payne, Durand-Lesserve & Rakondi 2008)18 is a first attempt to
synthesise what is known in this area, and also undertook two field
studies, in Senegal and South Africa. The results are mixed, but raise
important questions. The study found that while the informal settlers
studied in both case study countries enjoyed significant de facto secur-
ity of tenure, titling did make household heads feel more empowered
to defend their claims to the land, based on their sense that they could
appeal to an outside authority to defend their right. Titling showed
strong positive security of tenure impacts for women. Titles, and the
anticipation of receiving them, were found to have encouraged
improvement and extensions of housing. No evidence was found that
titling increased the likelihood of beneficiaries receiving credit, primar-
ily because the households feared to risk their prime asset by borrow-
ing against it. The studies found that titling did increase land values,
but warned that households’ incomes remain low and that those house-
holds may not be able to bear increased taxes and rents which may
result from rises in land value.
There are studies, such as Carter and Salgada (2001), that suggest
the poor tend to lose out when their land becomes marketable, and
some authoritative comparative studies have concluded that this is
usually the case (De Janvry et al. 2001). They suggest that the poor will
participate in the formal land market primarily as sellers, rather than
buyers. This is in part due to their difficult access to credit, with or
without a title. From the point of view of the banks, loans to small-
holders are problematic: the amounts are modest, the costs per loan
high, and foreclosure and disposal difficult. A lender will generally pre-
fer that the applicant have a reliable income stream; land security is
welcome, but will not be enough in itself.19
The scenario of poor land users with low, stagnant incomes while
their land rapidly appreciates and charges on land use rise is worri-
some. The danger is that the poor will then be forced to sell their resi-
dential holdings. In theory, they can then buy new residential holdings,
most likely on the urban fringe, but they then lose work opportunities
in the informal sector which the location of their existing residences
make possible.
In addition, concerns have arisen over the sustainability of the sys-
tems of formal land rights created by systematic land registration. The
sustainability of the register is heavily dependent on the voluntary
actions of registered owners to register their transactions and inheri-
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tances. But there is evidence from some countries that many registered
landholders continue to deal with their land as they always have, rely-
ing on customary norms for inheritance and transfers and failing to
register either transactions or successions. Kenya and its major pro-
gramme of systematic titling beginning in the 1960s is the case most
often cited (Okoth-Ogendo 1986, Place & Hazell 1998), but the issue
has also arisen in Uganda (Eisenhauer 1998) and Madagascar (Jacoby
& Minten 2005). It is sometimes suggested that this problem belongs
to older projects, but a recent evaluation of the impacts of a GTZ titling
project in Cambodia (Deutsch 2006) suggests that this failure to regis-
ter is not a thing of the past, and that, in spite of substantial public
education activities under this project, many new titleholders are fail-
ing to register transactions and successions. A variety of factors
contribute to this: lack of understanding of the benefits of keeping a re-
gistration current, social reservations about individualised ownership,
and the costs (not just fees, but transaction taxes, stamp taxes, even
back tax collection) imposed as part of the registration of transac-
tions.20
Key questions that critics of land formalisation now raise, based on
empirical studies spanning half a century, include:
– Are those holding land ‘informally’ really insecure? For example, if
they hold under customary land tenure systems, are those systems
meeting their immediate needs, and is there any felt need for
change?21
– Are there real economic opportunities for formalised right holders?
Appropriate sequencing of development efforts is key. Some titling
projects have been done in deep rural areas, where a farm to mar-
ket road would clearly have been far more immediately useful to re-
sidents.22
– Who loses land rights when land is formalised, especially where the
process is used to implement an individualisation policy? It is not
just ‘the community’, but other individuals as well. Wives, who un-
der custom had a right to land from their husband, may find that
he, as the registered owner, can sell the land out from under them
and their children.23
– Does marketability make landholding more secure? Market failures
and distortions are considerable in developing countries. Economic
desperation sales of land are common; a poor family then loses a
productive asset or a valuable location that it may never be able to
replace.24
– Is there provision for registration of common property, the property
of local communities? Often there is not, and in many cases this re-
sults in commons’ areas either being partitioned among the power-
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ful in the community, or the commons being registered in the
name of the state.25
– Why is it not possible to register customary rights, rather than con-
verting them to private ownership for registration? This is the ap-
proach taken by Ghana’s Land Registration Act of 1989.26
– Does a ‘rule of law’ environment exist? Rights need to be enforce-
able, or are meaningless. If the judiciary is corrupt and there is no
use turning to the courts, what is the point of registering property
rights?27
– Will the new system be sustainable? Often registered landholders
fail to register their subsequent transfers (sales and successions),
and instead revert to informal transfers to avoid fees and other
costs. The register becomes an historical document rather than a
living, reliable record of land rights.28
Are there other options for providing security of tenure? The expense
and slowness of systematic land registration have stimulated experi-
mentation with alternative approaches. Some possibilities that have
been explored:
– Adapt rather than replace customary rights. In Botswana since the
late 1960s, democratically elected District and Sub-District Land
Boards have administered modified customary as well as statutory
land rights (Adams, Kalabamu & White 2003, Quan 2000).
– Register community rights rather than individual rights. The Land
Act in Mozambique and the experience under it provides valuable
insights (Tanner 2002).29
– Design and test simpler, community-based models. Community-
based certification of household land rights in Ethiopia is a much
less expensive model of formalisation than those typically supported
by the donor community (Deininger et al. 2007, Rahmato 2008:
181-228).
– Engage traditional authorities and reform their processes. The mul-
ti-donor Ghana Land Administration Project has created pilot cus-
tomary land secretariats in an attempt to make traditional land ad-
ministration more transparent and accountable (Quan & Green
2005).30
Are there ways to ensure that the poor benefit from systematic land
registration programmes? Typically amelioration focuses on how to
minimise risks of sudden exposure to market forces. More gradual
transitions to private ownership may reduce dangers of loss of land
through distress sales. Some countries, aiming to protect new land-
owners, have imposed moratoria on land sales after individual owner-
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ship is introduced. In Armenia, for example, a three-year moratorium
was enacted when land was privatised and distributed in 1991. In Uk-
raine, a six-year sales moratorium was imposed in 2001. A Kyrgyz mor-
atorium on the sale of agricultural land was put into place when land
was privatised and allocated, but has subsequently been lifted. The
Moldovan Land Code contained a ten-year moratorium on sales that
was declared unconstitutional and lifted in late 1996. Other countries
have attempted to protect new landowners from the danger of mort-
gage foreclosure by setting moratoria on mortgages. The few years of
these moratoria pass quickly, and give smallholders a chance to begin
to appreciate the real value of their land. Such moratoria are more ef-
fective if the time is used for public education on land values and parti-
cipation in land markets (Bledsoe 2006).
This review of problems with systematic title registration and some
of the rethinking currently taking place raises serious questions. How
could they be neglected in the presentation of formalisation in De
Soto’s work, and that of ILD? Why has the simplification implicit in
those formalisation proposals not been more vociferously challenged
by those in the donor community with experience in these areas and
knowledge of the mixed results of empirical impact evaluation studies?
The Embrace of Simple Solutions
The World Bank is currently the international donor agency with a cri-
tical mass of expertise of land tenure. It has funded research which
have produced a number of key studies (e.g. Feder 1988, Bruce &
Migot-Adholla 1994, Binswanger, Deininger & Feder 1995), and the
Bank’s considerable experience in this area is reflected in a recent Pol-
icy Research Paper on Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction
(Deininger 2003). While those outside the Bank often regard the Bank
as a reflexive advocate of market solutions, the Bank understands that
land markets will not, left to themselves, deliver land to poor but effi-
cient producers, and much of the recent work of the World Bank on
negotiated land reform (government funding provided to groups of the
poor to purchase land in the market) reflects that understanding (Dei-
ninger 1999).
When Bank land tenure experts heard that De Soto had discovered
land formalisation, it was a little like American Indians being told that
Columbus had discovered their continent. The Bank’s land tenure
researchers had always lived there. They had for years been studying
the impacts of land formalisation and empirical research sponsored by
the Bank has been important in both establishing the potential of land
registration and in raising many of the concerns about impacts men-
46 JOHN W. BRUCE
tioned above. And yet their response to De Soto’s grand entrance upon
the land formalisation scene was muted. Why were obvious questions
not raised, and raised prominently?
First, those involved in development of land policy in the Bank saw a
potential advantage in De Soto’s advocacy of formalisation. It was new
wind in the sails of an approach that the Bank had favoured for many
years, a process that the Bank saw itself in the process of refining. In
these circumstances, it was not only counterproductive to challenge De
Soto’s assertions, but tempting to repeat them as truisms. This is part
of a larger problem. In the competition for resources for programmes
within donor institutions, it is often necessary for experts to overstate
or oversimplify the case for the programme being advocated. The joke
about an official lamenting he did not have a one-handed economist
(so that he will not be advised ‘On the one hand …, but on the other…)
is not a joke. It reflects reality.
Second, it has been appreciated, even by those who are not im-
pressed by the rigour of De Soto’s work on formalisation, that his pre-
sentation of his case for formalisation is highly effective and engaging.
He brought great credibility to the task from his earlier work on illegal
squatter communities in Lima, showcased in The Other Path, and his
radical advocacy of regularisation of their landholdings. Some elements
of the effectiveness with which he made his case in The Mystery of
Capital are:
1 The historical approach adopted allowed him to make his points by
telling stories. Stories, it is increasingly appreciated, are the way we
best internalise knowledge.
2 His unearthing of formalisation parallels in early American legal
history resonated with American readers.
3 His posing of under-development as a mystery and leading the
reader to a solution intrigues. We all enjoy a good mystery.
4 His solution is a revelation. It was in front of us all the time, De
Soto tells us, in the operations of our land market and banking sys-
tem, but we never saw it until he put his finger on it.
5 His solution is simply stated and powerful: formalisation can re-
lease new value in land and transform it into capital.
This has made The Mystery of Capital a useful tool for engaging devel-
oping country officials on the importance of land law and land admin-
istration reforms.31
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Finally, some very senior officials in the Bank had read The Mystery
of Capital and were enthusiasts, and it was seen as risky and counter-
productive to challenge that enthusiasm. The embrace was sometimes
alarmingly broad: a Bank Vice-President seriously suggested sending
De Soto to Darfur to resolve the land problems there at the height of
the violence, and had to be weaned away from the idea by his staff.32
Conclusion
How in light of all this should we regard land formalisation? De Soto
has made a significant contribution. His work has focused attention on
the link between poverty and informality, and notes a neglected anti-
poverty potential of formalising rapidly-appreciating urban land to
urban squatters. He highlights the increase in land value that accompa-
nies registration, which had not been given sufficient attention in the
earlier, agrarian literature. He identifies formalisation as a means of
legally empowering the poor, and we are in need of effective strategies
to that end. The strategy of ‘vivifying dead capital’, whatever its risks,
addresses directly a fundamental problem of development, that of
creating new domestic capital.
But if his work is motivational, it is also a serious simplification, in
that it ignores a half-century of empirical studies of the highly variable
impacts of land formalisation in different situations. It quite legiti-
mately calls for urgent attention to land policy and land law reform,
but is potentially misleading in that it encourages formalisation initia-
tives that are insufficiently thought-through and may ultimately prove
to be ill-advised.
The appropriate response is to recognise the need for continuing
and independent policy and legal research on different models of
formalisation, both systematic land registration and alternative
approaches. That research must be as empirical and critical whether
assessing new models or old models. The task of developing and pro-
moting models of land formalisation that can be deployed at modest
cost and in a socially sound fashion is a matter of increasing urgency.
Lack of robust legal recognition of rights for the developing world’s
poor has left them profoundly vulnerable to loss of their land as the
world’s demand grows for production of biofuels and food crops, con-
servation and carbon sequestration. It is equally important that it be
engaged, and that where promising models are identified, they are
brought to the attention of policymakers and donor agencies. This
needs to be done effectively, and a lesson should be taken from De
Soto about the value of story-telling in communicating information.
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Notes
1 Wikipedia defines a ‘silver bullet’ as a metaphor for ‘any straightforward solution per-
ceived to have extreme effectiveness’. The metaphor originates in folklore that were-
wolves, otherwise invulnerable, can be killed by bullets made of silver.
2 Institute for Liberty and Democracy (2001a, 2001b, 2005a & 2005b), and Institute
for Liberty and Democracy and Consortium for the Formalization of Haitian Infor-
mal Assets (1998). The Egyptian, Haitian and Tanzanian studies are exhaustive. As
far as the author is aware, there has not been much follow-through on these studies
by governments.
3 The terms ‘land tenure’ and ‘property rights in land’ are used interchangeably here,
as when reform of property rights is called land tenure reform. ‘Tenure’ comes out of
the property terminology of common law and while it originally has a narrower
meaning, dealing with the duration of land rights, it now is used to cover all the
rights and responsibilities involved in a property right (or tenure), such as owner-
ship.
4 For example, see the recent World Bank policy research report on land: Deininger
(2003: 52-55).
5 In the words of John Stuart Mill (1886: 142): ‘When “sacredness of property” is
talked of, it should always be remembered, that any sacredness does not belong in
the same degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original inheri-
tance of the whole species. Its appropriation is wholly a question of general expe-
diency. When private property in land is not expedient, it is unjust.’
6 It is the genius of modern Western systems of land law that they achieve a balance
between private and public interest by such selective regulation, rather diluting the
content of the ownership right itself. In so doing, the incentive effects of property
rights, which are very much a matter of belief and confidence, are preserved in the
public psyche, even while the exercise of those property rights is constrained in im-
portant respects.
7 The Anglo-American Common Law concept of ‘prescription’ and the American legal
concept of ‘pre-emption’ both allow ratification of long and open possession of the
land of another, the former simply transferring it to the occupant, the latter creating
a right for the occupant to purchase it from the owner. Both reflect a policy of ‘use it
or lose it’. De Soto (2000: 128-129) discusses pre-emption on the early American
frontier as an exemplary instance of formalisation.
8 The evolution and manipulation of those systems during the colonial period is well
documented (Manners 1964, Colson 1971, Chanock 1991), and there has been a
long-running debate about whether such systems should be suppressed/replaced or
recognised/reformed. (e.g. Johnson 1972, Ault & Rutman 1979, Migot-Adholla, Ha-
zell, Blarel & Place 1991, Bruce 1993, and Bruce & Migot-Adholla 1994).
9 Taking this tack, Table 2.1 in De Soto (2000: 36) badly overstates the extent of land-
holding in the developing world which should be characterised as ‘informal’. The dis-
tinction is important because reform of these systems poses special problems, includ-
ing working on the front line of competition for power between traditional and civil
authorities.
10 The systematic land registration programme begun in Kenya in the last years of the
colonial dispensation but adopted by post-independence governments has produced a
large, remarkable and largely critical literature. See Coldham (1978), Shipton (1988),
Migot-Adholla et al. (1993) and, in a somewhat more positive vein, Hunt (2005).
11 A later edition of The Other Path is sub-titled ‘the economic answer to terrorism’, and
contains a substantial new forward by the author, dated 2002, developing the argu-
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ment that ILD’s formalisation contributed significantly to the defeat of the Shining
Path guerillas in Peru.
12 Dickerman (1987) provides annotations for over 500 publications on land formalisa-
tion in Africa, and Knox (2007) has annotated over 100 relatively recent empirical
studies of the economic impacts of land formalisation.
13 De Soto cites the ‘Torrens System’ as an example of breakthrough law reform (2000:
200). Title registration was developed as an alternative to an older system of records
of rights in land, known as deed registration. That system allowed those engaging in
transfers of land to record the deed of grant, transfer of deed, inheritance or other
source of right in a public office where it is publicly accessible, but without any affir-
mation of the validity of those documents by the state. For a review of these systems
see Simpson (1967) and Dale & McLaughlin (1999).
14 For this reason the system is sometimes referred to as ‘land registration’ rather than
‘title registration’; the former term emphasises the organisation of the register by par-
cels of land, while the latter emphasises the legal conclusiveness of registration un-
der this system.
15 In sporadic titling, the applicant needs to bear the actual costs, notably survey costs,
which can be considerable.
16 Systematic registration is used only for initial registration, and whether initial regis-
tration is systematic or sporadic, the registration of subsequent transactions is spora-
dic, on application.
17 In first registration under systematic title registration, it is important that the time
necessary to do the work well be taken. Registration legally validates the titles placed
on the register, effectively cutting off other claims, pains should be taken to ensure it
is done well. Attempts to measure success in systematic land registration pro-
grammes in terms of low costs per hectare or parcel are, from this angle, misguided.
18 The comparative study was supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
SIDA, and UN-Habitat, and included two case studies, from Senegal and South Afri-
ca. A summary has been published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Payne, Durand-Lesserve & Rakondi 2007), and the literature review on which the
synthesis is based is available as well (Durand-Lesserve, Fernandez, Payne & Rakondi
2007).
19 This helps explain a conundrum that had puzzled economists: since Berry and Cline
(1979) it has been broadly acknowledged that smallholders are generally quite effi-
cient land users, but they have difficulty obtaining land in land markets, which are
supposed to move land to efficient users. Why is this? Credit market imperfections
are at least part of the answer (Binswanager et al. 1995). World Bank economists
now accept that, for land markets to move land to the poor, targeted credit must be
provided; hence a new generation of Bank projects focused on market-mechanism
land reform, in which loans are provided to landless groups which allow them to pur-
chase large parcels on the market, for later subdivision (Deininger 2004).
20 Some factors have been identified that discourage registrations, and best practice is
to avoid them. They include: 1) organisational arrangements that involve multiple vis-
its to multiple offices to register transactions; 2) highly centralised systems where tra-
vel to the land registry, sometimes in the national capital, is required to register a
transaction; 3) taxes imposed (in addition to reasonable fees for services) through the
registry system; and 4) attempts to enforce land use restrictions (such as limits on
subdivision among heirs) through the registry system (Bruce 2007).
21 Cousins et al. (2005) explain why they consider formalisation an inappropriate ap-
proach to land tenure in South Africa’s communal areas. Bruce and Migot-Adholla
(1994) stress the need for correct sequencing of land registration initiatives in rela-
tion to other economic developments, arguing that premature registration fails to de-
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liver promised benefits but at the same disrupts local social relations reflected in ex-
isting tenure arrangements.
22 Many of the early registration pilot efforts were carried out in deep rural areas, rather
than the higher-value urban and peri-urban land where greater impacts from the ac-
tivity might have been expected.
23 There is a valuable comparative study of gendered impacts of land registration in
Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Laos, and Ghana (World Bank 2005).
24 This emerged as an important problem in the Kenyan land registration (Okoth-Ogen-
do 1986, Shipton 1988), and is a concern of those examining the impact of land mar-
kets on the poor (De Janvry 2001).
25 Tanzania has recognised the right of thousands of villages to manage local natural re-
sources, in a national programme intended to promote better NRM; it is a case of a
broader trend toward decentralisation of control over land in developing countries
(Alden Wily 2003).
26 In practice, registration of customary rights can be difficult, because however clear
the legal position may be, the content of those rights may be contested on the ground
by powerful interests. For an exceptionally searching study of the role of chiefs re-
garding land in peri-urban Ghana, see Ubink (2008). More generally, see Toulmin &
Quan (2000).
27 The enforceability of legal rights is the crucial unarticulated premise for most eco-
nomic reasoning on the impact of property rights and formality. Enforceability is, in
fact, often not present. The courts may be ineffective or corrupt, or the justice system
may be hopelessly complex, its processes arcane and time-consuming.
28 In Laos, a multi-donor funded programme of land registration has been unable to
find a legal basis for registering land to local government entities. It is not uncom-
mon to find that the ‘village’ has no legal identity in national law. In such cases, the
village pasture or the village soccer field ends up registered in the name of the ‘state’
(Bruce et al. 2007: 35).
29 Popular demand for land registration often comes primarily from the concern in lo-
cal communities that if they do not register their land, the government will give it to
someone else. This is ‘defensive’ titling, and its objectives can be accomplished by re-
gistering the community as the owner of its land, a process simpler and less costly
than surveying and registering all individual claims. The Mozambique model seeks
to address a key problem: how to preserve household and individual rights within
community ownership, avoiding reducing community members to community
tenants (Tanner 2002, 2006).
30 The intention of this project component, supported by DFID, is to reduce chiefs’ land
dispositions to writing, to ensure their preservation in a local registry, to make them
more effective proof, and at the same time to make chiefs more accountable for their
actions (Quan & Green 2005).
31 One Bank country economist reported to the author: ‘I give copies of the Bank’s poli-
cies on land and development to the Minister, and never got a reaction. I give him a
copy of The Mystery of Capital and a few days later he had read it and wanted to talk
about it.’
32 In USAID, the major funders of De Soto’s ILD, the sense that De Soto has the ear of
presidents and congressmen has dictated that any questioning of his ideas be ap-
proached with considerable delicacy, or not at all.
SIMPLE SOLUTIONS TO COMPLEX PROBLEMS 51
Bibliography
Adams, M., F. Kalabamu & R. White (2003), ‘Land tenure policy and practice in Botswana –
governance lessons for Southern Africa’, Journal fu¨r Entwicklungspolitik (Austrian Journal
of Development Studies) XIX (1): 55-74.
Alden Wily, L. (2003), Governance and Land Relations: A Review of Decentralization of Land
Administration and Management in Africa. London: IIED.
Alston, L., G. Libecap & R. Schneider (1996), ‘The determinants and impact of property
rights: Land titles on the Brazilian frontier’, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 12
(1): 25-61.
Atwood, D. (1990), ‘Land registration in Africa: the impact on agricultural production’, World
Development 18(5): 659-671.
Binswanger, H., K. Deininger & G. Feder (1995) ‘Power, distortion, revolt, and reform in
agricultural land relations’, in Behrman, J. & T.N. Srinivasan (eds.), Handbook of develop-
ment economics, Vol. 3, 2659-2772. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Bledsoe, D. (2006), ‘Can land titling and registration reduce poverty?’ in Bruce, J. et al.
(eds.) Land law reform: achieving development policy objectives, 143-174. Washington DC,
Legal VPU, The World Bank.
Bruce, J. (1993), ‘Do indigenous tenure systems constrain agricultural development?’ in Bas-
sett, T.J. & D. E. Crummey (eds.), Land in African agrarian systems. Madison WI: Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Press: 35-56.
Bruce, J. (2004a), ‘Comparing individual and communal ownership’ in Roth, M. et al. (eds.),
National Land Tenure Conference: Finding solutions, securing rights. Pietermaritzburg, SA:
LexisNexis/Butterworths: Department of Land Affairs and Land Tenure Center, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Madison: 127-137.
Bruce, J. (2004b), ‘Strengthening property rights for the poor’, in Meinzen-Dick, R.S. & M.
Di Gregorio (eds.), Collective action and property rights in sustainable development. Wa-
shington DC: CAPRI/IFPRI.
Bruce, J. (2006), ‘Reform of land law in the context of World Bank lending’, in Bruce, J. et
al., Land law reform: Achieving development policy objectives. Washington DC: Legal Vice-
Presidency, World Bank: 11-65.
Bruce, J. & A. Knox (2009), ’Structures and Stratagems: Decentralization of Authority over
Land in Africa’, World Development (Special Issue on the Limits of State-Led Land Re-
form) 37(8): 1360-1369.
Bruce, J. et al. (2007), Land and business formalization for legal empowerment of the poor; strate-
gic overview paper. Washington DC: ARD for USAID.
Bruce, J. & S. Migot-Adholla (eds.) (1994), Searching for land tenure security in Africa. Dubu-
que IA: Kendall/Hunt.
Burns, T. (2007), ‘Land Administration Reform: Indicators of Success and Future Chal-
lenges’. Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 37. Washington DC: The
World Bank.
Calderon Cockburn, J. (2002), ‘The mystery of credit’. Land Lines 14(2). Cambridge MA; Lin-
coln Institute for Land Policy.
Carter, M. & P. Olinto (2003), ‘Getting institutions right for whom? Credit constraints and
the impact of property rights on the quantity and composition of investment’, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 85 (1): 173-186.
Carter, M. & E. Zegarra (2000), ‘Land markets and the persistence of rural poverty: post-lib-
eralization policy options’, in Lopez, R. & A. Valdez (eds.), Rural poverty in Latin America.
NY, NY: Palgrave MacMillan Press.
Chanock, M. (1991), ‘Paradigms, policies, and property: a review of the customary law in
land tenure’, in Manners, K. & R. Roberts (eds.), Law in Colonial Africa, 61-84. Ports-
mouth NH: Heinemann Educational Books.
52 JOHN W. BRUCE
Coldham, S. (1978), ‘The effect of registration of title upon customary land rights in Kenya’,
Journal of African Law 22(2): 91.
Colson, E. (1971), ‘The impact of the colonial period on the definition of land rights’, in Pro-
files in change: African society and colonial rule, Vol. 3 of Gann, L. & P. Duignan (eds.), Co-
lonialism in Africa: 1870-1960, 193-215. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008a), Making the law work for everyone.
Volume I. Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. New York: Com-
mission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor & UNDP.
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008b), Making the law work for everyone.
Volume II. Working group reports. New York: Commission on Legal Empowerment of the
Poor & UNDP.
Cotula, L. (ed.) (2007), ‘Changes in “customary” land tenure systems in Africa’. London:
Russell Press for IIED/FAO.
Cotula, L., C. Toulmin & C. Hesse (2004), Land Tenure and Administration in Africa: Lessons
of Experience and Emerging Issues. London: IIED.
Cousins, B. et al. (2005), Will formalizing property rights reduce poverty in South Africa’s ‘second
economy’? Questioning the mythologies of Hernando de Soto. PLAAS Policy Brief No. 18.
October 2005. Capetown: Program for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of Wes-
tern Cape.
Currie, J.M. (1981), The economic theory of agricultural land tenure. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Dale, P. & J. McLaughlin (1999), Land administration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
De Janvry, A. et al. (2001), Access to land, rural poverty and public action. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
De Soto, H. (1989), The Other Path. New York: Basic Books.
De Soto, H. (2002), The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books.
Deininger, K. (2003), Land policies for growth and poverty reduction. Washington DC: World
Bank and Johns Hopkins University Press.
Deininger K. & J. Chamorro (2004), ‘Investment and equity effects of land regularization:
The case of Nicaragua. Agricultural Economics 30(2): 101–116.
Deininger, K. et al. (2007), ‘Rural land certification in Ethiopia: Process, initial impact, and
implications for other African countries’. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
4218. Washington DC: World Bank.
Demsetz, H. (1967), ‘Toward a theory of property rights’, American Economic Review 57: 347.
Deutsch, R. (2006), ‘Beneficiary assessment of land title recipients under the Land Manage-
ment and Administration Project’. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Land Management, Urban
Planning and Construction and GTZ.
Dickerman, C. (1987), ‘Security of tenure and land registration in Africa: Literature and
synthesis.’ Land Tenure Center Paper 137. Madison (WI): Land Tenure Center, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Madison.
Durand-Lesserve, A. et al. (2007), ‘Social and economic impacts of land titling programmes
in urban and peri-urban areas; a review of the literature’. http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/re-
search/pdfs/Desk_review_21Mar07.
Englebert, P. (2006), ‘Patterns and theories of traditional resurgence in tropical Africa’, Mon-
des en De´veloppement 30 (118): 51-64.
Feder, G. & D. Feeny (1991), ‘Land tenure and property rights: theory and implications for
development policy’, World Bank Economic Review 5(1): 135.
Feder, G. & A. Nishio (1999), ‘The benefits of land registration and titling: economic and so-
cial perspectives’, Land Use Policy 15(1): 25.
Feder, G. et al. (1988), Land policies and farm productivity in Thailand. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press.
SIMPLE SOLUTIONS TO COMPLEX PROBLEMS 53
Field, E. (2004), ‘Property rights, community public goods, and household time allocation in
urban squatter communities: Evidence from Peru’. William and Mary Law Review 45(3):
838-887.
Fitzpatrick, D. (2005), ‘“Best practice” options for the legal recognition of customary tenure’.
Development and Change 36(4): 449-475.
Galiani, S. & E. Schargrodsky (2004), ‘Effects of land titling on child health and education’.
Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Jacoby, H. & B. Minten (2005), ‘Land titles, investment and agricultural productivity in Ma-
dagascar’. Mimeo, Tananarive: World Bank.
Joireman, S. (2008), ‘The mystery of capital formation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Women, prop-
erty rights and customary law’, World Development 36 (7): 1233-1246.
Kanji, N. et al. (2005), ‘Can land registration serve poor and marginalised groups? Summary
report.’ Securing land rights in Africa. Research report 3. London: IIED.
Knox, A. (2007), ‘Annex 7. Annotated bibliography on formalization’, in Bruce, J. et al., Land
and business formalization in legal empowerment of the poor. Washington DC: ARD for
USAID. Available only in the electronic version on the ARD firm website: http://www.
ardinc.com/upload/photos/677Land_and_Business_Formalization_Strategic_Overview_-
Paper_FINAL_with_Annexes.pdf.
Hunt, D. (2005), ‘Some outstanding issues in the debate on external promotion of land pri-
vatization’, Development Policy Review 23(2): 199-231.
Institute for Liberty and Democracy (2001a), ‘Honduras: Country diagnostic report’. Lima,
Peru: ILD.
Institute for Liberty and Democracy (2001b), ‘Executive summary: The capitalization of the
poor and middle-class in Mexico’. Lima, Peru: ILD.
Institute for Liberty and Democracy (2005a), ‘Executive summary. The extra-legal economy
where the majority of Egyptians live and work: What the government of Egypt can do to
integrate them into the mainstream economy and substantially reduce poverty and in-
crease economic development’. Lima, Peru: ILD.
Institute for Liberty and Democracy (2005b), ‘Executive summary. Program to formalize the
assets of the poor of Tanzania and strengthen the rule of law’. Lima, Peru: ILD.
Institute for Liberty and Democracy and the Consortium for the Formalization of Haitian In-
formal Assets (1998), ‘Urban real estate formalization program in Haiti. Summary re-
port and volumes I-IX’. Lima, Peru. ILD.
Lavigne Delville, P. (2000), ‘Harmonising formal law and customary land rights in French-
speaking Africa’ in Toulmin, C. & J. Quan (eds.), Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in
Africa. London: DFID/IIED/NRI: 97-122.
Manners, R. (1964), ‘Colonialism and native land tenure: A case study of ordained accom-
modation’, in Manners, R. (ed.) Process and patterns in culture: Essays in Honor of Julian
H. Stewart. Chicago: Aldine.
Migot-Adholla, S., F. Place & W. Oluoch-Kosura (1993), ‘Security of tenure and land produc-
tivity in Kenya’ in John W. Bruce & Shem Migot-Adholla (eds.), Searching for land tenure
security in Africa, 119-140. Dubuque IA: Kendall-Hunt.
Migot-Adholla, S. et al. (1991), ‘Indigenous land rights systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A
constraint on productivity?’, The World Bank Economic Review 5(11):155-175.
Mill, J.S. (1886), Principles of political economy. London.
Moore, S. F. (1986), Social facts and fabrications:‘customary’ law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Okoth-Ogendo, H. (1986), ‘The perils of land tenure reform: The case of Kenya’ in Artzen,
J., L. Ngcongco, and S. Turner (eds.), Land policy and agriculture in Eastern and Southern
Africa. Tokyo: U.N. University: 79-92.
54 JOHN W. BRUCE
Payne, G., A. Durand-Lasserve & C. Rakodi (2007), ’Urban land titling programmes’, in
Brother, M.E. and J.A. Solberg (eds.) Legal Empowerment – A Way out of Poverty, Norwe-
gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, Issue 3: 11-41.
Payne, G., A. Durand-Lesserve & C. Rakondi (2008), ‘Social and economic impacts of land
titling programmes in urban and peri-urban areas; international experience and case
studies of Senegal and South Africa’. pdfhttp://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/research/pdfs/
Synthesis_report_04Apr08.pdf
Platteau, J-P. (1996), ‘The evolutionary theory of land rights as applied to Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca: a critical assessment’, Development and Change 27(1): 29-86.
Platteau, J-P. (2000), ‘Does Africa Need Land Reform?’, in Toulmin, C. & J. Quan (eds.),
Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa. London: DFID/IIED/NRI: 51-74.
Quan, J. (2000), ‘Land boards as a mechanism for the management of land rights in South-
ern Africa’, in Toulmin, C. & J. Quan (eds.), Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Afri-
ca. London: DFID/IIED/NRI: 197-206.
Quan, J., & T. Green (2005), ‘DFID Ghana framework agreement for support to LAP, mobili-
zation/inception visit report, 9-19 August 2005’.
Rahmato, D. (2008), The peasant and the state: studies in agrarian change in Ethiopia 1950s-
2000s. Addis Ababa: Custom Books.
Sjaastad, E. and D. Bromley (2000), ‘The prejudices of property rights: on individualism,
specificity, and security in property regimes’, Development Policy Review 18(4): 365-89.
Seidman, R. (1978), State, law and development. London: Croom-Helm.
Shipton, P. (1988), ‘The Kenyan land tenure reform: misunderstandings in the public crea-
tion of private property’, in Downs, R. & S. Reyna (eds.), Land and society in contemporary
Africa. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England: 91-135.
Simpson, S. (1967), Land law and registration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tanner, C. (2002), Law-making in an African context: the 1997 Mozambican Land Law. FAO
Legal Paper. Rome: FAO.
Tanner, C. (2006), ‘Implementing the Mozambican Land Law in Practice’. Paper presented
to the International Conference on Changing Politics of Land in Africa: Domestic Poli-
cies, Crisis Management, and Regional Norms. University of Pretoria, 28-29 November
2005.
Toulmin, C. and J. Quan (2000) ‘Registering customary rights’, in Toulmin, C. & J. Quan
(eds.), Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa. London: DFID/IIED/NRI: 207-228.
Ubink, J. (2008), In the land of the chiefs; customary law, land conflicts, and the role of the state
in peri-urban Ghana. Leiden: Leiden University Press.
World Bank (2005), ‘Gender issues and best practices in land administration projects; a
synthesis report’. Washington DC: World Bank.
SIMPLE SOLUTIONS TO COMPLEX PROBLEMS 55

3 Securing Land Rights in Africa – Trends in
National and International Law
Lorenzo Cotula
Introduction
Land is central to the livelihoods, culture and identity of millions of
people across rural Africa. Rural livelihoods crucially depend on this re-
source. Control over land is often central to national and local political
power. Land may also provide the basis for social identity and mobilisa-
tion, and for a collective sense of justice.
Although land tenure reform has been on the agenda for a long
time, recent developments in economies and societies have made it an
even more pressing issue. In many parts of Africa, demographic
growth has increased population density and competition for valuable
land. Urban settlements are growing fast, encroaching on agricultural
land, attracting youths from rural areas, and fostering demand for food
– which in turn boosts agricultural intensification. These processes
promote change in local (‘customary’ but continually evolving) land
tenure systems, namely towards greater individualisation and commer-
cialisation of land relations. As ‘custom’ is reinvented and manipulated,
weaker groups are losing out.
Globalisation is also having impacts on local land relations. Trade
liberalisation makes local production systems more integrated into the
global economy, with export crops expanding into areas previously used
for locally consumed products. In many places, pressure on the land is
growing as a result of increasing investments in petroleum, mining
and agribusiness for food, fuel and other agricultural commodities.
These investments translate into growing areas of land – often those
with greater irrigation potential or proximity to markets – being allo-
cated to large-scale investors.
Public policy to secure and regulate land rights is therefore more
needed than ever. This chapter outlines some of the main trends in
national policy and legislation. In discussing national trends, emphasis
is on innovative developments, while acknowledging that promising
policy or law reforms do not necessarily translate into positive out-
comes on the ground. Given the very broad scope and great diversity
within and between countries, much valuable detail has inevitably been
passed over. The main focus is on rural land, although it is recognised
that rural and urban land access issues cannot be separated.
The next section provides a brief overview of trends in land tenure
in sub-Saharan Africa. Section three discusses recent developments for
a few particularly important issues concerning land rights in Africa:
approaches for recognising and recording local land rights, gender, pas-
toral land rights, large-scale land acquisitions, and use of international
bodies to protect land rights. The conclusion (the fourth section) pro-
vides a few final remarks.
Land Tenure in Africa – A Bird’s Eye View
Land policy and legislation in sub-Saharan Africa are influenced by his-
torical legacies rooted in the colonial system and in post-independence
political choices. On paper, central states tend to claim a significant
degree of control over much of rural land. After independence (but fol-
lowing a colonial pattern), most African governments nationalised or
otherwise took control over land. This was to promote agricultural
development on the one hand, and to seize control of a valuable asset
and a source of political power on the other.
For instance, all land is owned by the state in Mozambique (under
the 1975, 1990 and 2004 Constitutions and the Land Act 1997), Niger-
ia (where the Land Use Act 1978 vests land ownership with the gover-
nor of each federated state) and Tanzania (under the Land Act 1999
and the Village Land Act 1999). In some countries, nationalisation ex-
cluded the (usually little) land held under private ownership. In Sene-
gal, Law 64-46 of 1964 vests all untitled land in a domaine national
held by the state. Similar arrangements exist for instance in Chad and
Mali.
Other countries have enabled or even promoted private property to a
greater extent. Kenya, for instance, has long had a land titling pro-
gramme to register private property, converting customary land rights
into freehold. In Ghana, part of the land is owned by the state but most
of it belongs to private entities such as customary chiefdoms, extended
families and individuals.1 In the 1990s, political democratisation and
economic liberalisation have brought about law reforms introducing or
strengthening protection of private land ownership in several countries
that had previously nationalised land – for instance in Burkina Faso,
where legislation on Re´organisation Agraire et Foncie`re was revised to
that effect in 1991 and 1996 and a more recent law was passed in
2009.
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However, in most cases, the state remains the key player in land
relations. With a few country exceptions, private land ownership tends
not to be widespread even where it is formally recognised – particularly
in rural areas. The World Bank estimated that, across Africa, only
between 2 and 10 percent of the land is held under formal land tenure;
this mainly concerns urban land (Deininger 2003). Even where private
ownership exists in practice as well as in the law, state institutions may
retain important powers – for instance, through legislation requiring
government approval for land transfers – although more recent legisla-
tion tends to allow and/or promote various forms of land transfers.
With much control over land vested in the state and with limited
spread of private ownership, most groups and individuals in much of
rural Africa enjoy various types of land use rights. On land owned or
held by the state, resource users may enjoy use rights so long as they
put land to productive use, for instance under mise en valeur require-
ments found in the legislation of much of Francophone Africa (e.g.
Cameroon, Chad, Mali and Senegal). Outside Francophone Africa,
similar land use requirements are found for instance in Tanzania’s Vil-
lage Land Act 1999 (section 29). In these cases, land management in-
stitutions may be mandated to monitor productive use, and to reallo-
cate land to third parties in case of non-use. Where land use rights are
withdrawn, compensation is paid for loss of ‘improvements’ (crops,
buildings) but often not for loss of land rights as such (e.g. under the
laws of Cameroon and Senegal).
This legal regime, coupled with lack of clear legal definition of what
constitutes ‘productive use’ and with the ensuing broad discretion of
government officials responsible for monitoring fulfilment of this re-
quirement, may open the door to abuse on the part of the government
officials, and undermines the security of local land rights. This is parti-
cularly so for those groups whose resource use is often not considered
as ‘productive enough’ due to widespread (mis)perceptions, such as
pastoralists (Hesse & The´baud 2006).
In much of rural Africa, lack of financial resources and institutional
capacity in government agencies, lack of legal awareness and, often,
lack of perceived legitimacy of official rules and institutions all contrib-
ute to limiting the outreach of state legislation in the areas of property
rights and resource tenure. On the ground, much of the rural popula-
tion continues to access land through local tenure systems. These sys-
tems are based on (usually unwritten) rules founding their legitimacy
on ‘tradition’, as shaped both by practices over time and by systems of
belief. Because of this, they are usually described as ‘customary’ – and
for easier reading I follow this terminology. In reality, local tenure sys-
tems have profoundly changed as a result of cultural interactions,
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population pressures, socio-economic change and political processes
(Chanock 1985, Mamdani 1996, Cotula with Neves 2007).
According to the dominant if somewhat stereotyped view of custom-
ary resource tenure systems in Africa, land is usually held by clans or
families on the basis of diverse blends of group to individual rights,
accessed on the basis of group membership and social status, and used
through complex systems of multiple rights. In reality, customary
resource tenure systems vary considerably depending on the context.
Important differences exist, for instance, between pastoral and farming
contexts, and between patrilineal and (in Africa more rare) matrilineal
systems.
In farming contexts, for instance, customary systems usually entail
collective landholding and the allocation of farming rights over specific
plots by the land management authority (e.g. a ‘chief’) to smaller fa-
mily units. The nature of these smaller units and of the farming rights
they hold vary considerably from place to place. In many cases, farm-
ing rights are conditional upon the continued use of the plot. And,
while such rights are often inheritable, restrictions usually exist on
sales (especially to outsiders), although certain transactions may be al-
lowed (gifts, loans, etc.) and some systems do allow land sales.
The insecurity of local land rights may be rooted in the weak legal
protection of these customary resource rights – which are the entitle-
ments through which most rural dwellers gain access to resources.
While in the eyes of local groups customary rights may be real and le-
gitimate, these rights tend to enjoy little legal protection. In Burkina
Faso, for instance, legislation passed in the 1980s to nationalise land
abolished customary rights – though more recent legislation has taken
steps to protect them. In Kenya, the above-mentioned land registration
process entailed the conversion of customary land rights into freehold.
Underpinning these various legislative efforts was a design to abolish
systems perceived as ‘backward’ and exploitative, and to establish ‘mod-
ern’ systems of property rights that could provide a basis for economic
development. In practice, however, these attempts have had little
impact on the ground, and customary arrangements remain the main
mechanism through which most of the rural population gains access
to land.2
On the other hand, some countries have long protected customary
rights, mainly as a result of historical legacies. In Ghana, colonial
attempts to suppress customary rights and vest ‘waste’ land with the
Crown (particularly with the 1910 Land Rights Bill) were successfully
resisted by customary chiefs and other interest groups. The colonial
administration subsequently changed tactics, working to strengthen
the customary land rights of chiefs and use them as an instrument for
indirect rule in rural areas (Amanor 2005). Today, Article 11 of Ghana’s
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1992 Constitution specifically recognises customary law among the
sources of law, while Article 267 regulates the role of customary chiefs
in land administration.
Several other countries have recently taken steps to strengthen the
protection of customary rights – even where land is state-owned or
vested with the state in trust for the nation. Customary rights are for
instance protected under Mali’s Land Code 2000, Mozambique’s Land
Act 1997, Namibia’s Communal Land Reform Act 2002, Tanzania’s
Land Act and Village Land Act 1999 and Uganda’s Land Act 1998. In
Mali, while post-independence legislation abrogated customary rights,
the Land Codes (Codes Domanial et Foncier) of 1986 and 2000 (as
amended in 2002) legally recognise customary land rights and grant
them (some degree of) legal protection (Articles 43-48). Mozambique’s
Land Act 1997 reaffirms the principle of state ownership over land but
protects ‘rights of use and benefit’ (DUAT in Portuguese), which are
acquired either on the basis of customary law or through good-faith
occupation for at least ten years (Article 12). Under Namibia’s Commu-
nal Land Reform Act 2002, customary land rights on ‘communal land’
are legally protected (Article 19(a)). Tanzania’s Village Land Act 1999
states that customary rights of occupancy have ‘equal status and effects’
to statutory rights (section 18(1)). This legislation follows the landmark
case Attorney General v. Akonaay, Lohar and Another, in which the Tan-
zanian Court of Appeal held that customary land rights are ‘real prop-
erty’ protected by Article 24 of the Tanzanian Constitution (on the right
to property), and as such entail payment of ‘fair’ compensation in case
of expropriation.3 In Uganda, while the Land Reform Decree of 1975
made customary landholders tenants at will of the state (McAuslan
2000), the 1995 Constitution and the 1998 Land Act, as amended, pro-
tect customary land rights.
However, even where customary rights are legally protected, such re-
cognition may be limited or qualified. In Mali, for instance the Land
Code 2000 devotes only a few provisions to customary rights (Articles
43-48), while most provisions are devoted to private ownership and
other legal concepts of European origin. This contrasts with the very
limited land area held under private ownership and with the fact that
customary rights are the main form of land access in rural areas (Djire´
2007). Article 43 of the Code merely states that individual or collective
customary rights are ‘confirmed’, and that customary right holders can
only be deprived of their rights for a public purpose and against pay-
ment of fair compensation. The procedure for land expropriation ap-
plies, with some exceptions, to the taking (purge) of customary rights
(Article 47). Customary rights may be recorded (constate´s), following a
procedure specified by the law, although this provision has had no
practical application.4 However, formal registration of customary rights
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and their conversion into private ownership can only occur if there is
‘permanent and evident’ use of the land, for instance through a build-
ing or regular cultivation (Article 47).
In addition, the implementation of legislation strengthening custom-
ary land rights may not be assisted by the strong political will required
for such legislation to have an impact on the ground. In some cases,
governments supported the adoption of legislation on customary rights
under pressure from government agencies or civil society movements
but have focused implementation efforts on other issues, such as pro-
moting land access for larger operators perceived to be more productive
and efficient – or simply more closely linked to political elites.
In Mozambique, for example, recent changes to key aspects of the
land legislation suggest that the political commitment to implementing
the legal provisions that protect local land rights is faltering. A 2007
amendment to Article 35 of the Land Regulation 1998, coupled with a
subsequent change in its administrative interpretation, have made it
more difficult for new community land delimitations to go through:
delimitations now require a land use plan and must be approved by
the Minister for Agriculture (if over 1,000 hectares) or the Council of
Ministers (if over 10,000 hectares). As ‘local communities’ can include
thousands of people, it is quite common for delimitations to fall within
the responsibility of the central government. In addition, the regulatory
and interpretive change requires communities to show that they can
use the land productively. However, new regulations adopted in 2010
following national dialogue reversed the 2007 reforms and this issue
now seems to have been solved.
Some Key Land Tenure Issues – Recent Developments
Recognising and Recording Local Land Rights
Efforts to improve land tenure security have traditionally emphasised
large-scale individual titling and registration programmes. Individual
titles, a long-standing argument runs, would increase the willingness
and ability of landholders to invest, by removing disincentives (as land-
holders would not invest in the land unless they can be reasonably con-
fident that they will not be deprived of it) and by improving access to
credit (as titles can be used as collateral). On the basis of these argu-
ments, titling and registration programmes have been implemented
over the past decades in many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America.
In Asia and Latin America there has been some success with titling
and registration. In Thailand, land titles are reported to have led to
higher land values, greater agricultural investment and higher produc-
tivity (Feder et al. 1988, Deininger 2003). Increases in land values and
62 LORENZO COTULA
agricultural investment following registration have also been reported
in Nicaragua, Ecuador and Venezuela (Deininger 2003). But in Africa,
registration programmes have proved slow, expensive, difficult to keep
up-to-date and hard for poor people to access. As a result, very little
rural land has been registered (Deininger 2003). Where titling and
registration have been implemented, greater agricultural investment
has not necessarily materialised. High monetary, transaction and other
costs discouraged registration of land transfers, thus making land reg-
isters outdated and undermining their ability to secure land rights. Re-
gistration may not be enough to improve farmers’ access to credit
where high transaction and other costs hinder credit supply in rural
areas and where an unpredictable and fluctuating environment makes
farmers risk-averse and hence reluctant to apply for loans. Also, many
registration programmes had negative distributive effects, as those with
more contacts, information and resources were able to register land in
their names, to the detriment of poorer claimants (for example, in Ken-
ya’s long-standing registration programme). Where there are signifi-
cant costs to registration, in both cash and time, smallholders are parti-
cularly vulnerable to losing their rights over land. Moreover, registra-
tion tends to penalise holders of secondary land rights, such as women
and herders, as these rights often do not appear in the land register
and are thus effectively expropriated (Atwood 1990, Migot-Adholla &
Bruce 1994, Firmin-Sellers & Sellers 1999, Platteau 2000).
As experience and understanding of land registration has developed,
more nuanced and appropriate approaches have emerged. There is
now greater recognition that land laws must build on local concepts
and practice, rather than importing one-size-fits-all models. This
entails, among other things, legally recognising local land rights, which
are the entitlements through which most people gain access to rural
land. Land registration is now seen as a useful component of a broader
and more sophisticated tenure security strategy, for example to deal
with contexts where customary systems have collapsed, where land dis-
putes are widespread, and in areas of high-value land and newly settled
areas.
As a result of this shift in thinking, some recent land laws present
important innovations compared to their predecessors. As discussed
above, several countries have made explicit efforts to protect customary
land rights and include them in land records – for instance under
Uganda’s Land Act 1998, Mozambique’s Land Act 1997, Tanzania’s
Land Act and Village Land Act 1999, and Niger’s Rural Code 1993.
Use or lease rights over state-owned land may also be recorded and en-
joy varying degrees of protection in countries like Ethiopia and Mozam-
bique. Recognising the practical difficulties of documenting land rights
across the national territory, Mozambique’s Land Act formally protects
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customary rights regardless of whether they have been registered or
not (Articles 13(2) and 14(2)); however, in practice lack of registration
does make land rights more insecure, and development agencies and
NGOs have been helping local groups register their collective landhold-
ings (Chilundo et al. 2005, Norfolk and Tanner 2007).
Simple, low-cost and accessible forms of land records have been
introduced in several countries, for instance through systematic land
registration programmes in the Ethiopian states of Amhara and Tigray
(Adenew and Abdi 2005, and Haile et al. 2005, respectively), through
the plan foncier rural in Benin (Chauveau 2004, Le Meur 2006) and
through the guichet foncier in Madagascar (Teyssier 2010). In Madagas-
car, for example, the 2005 Land Policy and Law No. 019 of 2005 pro-
tect rights over untitled land and enable landholders to obtain certifi-
cates from land offices established at the municipal level. The proce-
dure is significantly more accessible than the formal titling system
administered by the central state, with average unit costs of about E 10
(instead of E 370) and an average lead time of six months (instead of
six years; Teyssier 2010).
As for the right holder, several recent titling programmes have is-
sued titles not only to individuals but also to families and local commu-
nities. For example, Amhara’s land registration programme features
joint titling for couples, though this is not systematically implemented
(Adenew and Abdi 2005). And Mozambique’s Land Act 1997 protects
the collective land rights of legally defined ‘local communities’, and
provides for the recording of these rights.
None of these models is perfect, of course. Implementation is often
constrained by limited resources. In Madagascar, fast progress has en-
abled 20 percent of the 300 municipalities to set up a guichet foncier –
but much remains to be done to scale up to the national level (Teyssier
2010). The low-cost registration system in the Ethiopian state of Tigray
enabled rapid implementation and ensured that the process was acces-
sible to farmers; but the technology used did not allow boundary deli-
mitation, so that land registration was of limited use to solve boundary
disputes – an issue that the later Amhara registration process sought
to tackle (Haile et al. 2005). In Mozambique, ‘local communities’ can
encompass thousands of people spread over large areas of land – and
unless downwards accountability is ensured within the community, col-
lective registration does little to protect the rights of more vulnerable
groups. But the attention to accessibility and local appropriateness, the
recognition of ‘customary’ rights – which are the entitlements through
which much of the rural population gains access to land – and the will-
ingness to try ‘something new’ compared to earlier, one-size-fits-all
approaches are positive features of this wave of reforms.
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Gender
In much of rural Africa, women constitute a large portion of the eco-
nomically active population engaged in agriculture, both as farmers
and as farm workers, and play a crucial role in ensuring household
food security. However, women’s access to key assets like credit is often
constrained, and women tend to remain concentrated in the informal
sector of the economy. In plantations, they often provide labour with-
out employment contracts, on a temporary or seasonal basis or as
wives or daughters of male farm workers.
Women’s access to land under widely applied customary systems var-
ies considerably from place to place. Substantial differences exist
between patrilineal and matrilineal societies, with women generally
having stronger land rights under the latter. However, in most cases,
rights in arable land are allocated by the lineage authority to the male
household head; women have secondary, derived rights, obtained
through their relationship with male family members (husbands,
fathers, brothers or sons). Under many customary systems, women’s
inheritance rights are limited: not only within patrilineal systems
(where property devolves along the male line, to the exclusion of wo-
men), but also in matrilineal systems (where, although property traces
through the mother’s line, land control usually rests with male family
members).
With population pressures, cultural change, agricultural intensifica-
tion and commercialisation, many customary systems have evolved to-
wards greater individualisation, extending the rights vested in male
household heads and further eroding women’s secondary rights (Lastar-
ria-Cornhiel 1997). When off-farm activities or migration are usually
undertaken by men, women’s responsibilities for agriculture increase –
what is referred to by some as the ‘feminisation of agriculture’. Some
authors suggest that this increased burden is accompanied by greater
decision-making power for women within the household. Others note
that this effect is very limited, as women tend to remain under the
‘protection’ of the extended family (David 1995). On the other hand, in
areas with increasing land scarcity and limited off-farm opportunities,
women are being deprived of their land access, including through the
‘rediscovery’ of norms on female seclusion based on religious or cus-
tomary practice (e.g., for a study on the ‘defeminisation of agriculture’
in Niger, see Doka and Monimart 2004).
However, in many areas, women are increasingly keen to assert their
claims over land. All over Africa, one can find examples of women
negotiating rights to land and associated resources (Freudenberger
1993). For instance, women may enter sharecropping arrangements, as
documented for Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire (Amanor 2001, Kone´ 2001).
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In addition, there are growing numbers of reports of women buying
land either individually or collectively. In many parts of the world,
NGOs support women’s groups by helping them to obtain land on a
collective basis.
For a long time, land legislation tended not to directly tackle gender
issues. For instance, in the Kenyan land registration programme (1954
onwards), registration was usually made to the male household head,
thereby undermining women’s unregistered secondary rights (Macken-
zie 1998). However, some laws adopted since the 1990s have paid
greater attention to gender equity, by embracing the principle of non-
discrimination, abrogating customary norms, presuming joint owner-
ship of family land, outlawing land sales without consent of both
spouses, and providing for women’s representation in land manage-
ment bodies. For instance, Niger’s Rural Code of 1993 recognises the
equal right of citizens to access natural resources without sex discrimi-
nation. In Burkina Faso, Law No. 14 of 1996, revising earlier legisla-
tion, provides for the allocation of state-owned land without distinction
based on sex or marital status, and under the Mozambican Land Act
1997, both men and women may have rights in state-owned land (Arti-
cles 10(1) and 16(1)).
In Tanzania, the Land Act 1999 explicitly affirms the equality of
men’s and women’s land rights (sections 3(1)(c) and 3(2)). Spousal co-
ownership of family land is presumed (section 161). Consent of both
spouses is required to mortgage the matrimonial home (section 112(3)),
and in case of borrower default, the lender must serve a notice on the
borrower’s spouse before selling mortgaged land (section 131(3)(d).
Moreover, a ‘fair balance’ of men and women is to be ensured in the
appointment of the National Land Advisory Council (section 17). Simi-
larly, the Village Land Act 1999 prohibits discrimination against
women in the application of customary law (section 20(2)), and when
a village council is deciding on an application for a right of occupancy
(section 23).
Under Uganda’s Land Act 1998, specific provisions ensure wo-
men’s representation in the Uganda Land Commission, in Land Dis-
trict Boards and in parish-level Land Committees (sections 48(4), 58
(3) and 66(2)). Moreover, while decisions on land adjudication con-
cerning customary rights are to be made according to customary law,
decisions denying women access to ownership, occupation or use are
null and void (section 28). Although selling, leasing or giving away
land requires the consent of the spouse (section 40), a clause intro-
ducing the presumption of spousal co-ownership, initially included
in the Bill passed by the Parliament, was excluded by the President
from the gazetted text.
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Judicial decisions have also played an important role in determining
women’s land rights, particularly by invalidating discriminatory norms
on constitutional grounds. A landmark case is Ephrahim v. Pastory and
Another, decided by the High Court of Tanzania. In this case, a Haya
woman who had inherited land from her father sold it outside the clan.
A male clan member brought an action to declare the sale void, as
women could not sell land under Haya customary law (as codified in
the Declaration of Customary Law of 1963). The Tanzanian High Court
invalidated the norm on the basis of the principle of non-discrimina-
tion, which is affirmed in the amended Tanzanian Constitution and in
international human rights treaties ratified by Tanzania. The court sta-
ted therefore that Haya women could sell land on the same conditions
as Haya men, and held the disputed land sale valid.
Judicial decisions protecting women’s land rights appear to be in-
creasingly common – at least in some jurisdictions. In South Africa, a
recent landmark case is Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, con-
cerning inheritance. While statutory succession law (Maintenance of
Surviving Spouse Act 1990 and Intestate Succession Act 1987) recog-
nises women’s inheritance rights, section 23 of the Black Administra-
tion Act provided for the application of a customary law to the inheri-
tance of property belonging to ‘a Black’. Customary law and regula-
tions enacted on the basis of customary law severely restricted
women’s succession rights by providing for inheritance by the eldest
son. A first constitutionality challenge to these rules was rejected in
Mthembu v. Letsela and Another. But in the Bhe case the Constitutional
Court declared these norms discriminatory and thus unconstitutional.
Most recently, a constitutionality challenge to South Africa’s Commu-
nal Land Rights Act 2004 on both procedural and substantive
grounds, including gender bias, resulted in the entire law being
struck down due to its improper enactment; because of this finding,
the Court did not deem it necessary to examine the merit of the sub-
stantive grounds for alleged unconstitutionality, which included gen-
der discrimination.5
It is difficult to assess the difference that these legislative and judi-
cial interventions have made on the ground. In many countries, the
implementation of laws protecting women’s rights is constrained by
entrenched cultural practices, lack of legal awareness, limited access to
courts and lack of resources. These implementation problems are gen-
erally more severe in rural areas than in urban areas. In these cases,
effective interventions to improve women’s land rights need to include
not only legislative reform but also concrete steps to bridge the gap
between law and practice.
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Securing the Resource Rights of Pastoral Groups6
For pastoralists, herd mobility and secure access to strategic resources,
such as water and dry season grazing, are critical, and require flexible
arrangements enabling herders to access grazing resources rather than
exclusive ownership rights over a given area. Such arrangements are at
odds with the tools generally used to secure and manage land rights
and raise challenges for securing pastoralists’ resource rights. Land ti-
tling and registration, even at a group level, of exclusive rights over a
clearly delimited area may not provide for the flexible access arrange-
ments addressing inter-group interests, which characterise many pas-
toral societies – for instance in much of West Africa. Conventional
common property arrangements may not necessarily work either,
because of the clear group membership rules and clearly defined
resources typically embodied in common property rights mechanisms
(see Ostrom 1990). State ownership of pastoral resources has also
proved ineffective, their interventions to regulate grazing through fen-
cing and seasonal closures reducing flexibility and mobility (Toulmin
et al. 2004).
Much past and current debate regarding pastoral rangelands con-
tinues to make reference to the article by Hardin (1968) on the ‘Trage-
dy of the Commons’. The premise of Hardin’s argument is that by
holding land in common, individual herders have no incentive to limit
the number of animals they graze on that land. Without such incen-
tives, conditions are set for land degradation. Pastoral development
policies in the 1970s and 1980s were heavily influenced by these nega-
tive perceptions of both pastoralism and customary tenure systems. A
major preoccupation of governments and donors was thus to control
rangeland degradation through the regulation of livestock numbers.
Herders and the number of livestock they kept had to be controlled, as
did their movements. They were encouraged to ‘modernise’: to settle
down and raise fewer animals more intensively. The focus for all these
initiatives was on capital investments and infrastructure (fencing,
water, roads and markets), intensification through sedentarisation, and
herd size control. Few if any of these policies in fact contributed to sus-
tainable rangeland management or improved pastoral livelihoods.
It is now widely accepted that rainfall variability is the primary driv-
ing force behind fluctuations in pasture productivity in arid and semi-
arid areas, with grazing pressure rarely a significant factor, given
highly mobile, seasonal patterns of resource use. Opportunistic man-
agement, allowing pastoralists to respond rapidly to changing grazing
conditions and fodder availability through mobility or the opportunity
to offload or restock livestock, is now recognised as a key requirement
for the sustainable management of rangelands in dryland areas. This
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requires specifically tailored arrangements that secure the resource
rights of pastoral groups while enabling flexibility for herd mobility.
Insights in how to do this can be drawn from recent experience in
the Sahel. There, the past decade has seen a promising shift by several
governments to recognise and regulate access and tenure rights over
pastoral resources – first with Niger’s Rural Code 1993 and then with
the pastoral laws passed in Guinea (Pastoral Code 1995), Mauritania
(Pastoral Code 2000), Mali (Pastoral Charter 2001) and Burkina Faso
(Pastoral Code 2002). Although the approaches taken by legislators
vary considerably across countries, this pastoral legislation recognises
mobility as the key strategy for pastoral resource management – con-
trary to much previous legislation, which was hostile to herd mobility.
Under Mali’s Pastoral Charter, for instance, herders have a right to
move with their herds for their production needs. In order to maintain
or enable mobility, pastoral legislation seeks to protect grazing lands
and cattle corridors from agricultural encroachment and to secure her-
ders’ access to strategic seasonal resources. The tools used range from
the delimitation of pastoral resources to innovative legal concepts like
the terroir d’attache in Niger.7 Pastoral laws also regulate multiple and
sequential use of resources by different actors (e.g., herders’ access to
cultivated fields after harvest), and determine the role which pastoral
people can play in local conflict management.
While these laws constitute a major step forward, some problems
remain. Although some laws now recognise pastoralism as a legitimate
form of productive land use (mise en valeur, upon which protection of
land rights is conditional), the concept of mise en valeur pastorale re-
mains ill-defined, and generally involves investments in infrastructure
(wells, fences, etc.) that are not required for agricultural forms of mise
en valeur.8 Also, rangelands are still often affected by many laws, often
uncoordinated, and managed by a range of different institutions. Laws
on land, water, forests and decentralisation may all have implications
for rangeland management.
Regional integration processes based on free movement of persons
and goods also have implications for international transhumance.
Besides the ‘traditional’ bilateral or regional transhumance agreements,
international transhumance is increasingly regulated by instruments
adopted within the context of regional integration arrangements (for
instance, in West Africa, by Decision A/DEC.5/10/98 of 1998 adopted
by ECOWAS9). These instruments usually require a transhumance cer-
tificate indicating number and types of animals, vaccinations received
and the itinerary planned. But notwithstanding these norms, cross-
border movements are still often constrained by administrative prac-
tices.
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Important innovations have also taken place at field level. Through-
out West Africa, for instance, local conventions (conventions locales) –
community-based agreements concerning the management of shared
natural resources – have been set up, negotiated by all interested natur-
al resource users, usually with support from development projects.
These conventions are an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of pre-
vious approaches to natural resource management focusing on indivi-
dual villages (e.g. the gestion du terroir approach), which often resulted
in the exclusion of groups not resident in the village, particularly trans-
humant herders.
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions
Recent spikes in world food and energy prices have fostered renewed
momentum for agricultural investment in lower and middle-income
countries. Governments in some food-importing countries are promot-
ing the acquisition of land overseas as a means to ensure long-term na-
tional food security. And businesses are recognising new opportunities
for strong returns from international investments in agriculture for
food, fuel and other agricultural commodities. Over the past couple of
years, the acquisition of long-term rights over farmland in Africa (typi-
cally leases rather than outright purchases) has made headlines in a
flurry of media reports across the world. Lands that only a short time
ago seemed of little outside interest are now being sought by interna-
tional investors by the tune of hundreds of thousands of hectares.
Dubbed ‘land grabs’ in the media, land acquisitions have kindled much
international debate, in which strong positions are taken on the im-
pacts of such investments on environment, rights, sovereignty, liveli-
hoods, development and conflict at local, national and international
levels. Trends and drivers characterising this phenomenon have been
amply discussed elsewhere (Cotula et al. 2009). The focus here is on
trends in national legislation.
Land acquisitions are taking place in a legal context that, as dis-
cussed in the second section, tends to establish a central role for the
state and only grant weak protection to local land rights. As govern-
ments formally own all or much of the land in many African countries,
government leases are the main source of land for prospective inves-
tors, including 100 percent of the deals documented in Ethiopia and
Mali by Cotula et al. (2009). However, direct deals with customary
chiefs are common in countries where traditional authorities have re-
tained formal control over land, such as Ghana (Cotula et al. 2009,
Schoneveld et al. 2010).
Procedures for investors to access land vary considerably across
countries – in terms of steps, time and costs. For instance, in Mozam-
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bique all investment projects (whether foreign or national) require gov-
ernment approval (under the 1993 Regulation to the Investment Act),
while in Ghana no such approval is required outside the mining and
petroleum industries but foreign investors must register with the Gha-
na Investment Promotion Centre under the Ghana Investment Promo-
tion Centre Act 1994.10
A recurring investor concern is that land access procedures in many
lower and middle-income countries are seen as long and cumbersome
(World Bank 2010). Some countries have taken steps to streamline the
administrative process that investors must go through in order to
acquire land. One-stop-shops and investment promotion agencies play
a key role in this. In countries like Mali, Mozambique and Ghana, in-
vestment promotion agencies facilitate the acquisition of all necessary
licences, permits and authorisations. In other countries, the investment
promotion agency is mandated to play a more ‘hands-on’ role – for ex-
ample in Tanzania, where the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) is
responsible for identifying and providing land to investors, as well as
with helping investors obtain all necessary permits (Article 6 of the
Tanzanian Investment Act 1997). This entails identifying land not cur-
rently under productive use, and directly allocating it to investors. Land
is vested with the TIC and then allocated by this to the investor on the
basis of a derivative title. After the end of the investment project, the
land reverts back to the TIC (Articles 19(2) and 20(5) of the Land Act
1999).11
In order to promptly provide information to prospective investors
about the nature, size and location of available land, some countries
have undertaken national inventories of available land and established
databases accessible to incoming investors. In Tanzania, for example,
the TIC has identified some 2.5 million hectares of land as suitable for
investment projects.12 Similarly, the Mozambican government carried
out a land inventory covering the whole country to identify land poten-
tially available for incoming investments. This exercise was concluded
in early 2008 at a scale of 1:1,000,000. It indicated that the country
has about 7 million hectares available for allocation to land-based eco-
nomic activities – a smaller area than was expected. As the scale of the
mapping was too large to be useful, another inventory at a scale of
1:250,000 is now being prepared (Nhantumbo & Saloma˜o 2010).
However, concepts like ‘idle’ or ‘waste’ land, which underpin these
inventory exercises, often reflect an assessment of the productivity
rather than existence of resource uses: these terms are often applied not
to unoccupied lands, but to lands used in ways that are not perceived
as ‘productive’ by government. Yet perceptions about productivity may
not necessarily be backed up by economic evidence (for instance, on
pastoralism, see Hesse & The´baud 2006), and low-productivity uses
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may still play a crucial role in local livelihood and food security strate-
gies.
The nature, scope, content and duration of the land rights that inves-
tors – particularly foreign investors – can acquire varies across coun-
tries. This diversity reflects diverging political orientations with regard
to land tenure, particularly as to whether private land ownership is al-
lowed, and whether non-citizens may gain access to it. Some countries
treat domestic and foreign investors differently: legislation allows na-
tionals to acquire land ownership, but restricts foreign investors’ acqui-
sition of land ownership or even long-term use rights. Although some
countries have recently come under pressure to ease these restrictions,
the regulation of foreign land ownership is not just a ‘developing coun-
try’ phenomenon: 30 states in the United States have restricted foreign
ownership, and the US Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act
1978 requires foreigners to register acquisitions of land larger than 10
acres (McAuslan 2010). In Africa, restrictions on foreign ownership
are rooted in the scars left by colonial history – and regulating foreign-
ers’ access to land ownership was seen as a way to avoid going back to
the colonial experience (McAuslan 2010). Examples of restrictions on
foreign ownership are provided by Ghana and Uganda. In Ghana,
while nationals may own land, foreigners may not – they can only ac-
quire land leases of up to 50 years (Article 266 of the 1992 Constitu-
tion). Under Uganda’s Land Act 1998 non-citizens may only be given
land leases for up to 99 years, and are barred from acquiring freehold
rights (Article 41).
Legislation may also restrict certain forms of land use by non-
nationals. Depending on the country context, the policy objective may
be to prevent speculative land acquisitions, or to protect local produ-
cers. In Uganda, foreign investors may not acquire land for the pur-
pose of crop or animal production, but they may lease land for other
purposes (Article 10 of the Investment Code Act). In Tanzania, foreign-
ers may acquire land use rights only for the purpose of an investment
project approved under the terms of the Tanzania Investment Act (Arti-
cles 19 and 20 of the Land Act 1999). In Namibia, the Agricultural
(Commercial) Land Reform Act 1995 (Article 58) requires a govern-
ment authorisation for the acquisition of land ownership by foreign
nationals; this authorisation is granted on the condition, amongst
others, that the acquisition for an investment is eligible under invest-
ment legislation.
While much international attention has focused on the acquisition
of land rights, large agricultural projects also involve other key re-
sources, particularly water. For example, media reports suggest that
some investors are seeking priority access rights over water.13 This may
have major implications for the ability of other producers to have
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secure access to water, and requires closer attention – though a discus-
sion of water rights is beyond the scope of this study.
National and international arrangements provide ways to protect the
land and natural resource rights acquired by investors. For example,
international investment treaties usually provide legal protection for
investment by nationals of one state party in the other state. They typi-
cally define investment very broadly, covering investment in agriculture
including land acquisitions. Their provisions usually include safeguards
against discrimination, expropriation and arbitrary treatment, provi-
sions on profit repatriation and currency convertibility, and access to in-
ternational arbitration as the mechanism to settle investment disputes.
Recent years have witnessed a boom in investment treaties. By the end
of 2008, investment treaties had reached a total of 2,676 (UNCTAD
2009), up from 440 in 1991 (UNCTAD 1992). Figure 1 illustrates this
trend with regard to a sample of seven African countries that have been
affected by large-scale land acquisitions – Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar,
Mali, Mozambique, Sudan and Tanzania (Cotula et al. 2009). National
constitutions (particularly provisions on the right to property), invest-
ment codes and sectoral legislation also tend to protect the investor’s
land rights from arbitrary interference, and to require compensation for
losses suffered. Like investment treaties, investment codes may enable
investors to directly access investment arbitration to solve disputes.
Figure 1 Number of bilateral investment treaties concluded by seven African coun-
tries, by decade and cumulative
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However, evidence on the extent to which investment treaties do pro-
mote investment is mixed (for a review, see Sauvant and Sachs 2009).
Also, the formulation of some treaties has raised concerns that the pol-
icy space for host countries to take action in the public interest may be
reduced, as treaty norms restricting expropriation or requiring ‘fair and
equitable treatment’ have been interpreted in very broad terms (Mann
et al. 2006). Some controversial, treaty-based international arbitrations
have seen investors challenge environmental or other public-purpose
regulation adopted by host states.14 This creates the need for caution
by host governments to understand the full implications of what they
are signing up to when entering into investment treaties.
From the investor’s perspective, the extent to which these protection
mechanisms can be relied on in practice varies considerably, depend-
ing on factors linked to governance and rule of law. Experience sug-
gests that even the most effective protection regimes achieve little
against a determined political will to revise the terms of the investment
or even expropriate it altogether. This was illustrated by the wave of re-
negotiations affecting natural resource investments in Latin America,
Asia and Africa, when commodity prices peaked in 2008. The strong
emotive connotations of land to local populations make political risk
particularly acute in agricultural investments that involve the acquisi-
tion of large areas of land.
The widespread tenure insecurity affecting local land rights in Afri-
ca, coupled with growing interest in land from outside investors and
government efforts to attract investment, make local people vulnerable
to dispossession. Where customary systems are still functioning prop-
erly and are perceived as legitimate at the local level, they are unlikely
to be effective at defending local land rights vis-a`-vis investors that
mainly rely on formal law and negotiations with the government. And
even where customary rights are legally recognised (see second and
third section), significant threats may come from within local groups –
particularly from customary chiefs. In many parts of Africa, chiefs are
increasingly reinterpreting custom to claim ‘ownership’ over common
resources they were traditionally responsible for managing on behalf of
their community. These reinterpretations of customary law are strongly
contested by local resource users, but customary mechanisms for the
accountability of chiefs are not or no longer working in practice (e.g.,
on Ghana, see Ubink 2007). This situation provides the breeding
ground for the co-option of customary chiefs and local elites into strate-
gic alliances with the central state and agribusiness, and makes local
resource users vulnerable to dispossession. Recent research from Gha-
na has documented cases where customary chiefs re-allocated land
from local farmers to large biofuel plantations, with no local consulta-
tion or formal compensation (Schoneveld et al. 2010).
74 LORENZO COTULA
Legal safeguards for local land rights do exist in many jurisdictions,
but their effectiveness tends to be limited. For instance, the laws of
Mali and Mozambique require an environmental and social impact as-
sessment (ESIA) to be carried out prior to the land transfer. But the cri-
teria for approving or failing land deal applications on the basis of the
ESIA are not always explicit, and the results of these assessments are
often not available for public scrutiny (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). In
addition, several studies have documented cases of biofuel projects get-
ting started without the required environmental permits (e.g., on Gha-
na, see Schoneveld et al. 2010; on Mozambique, see Nhantumbo and
Saloma˜o 2010).
Local consultation may also be required through processes other
than ESIAs. In Mozambique, for example, the Land Act 1997 requires
prospecting investors to consult ‘local communities’ before receiving a
land lease from the government. But the implementation of this legis-
lation has fallen short of expectations. What is defined as community
consultation may be confined to discussions with village elders and
elites. Indirectly affected communities tend not to be included, and vil-
lagers usually do not receive full information on the proposed invest-
ments and the terms of land deals prior to the consultation. Records of
meetings are often incomplete and vague about timeframes, targets
and responsibilities, and agreements between the community and the
investor are generally not integrated into legally binding contracts
(Nhantumbo and Saloma˜o 2010). But in the cases where external orga-
nisations supported local people, there were better outcomes and nego-
tiations for community joint ventures in tourism are underway in sev-
eral places (Tanner & Baleira 2006).
Where land is taken on a compulsory basis, compensation regimes
and related procedural safeguards are key to safeguarding local interests.
It must also be recognised, however, that to many people no amount of
money is adequate compensation. This is particularly the case where
cash compensation would not enable affected communities to gain ac-
cess to alternative land, for instance due to limited development of land
markets. It is also the case where land has special cultural and spiritual
values. Where land is owned by the state, as is the case in much of rural
Africa, compensation is usually paid for loss of improvements (crops,
trees, buildings) but not for loss of land rights.15 Loss of other resources,
such as water and forest resources, are rarely compensable. Implement-
ing compensation schemes is riddled with challenge. Levels of compen-
sation are often seen as inadequate by the local population, and lack of
formal land markets due to limited transferability of land rights makes
it more difficult to properly value land. Conflicts about compensation
mechanisms and amounts have been documented for some recent bio-
fuels projects in Tanzania (for example, Sulle & Nelson 2009).
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Use of International Courts to Protect Land Rights
Land rights issues are directly related to human rights, and recent
years have witnessed growing convergence between land rights and hu-
man rights discourses. Diverse groups like indigenous peoples and
advocacy organisations have used human rights language to support
land claims, and development agencies have pursued rights-based ap-
proaches as a means for empowerment. International tribunals have
been more prepared to use human rights instruments with regard to
resource access disputes, and in several cases they have linked govern-
ment action undermining resource access for vulnerable groups to hu-
man rights violations.
While a ‘human right to land’ as such has no basis in international
law, several human rights are directly relevant to land rights. Even
where local land rights are based on customary systems that have no le-
gal recognition, they constitute ‘property’ protected by the human right
to property. This right is internationally recognised, for instance, by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 17), the American Con-
vention on Human Rights (Article 21) and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 14). The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and more recently the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights have specifically interpreted the right to property as
protecting the collective rights customarily held by indigenous and tri-
bal peoples over their ancestral territories – even in the absence of for-
mal titles or legal recognition under national law.16 Where people de-
pend on land for their food security, local land rights are also protected
by the right to adequate food recognised by Article 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 11 of the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. And where indigenous
and tribal peoples are involved, international law requires governments
and investors to seek the free, prior and informed consent of these
groups. This principle is enshrined in the 1989 Convention Concern-
ing Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted
by the International Labour Organisation (Convention No. 169). The
Convention is legally binding for the states that have ratified it.
A brief discussion of some international cases provides insights into
the relevance of human rights law to the protection of local land rights.
The most extensive jurisprudence in this regard has been developed by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court held that the
right to property of an indigenous people had been violated because,
though Nicaraguan legislation protected the resource rights of indigen-
ous peoples, there were no specific procedures to secure these rights,
no land titles had actually been issued and natural resource conces-
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sions had been granted to investors without prior local consultation.17
Similarly, in Saramaka People v. Suriname, the Inter-American Court
found that the collective right to property of the Saramaka people had
been violated because the state had awarded timber and mining rights
without prior consultation of the Saramakas, without these obtaining a
‘reasonable benefit’ from the natural resource investments and without
proper environmental and social impact assessment.18 Besides cases
involving interference with local land rights to pave the way to natural
resource investments, the Inter-American Court has also dealt with
issues concerning land restitution. In Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, an in-
digenous community claimed the restitution of their ancestral lands.
The government of Paraguay resisted this claim, partly because the
land belonged to a German investor protected under a bilateral invest-
ment treaty between Paraguay and Germany. The Court noted that
while the investment treaty contained a provision on expropriation, it
did not prohibit expropriation altogether – it merely subjected its legal-
ity to certain conditions, including public purpose. The Court held that
the public purpose requirement would be met where interfering with
the investor’s property rights is necessary to realise the human rights
of third parties, including through land restitution programmes aimed
at realising the human right to property of indigenous peoples.19
In Africa, use of international human rights institutions in relation
to land rights issues is more limited but growing. Violations of the right
to property linked to a land conflict were alleged in the ACHPR case
Bakweri Land Claims Committee v. Cameroon, but the complaint was de-
clared inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.20 The
recent decision by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights in CEMIRIDE and Minority Rights Group International v. Kenya
concerns a pastoralist group – the Endorois – that the Kenyan govern-
ment dispossessed of its ancestral lands by establishing a game reserve
in 1973, issuing a ruby mining concession in 2002 and selling parts of
the land to third parties. Compensation for evictions following the es-
tablishment of the game reserve were paid only to a limited number of
families (170 out of 400), were grossly below market values and were
only received 13 years after resettlement.21 The African Commission
found that several aspects of Kenyan law had not been complied with,
including the constitutional requirement of ‘prompt payment of full
compensation’. Non-compliance with national law constituted a breach
of Article 14 of the African Charter, as this requires compliance with
the provisions of ‘appropriate laws’.22 In addition, the Commission
found that, although a public interest may have been at stake, the forced
eviction of the Endorois was ‘disproportionate to any public need’.23
International investment law has also been invoked in relation to
land disputes between a foreign investor and a host state. This is not a
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new phenomenon – as illustrated by the rather old de Sabla and Tradex
Hellas cases, both concerning land expropriation claims. International
investment arbitrators have recently re-affirmed the principle that land
redistribution programmes carry an international law obligation for the
state to compensate foreign investors for losses suffered. This point
was made, for example, in the case Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and
Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, which was brought by a number of
Dutch nationals and concerned brutal and uncompensated land occu-
pations in Zimbabwe. The arbitral tribunal concluded that Zimbabwe
had breached its obligation to pay compensation under the investment
treaty between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe, and awarded da-
mages.24 International human rights law has also been invoked to
secure compensation within the context of land reform. In Mike Camp-
bell (Pvt) Ltd. and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, the Tribunal of the
Southern African Development Community found that Zimbabwe’s
controversial land reform was racially discriminatory and violated fun-
damental rights like the right to access courts and receive a fair hear-
ing; the Tribunal ordered the government of Zimbabwe to protect land
ownership and pay compensation for lands that had already been ex-
propriated.25
Finally, as already mentioned with regard to gender, recent years
have witnessed some high-profile cases where national courts have
reviewed government measures affecting local land rights in light of
human rights recognised by international law or national constitutions.
For example, in Sesana, Setlhobogwa and Others v. Attorney General, a
case decided entirely on the basis of Botswana’s national law, the High
Court of Botswana issued a landmark judgment on a petition filed by a
group of San (also known as Basarwa or Bushmen) that were relocated
by the government from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in 2002.
Although the San had lived as hunter-gatherers on that land from time
immemorial and enjoyed resource rights under their customary law,
the land was legally owned by the state. The government terminated
the provision of vital services such as water, food rations and healthcare
in the reserve; withdrew the ‘special game licenses’ that had exempted
the San from the legal prohibition to hunt in the reserve; and pre-
vented the San from entering the reserve without a permit. As a result
of these measures, the livelihoods of the San came under threat, and
many relocated outside the reserve. Compensation for loss of huts and
other assets was promised but not quantified nor paid. The High Court
found that although the land was owned by the state, the San were law-
fully occupying it, and that the San were forcibly deprived of this pos-
session without their consent. The measures withdrawing special game
licenses and restricting entry in the reserve were deemed to be unlaw-
ful and unconstitutional.
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Conclusion
For millions of people in the developing world, land is an asset of enor-
mous importance – not only as a basis for local livelihoods, but also, in
many cases, for culture and social identity. Land is also an increasingly
sought-after commodity, as the phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’ clearly
shows.
Recent trends in national and international law suggest that an in-
creasingly globalised system of property rights regimes is taking shape,
where claims based on interlinked national, international or local (‘cus-
tomary’) rules come into contact and – possibly – into conflict. Global
processes can have direct impacts on local land relations – whether
through international ‘land grabs’ or international human rights or in-
vestment law decisions. National law reforms – to secure local land
rights, mainstream gender into land legislation, enable pastoral mobi-
lity and/or to attract foreign investment, for example – are taking place
in ‘waves’ that are influenced by diverse factors like pressures from so-
cial movements, donors and advocacy groups, international discourses,
national concerns about promoting economic growth, and the interests
of national elites. The growing ratification of investment treaties and
use of international arbitration suggest that national legal frameworks
are increasingly tied to (and constrained by) international rules – and
foreign investors are indeed using international norms to challenge
national law. Similarly, local landholders have relied on international
human rights law to protect their ‘customary’ land rights before
national or international courts, while women have done the same to
challenge the legality of gender-discriminatory norms.
In contexts where stakeholders with widely different negotiating
power increasingly come into direct contact (such as large investors ac-
quiring land, host states and local land users), the extent to which com-
peting land claims are backed by solid legal protection and by the re-
sources necessary to enforce it can make a difference to the balance of
negotiating power, and to negotiating outcomes.
The stakes are high. Systemic changes in the nature and distribution
of land rights, for example as part of large-scale land acquisition
processes, can have lasting repercussions for the future of world agri-
culture and food security – and for the roles that agribusiness and
family farming will play in the coming decades. Irrespective of the di-
rection taken, secure local rights are a necessary (but, admittedly, not
sufficient) precondition to ensure that local groups do not lose out.
Securing local land rights is today more urgent than ever, and recent
experience with protecting local land rights in ways that are locally ap-
propriate and accessible to farmers provides useful lessons on how to
address this challenge.
SECURING LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA 79
Notes
1 Kasanga and Kotey (2001:13) estimate that 80-90 percent of all undeveloped land in
Ghana is held under customary tenure.
2 For example, for a study on the continued application of customary land rights after
the implementation of Kenya’s land registration programme, see Coldham (1978).
3 The case involved a legal challenge to expropriation without compensation of custo-
marily held land within the context of Operation Vijiji, which entailed widespread re-
allocation of land within and between villages. In the case, the Attorney General had
argued that customary land rights do not constitute ‘property’ under Article 24 of the
Constitution. In so doing, he relied on colonial-era case law stating that customary
rights do not constitute property rights, and on the provisions of Tanzanian legisla-
tion vesting land ownership with the President. In addition, the Attorney General
had argued that customary rights could not be considered full-fledged property rights
because they are typically not exclusive and non-transferrable.
4 The implementing regulations necessary to establish the recording procedure for cus-
tomary rights are the only statutory instrument to the Land Code that has not yet
been adopted.
5 Tongoane and Others v. Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs and Others. For an-
other South African gender case, see Hadebe v. Hadebe and Another, concerning a
land restitution claim.
6 This section is based on Toulmin et al. (2004) and Cotula et al. (2006).
7 Under Niger’s Rural Code and its implementing regulations, the terroir d’attache is
the area where herders spend most of the year (usually a strategic area, such as a
bas-fond or the land around a water point), and over which they have priority use
rights. Outsiders may gain access to these resources on the basis of negotiations with
the right holders.
8 See, for instance, Niger’s Decree 97-006 of 1997.
9 Economic Community of West African States.
10 Schoneveld et al. 2010 documented cases of agricultural investments that had not
been properly registered.
11 Tanzania’s Land (Amendment) Act 2004 introduced another land access arrange-
ment – the establishment of joint ventures between foreign investors and local
groups (under Article 19(2)(c) of the Land Act 1999, as amended).
12 www.tic.co.tz, particularly at http://www.tic.co.tz/TICWebSite.nsf/2e9cafa-
c3e472ee5882572850027f544/729d4c075f2b03fc432572d10024bea6?OpenDocument
(last visited on 28 July 2010).
13 See for example an interview with the director of Malibya, a company that runs a
100,000 hectares project in Mali’s Office du Niger: http://www.maliweb.net/category.
php?NID=37605.
14 See for example the cases Metalclad v. Mexico, Methanex v. US, or Bywater v. Tanzania.
15 E.g., in Cameroon, under Article 23 of Decree 76-166 of 1976.
16 See for example the following cases decided by the Inter-American Court: Mayagna
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Maya Indigenous Communities of the To-
ledo District v. Belize, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay and Saramaka
People v. Suriname. See also the recent case CEMIRIDE v. Kenya, decided by the Afri-
can Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
17 Paras. 140-155.
18 Paras. 115, 129 and 158.
19 Para. 140.
20 Paras. 5 and 55.
21 Para. 110-112 of the African Commission’s decision.
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22 Paras. 219-237.
23 Paras. 213-214 and 218.
24 Paras. 107 and 148.
25 Sections V – VIII of the judgment.
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4 From State to People’s Law: Assessing
Learning-By-Doing as a Basis of New Land Law1
Liz Alden Wily
Introduction
More than one billion people around the world hold land through cus-
tomary mechanisms which have insufficient support in national legis-
lation. Most still hold land as permissive occupants on lands classified
as government or public land. Efforts to change this are increasing.
However the changes being made are not always practical and custom-
ary land owners may find their tenure security relatively unchanged.
Commentators blame shortfalls on lack of political will and the high
institutional and financial costs involved in regularising customary ten-
ure. These are indeed impediments but this chapter explores a third
impediment which rests in the manner of legal reform itself. This re-
sults in often too complex and inappropriate mechanisms of securing
rights to allow uptake en masse. It is suggested that a new approach to
law-making in land and natural resource law is required; one which is
fully participatory with clients and includes opportunities to trial pro-
posed new paradigms in practice.
To argue the case, the chapter looks to an example in Tanzania
where the legal transition from state to people-owned forest lands is so-
lidly underway with the help of a new forest law. Unusual for such leg-
islation, the Forest Act 2002 built upon some years of testing with
communities as to how this transition could practically evolve. The re-
sult is that ordinary citizens are able to fully follow the law rather than
be defeated by its requirements. Nonetheless, it will also be shown that
legal constraints remain. These derive almost entirely from weaknesses
in supporting new land legislation promulgated several years earlier.
Although sound in its principles and arising in significant degree from
a process of public consultation, the prescriptions of new land law were
not developed on the basis of practical learning by doing or even tested
in the field. Therefore, this chapter argues, it lacks critical procedures
and constructs for the holding of customary property, which even quite
limited piloting would have demonstrated as essential.
Of course arriving at new law through more bottom-up and partici-
patory approaches is not so easy for law-makers who see legal drafting
as leading rather than being led. Nor is it easy to secure permission to
pilot new approaches where these diminish the authority of govern-
ments long used to possessing lands or other natural resources of high
value. Where localised and community-led approaches to law-making
have been attempted, communities are indisputably empowered and
may challenge existing tenure and governances far more extensively
than administrations were prepared to consider. They also gain knowl-
edge and solidarity. Nevertheless, the need and demand for more de-
volved and inclusive approaches to law-making grows. Ultimately, the
transition sought must be towards the emergence of national legisla-
tion which is more expressly people’s law than government’s law.
Customary Land Tenure
A tenure issue at the heart of much land reform today, concerns the
status of customary land tenure in national policy and statutes.2 As im-
plied above, this status has been generally poor; customary land inter-
ests historically denied status as private property rights (Alden Wily
2007). This has impacted upon whole societies, affecting more or less
all of Africa over the last century and other indigenous communities
around the world, often for much longer periods.
The conjunction of customary and indigenous land tenure is not sur-
prising. They are one and the same, sharing their origins in pre-state
forms of acquiring, holding and transferring land but since sustained
for as long as community-framed land use and land relations remain
relevant, broadly the case in many modern agrarian economies. They
also share the founding template of these systems as community-
based. This means their authority derives from and is sustained by the
living community, not the state. Landholding norms and rules may
change, as do the composition and shape of the community, but their
embeddedness in the social construct of local community does not. It
is therefore no surprise that customary or indigenous land relations
and forms of ownership vibrantly exist into the present.
However, policies, laws and programmes can readily vitiate or alter
community-based norms. While capitalist penetration has greatly influ-
enced the shape of locally-determined rights to land, the most directly
reconstructive factor has been recurrent programmes seeking to con-
vert (selected) customary interests into imported forms of tenure, and
to remove authority over landholding generally from community to
state. The latter has in particular been a century-long enterprise in Afri-
ca. In practice, community-based customary tenure survives vibrantly.
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This is mainly the result of the limited reach of conversionary pro-
grammes formally extinguishing customary tenure (see below). Their
limited reach is in turn at least partly the consequence of the lack of fit
of the offered statutory alternatives with what exists on the ground.
This is decreasingly so in regard to family houses or farms which have
become more permanent as shifting cultivation declines, and more
amenable to European-derived conceptions of absolute, singular and
individually-held forms of tenure. Even by custom, homesteads are
now often acknowledged as the private property of individuals or their
families, and are also more autonomously disposable, as the case with
introduced statutory norms. Where collectively-held forests, pastures
and swamps remain within the community’s domain, local interpreta-
tion of these as real property, albeit held collectively, has also strength-
ened. Even without such assets to bind the interests of a rural commu-
nity, communal norms seem to persist. In Kenya, for example, custom-
ary procedures as to whom parcels are transferred operate even after
half a century of their reconstruction as freehold entitlements (Hunt
2005).
In large parts of the world customary tenure remains a major and
active form of landholding. At least one billion people hold rural land
customarily (CLEP 2008). This includes 500 million people in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where conversionary statutory entitlement into intro-
duced tenure forms is limited to around 10 percent of the total land
area. Most of this is located in southern Africa and Kenya (Augustinus
& Deininger 2006). This leaves a customary domain of potentially 1.6
billion hectares, even after 300 million hectares of wildlife and forest
reserves and parks have been excluded. Given the fact that permanently
cultivated lands are surprisingly limited in Africa (around 189 million
hectares or only 8 percent of the total land area), most of these lands
are forest/woodlands, rangelands, marshlands and other landscapes,
held by custom and by logic on a collective basis. Similar high propor-
tions of naturally collective resources exist in parts of Latin America
and Asia, such as in Bolivia where 58 percent of the population are in-
digenous, or in Indonesia where more than 100 million Indonesians
regulate their land relations through customary norms (Colchester &
Fay 2007). While indigenous Sami of Norway, Maori of New Zealand,
Aborigines of Australia and Indians of North America are minorities in
the developed world, new legal treatment of their land holding is prov-
ing disproportionately influential worldwide (Alden Wily 2007).
Above, the term ‘holding’ is used with purpose. For a fact upon
which this paper rests is that much of the global customary estate is
not legally recognised as the property of customary holders. Most of
this land is de jure or de facto government land, variously described as
state lands, trust lands, tribal lands, reserves and especially public
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lands. Even where title is vested in heads of state or governments as
trustees for the national community, the real effects are to render cus-
tomary owners tenants of the state, or worse, ‘squatters’ on their own
(customary) lands.
How this technical landlessness of majority rural populations has
come about is a story in itself. Suffice it to say that it has substantial
roots in the resource grabbing habit of colonial enterprise of denying
that lands they appropriated were already owned. Or where ‘aboriginal
title’ (as it became known) was recognised, to cleverly relocate this as a
form of sovereignty (as in Americo-Indian ‘nations’) and to then
declare that this could not co-exist with the sovereignty of the new
modern state. Thus ownership was diminished to mere possession or
occupancy and use on unowned or unownable and thence national
lands (Alden Wily 2007, McAuslan 2006).
Over-emphasis upon colonial subordination must be avoided given
that the paradigms it established have been more than amply sustained
by post-colonial governments. It is, for example, arguably less the origi-
nal loss of customary property which modern Kenyans resent today
than the way in which recent administrations have been able to turn
such norms to their own advantage, resulting in startling levels of in-
equity among landholders and wrongful if legal takings of public lands
for officially-endorsed private purposes (Republic of Kenya, 2004). Nor
again should it be assumed that subordination of indigenous or cus-
tomary property rights has been the sole privilege of countries which
endured European colonisation; comparable diminishment of commu-
nity-based rights is as evident in post-feudal Afghanistan and Nepal as
in post-colonial Africa and Latin America (Alden Wily, Chapagain &
Shiva 2008).
Land Tenure Reform
Since the 1980s the subordination of indigenous or customary prop-
erty rights has begun to be challenged. Changes have taken root in a
gathering number of new constitutional provisions and land laws such
as in New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, India,
Papua New Guinea, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa and Mozambi-
que.3 However, even among best practice cases, limitations of newly-
embedded arrangements for customary rights are legion, making it dif-
ficult for newly-acknowledged land owners to practically secure their
legally admitted interests. Commentators (and governments) rightly
point to the inordinate expense of implementing new land legislation
or to the absence of political will for doing so (Adams & Palmer eds.
2007).
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While the above are genuine impediments, another factor is the in-
appropriateness of many procedures laid down for acknowledging cus-
tomary land rights. The greatest limitation is where formal entitlement
is required for a customary interest to be upheld, and frequently still
involving the extinction of customary incidents in the process. This is a
major drawback in new land laws enacted in Namibia (2002), South
Africa (2004), Coˆte D’Ivoire (1998, 1999) and Mali (1996, 2002). In
contrast, new land laws in Uganda (1998) and Tanzania (1999) assure
customary owners that whether their right is registered or not it legally
exists and will be upheld by the courts as a private property interest.
Whether obligatory or voluntary, registration in new land laws con-
tinues in many instances to be unwieldy and too remotely controlled.
The steps required are often complex and expensive. Frequently the is-
sues of most concern to customary owners are misjudged. New African
land legislation tends to reiterate the focus of 1960s-1970s registration
laws: they allow farmers to secure formal title to their farms but are
silent on the fate of the much more expansive collective land assets in
the community, and which are at risk from ever-rapacious logging,
mining, agricultural and ranching enterprises. Many new land laws
compound limitations by failing to acknowledge that customary land
interests in the modern world do amount to property (Alden Wily
2006).
The effect of many enacted changes is disappointing. For example,
none of the 14 million residents of the former homelands in South
Africa have taken up the opportunities of the Communal Rights Re-
form Law, 2002, and which law is in any event under constitutional
challenge by four communities which regard its provisions relating to
traditional authorities to be against democratic principles. No commu-
nity in Uganda has set about securing its expansive collective assets
under Communal Land Association provided for in the 1998 Land Act.
And while Mozambique’s Land Law of 1997 proclaims the priority
right of communities to customary lands, a significant proportion of
these lands has been allocated to private enterprise over and above the
will of the relevant communities (Norfolk & Tanner 2007). Mainly only
wealthy Namibians in rural areas have been able to obtain title deeds
for their farms and often take the opportunity to bring into those es-
tates grazing lands which more rightly belong to the whole community
(Mendelsohn 2008). Only at great donor cost are a handful of Tanza-
nian communities beginning to issue farm titles around which so
much of the new Village Land Act, 1999 is structured (Odgaard
2006). Nor have more than a minority of the promised award of lands
to customary owners eventuated in Latin America and Asia (Colchester
& Fay 2007, Ortiga 2004). Papua New Guineans still cannot defend
their lands against the issue of industrial concessions any more than
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Angolans or Ghanaians (Rusanen 2005, Foley 2007, Ayine 2008). And
yet all have been legally assured of their customary tenure.
A missing element is the needed degree of local participation in the
making of laws which so profoundly affect communities and rely upon
their compliance to be useful and used. Participation means more than
consultation, although this can assist when carried out at national scale,
as famously the case in Mozambique (Alden Wily & Mbaya 2001). Ide-
ally participation involves experiential learning to get the paradigms
right and ownable by those whom they most affect. Such an approach
improves the chance for provisions to be relevant, for cheap, accessible
and unfettered mechanisms for applying the law to be entrenched, and
for communities to be sufficiently empowered to drive political will to
see the law applied. Law-making around Tanzania’s expansive forest
resource is examined to positively illustrate the case.
Towards Community-Led Law Making: The Tanzanian Case
Regaining Customary Ownership of Forests
This example concerns the treatment of customary forestland interests
as reflected in the Forest Act 2002. The law is vastly superior in this
respect to prior legislation (Forest Ordinance 1959). Moreover, the new
law is being actively used by ordinary rural communities as a route to
secure, protect and conserve their forest land resources. This would
not have been so, had the new forest law not been directly shaped by
on-the-ground community forestry developments in the eight years
preceding its drafting and promulgation.
The forest/woodland resource (hereafter ‘forests’) is a critical ele-
ment of customary property in Tanzania. Cultivated lands represent
only 10 percent of the land resource. Around 18 million hectares of for-
est fall within community domains. Sometimes this is woodland and
sometimes more dense highland tropical forest.
The forest policy and law in force until 2002, as laid out in the For-
ests law (Cap 389) and forest policies of 1986 and 1988, made no pro-
vision for communities to be recognised as forest managers, let alone
owners. By the 1980s some 12 million hectares of the best forest had
already been withdrawn from customary ownership and control to cre-
ate National Reserves. No compensation was paid to customary owners
beyond losses incurred through having to dismantle houses or lose
standing crops. This was in accordance with the notion that commu-
nities were not land owners but merely lawful occupants on public
land. Public land itself was legally undescribed but amounted to gov-
ernment land.
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Community access and use rights to the forests were restricted to
the collection of fuel wood and minor products for subsistence. Gov-
ernment and, through concession or licence, commercial enterprises,
collected on the values of timber and other productive use of forests.
Forest Management Plans were primarily about policing boundaries of
National or Local Authority Reserves against their traditional owners,
amply evidenced in the regulations and procedures surrounding forest
management at the time (collated by Holmes 1995).
In contrast, the new Forest Act 2002 makes the rural community
the major force for forest conservation and management. Detailed pro-
vision is made for any of Tanzania’s 11,000 rural communities to bring
local forest under their control as either a declared Village Land Forest
Reserve or Community Reserve, the latter structured to cater to a sub-
unit of the village community or to cases where several owning com-
munities wish to co-manage the forest (Forest Act s.32-48). Creation of
new National or Local Authority Reserves may occur only when it has
been demonstrated to the Minister that the forest cannot be as well
regulated by the customary landholders themselves (s.24 (3)). Commu-
nities may also lease or manage National Forest Reserves or Local
Authority Reserves (s.27 & 39). The Minister may alter the status of
these properties to become Village Land Forest Reserves or Commu-
nity Forest Reserves as appropriate (s.29).
Substantial management powers are granted to communities desig-
nated as managers (s.14, 16, 37, 39-41, 47, 65, 78, 84 & 97). They may
determine if and how the community reserve is used and by whom,
and have the authority to exclude all or some outsiders. They may
establish, collect and retain fees for commercial use of products in
their forests and levy fines upon those who break rules which the com-
munity has laid down. They may determine which tree and plant spe-
cies are protected, as relevant to local conditions and threat. They may
enter into contracts for the use of their forest areas or for specific
resources. However they may not lease the forestland to non-members
of the community without the approval of the Land Commissioner, or
of Parliament in regard to larger areas. Pivotal to all this, communities
are legally bound to follow the regulations regarding the Community
or Village Forest Reserve which they have devised themselves and
entrenched in a simple management plan approved by the local Dis-
trict Council, and in an associated approved Village Forest By-Law.
Communities have taken up these opportunities with alacrity. By
2008 there were no fewer than 4.12 million hectares of forests under
community ownership and/or management (MNRT 2008). Over 2.34
million hectares fell within some 400 formally declared or gazetted Vil-
lage Land Forest Reserves and 1.77 million hectares within 246
National and Local Authority Forest Reserves. In these cases the com-
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munity is either the designated management authority or co-manager
with government foresters under Joint Management Agreements. More
than 2,325 (or 22 percent of) villages were involved.
This is aside from a flourishing class of smaller private family forest
reserves on customary property, which numbered several thousand in
2006 (Mlenge 2002, MNRT 2006). There is evidence that the condi-
tion of forests under community tenure and management is superior
to that of forests still under state management (Kajembe et al. 2006,
Blomley et al. 2008, Nelson & Blomley Forthcoming).
Of course there are failures.4 Broadly however, the legal change in
Tanzania as affecting forestland related rights may be declared a suc-
cess. This is highly advantageous to communities and the security of
their rights over collective resources. In most recent years it has also
gained conservation pertinence, as the realities of gross destruction of
forests which are not under community guardianship have come to
light, and place Tanzania’s forests among those being most rapidly de-
stroyed in the world (Miledge et al. 2007). Meanwhile the Tanzanian
tenure-based approach has impacted upon strategies outside Tanzania
as more countries acknowledge that recognising community ownership
of the resource is the optimal platform for securing sustainable conser-
vation. This challenges both the necessity for important resources to be
owned and controlled by governments and the wisdom of taking cus-
tomary resources away from communities and then expecting them to
conserve these lost assets (Alden Wily & Dewees, 2001, Gibbon & Al-
den Wily 2001, Gilmour et al. 2004).
The Community Forest Reserve Initiative: 1994-2001
How did this ‘success’ come about? It began in 1994. By then the fail-
ures of coerced on-farm tree planting by villagers to keep them out of
natural forests were evident, with continuing loss of cover and quality
in government’s forests reported (MNRT 1986). A new donor-driven
action plan had been launched in 1989 to establish buffer zones
around Reserves and to bring as much as possible of the remaining
resource into new reserves (MNRT 1988). A Swedish-funded National
Forestry Programme led the way. By 1992 it had identified six potential
Reserves in the north of Tanzania and systematically began surveying,
mapping and demarcating the boundaries of the first three future
reserves: Duru-Haitemba Forest (9,000 hectares), Mgori Forest
(45,000 hectares) and Suledo Forest (167,000 hectares). Millions of
dollars were expended (Alden Wily & Sjoholm 1995).
As boundaries were cleared, complex Management Plans devised
and Forest Guards deployed, local reaction set in. Affected commu-
nities were concerned to secure as much area and products as possible
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from the forests before these lands were withdrawn from customary
ownership and use. Elephant hunting and timber harvesting in Mgori
Forest flourished, aided by corrupt local officials (Alden Wily 1995,
1997a). The five Mgori communities also demanded the boundary be
redrawn to leave them more forest resources within their respective vil-
lage areas. A new 22 km cut-line was cleared at the cost of millions
more dollars.
In Duru-Haitemba the affected nine villages responded to the threa-
tened loss of their forested lands by clearing the forest as fast as possi-
ble, burning charcoal and establishing farms (Alden Wily & Haule
1995). Village leaders stopped regulating the use of the forest by live-
stock herds from the south. In Suledo, Masai leaders even sold some
parts of the forest to outsiders (Sjoholm & Luono 2002). Government-
deployed forest guards in all three areas became notoriously corrupt,
willing to issue timber extraction licences to those who paid.
By 1994 the Swedish-funded programme was frustrated. This author
was brought in to negotiate with the eight local communities of Duru-
Haitemba in Babati District and the five Mgori communities in Singida
District. The objective was to achieve their cooperation by offering
them (limited) use rights in multiple use zones to be demarcated on
the edge of the new Reserves. It took little time for it to emerge that
the key source of contention was not access but tenure; anger that
gazettement would extinguish their customary ownership and jurisdic-
tion over the forests (Alden Wily 1997).
To be fair, community customary regulation of the forests had his-
torically been casual and erratic. Its focus was upon limiting expansion
of farms into the most valuable parts of the forests and in the case of
Mgori Forest, geared to regulate seasonal access by pastoralists moving
through the forests to and from the south of the country and fre-
quently setting fires to find animals to hunt and new green shoots for
their livestock. Challenged to demonstrate that they could manage the
forest better than the government, should gazettement be halted,
affected communities got to work. With facilitation, including by a
sympathetic District Forestry Officer, within the space of several weeks,
three of eight Duru-Haitemba communities had thoroughly reviewed
every inch of their respective forests areas, agreed boundaries among
themselves, developed Forest Management Plans, and deployed their
own guards (ibid.).
The Plan in each case was simple: the forest was zoned into protec-
tion and use areas. Banned, permitted under quota, and freely per-
mitted uses of the forest were defined. The procedure for establishing
Forest Management Committees was debated within communities and
fine rates agreed. Broadly, forest use was limited to members of the
community. Guards were to be appointed on a rota basis, excused com-
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munal labour for the duration, and rewarded with part of the fines paid
by those offenders they apprehended. Every household pledged to an-
nually plant specified numbers and species of fuel wood trees on farms
to offset dependence upon the forest. Women, using large amounts of
forest wood to brew local beer and men producing bricks from wood-
guzzling kilns were directed by community consensus to plant double
the number of trees, and warned that they would in future have to pay
for wood collected from the forest for these purposes.5
Within four months all eight Duru-Haitemba villages had agreed the
boundaries of what were referred to tentatively as ‘Village Forest Re-
serves’, had appointed and equipped Village Forest Guards (more than
90 operating in December 1994), evicted pit-sawing groups, halted the
use of Duru-Haitemba by outsiders, elected Village Forest Committees,
each with a Sub-Village Committee responsible for its own most local
portion of the Forest. The main Village Forest Committees were ex-
pending collected fines on buying gumboots for the patrolling Guards.
While the Regional Forestry Programme nervously supported the in-
itiative and even redeployed its own government forest guards out of
the area, the central forest administration was incensed. The Director
visited the area and ordered the communities of Duru-Haitemba to
stop managing ‘government property’. Fired up with their solidarity
and success, the communities demurred. They pointed out their
achievements, berated the Director for the corruption of his forest
guards prior to community management, observed that the Reserve
was yet to be gazetted and never would be; the forest, they said, did not
belong to the government but to themselves and that they were in the
process of securing formal entitlement for their village areas inclusive
of forested commons.
The last point was key, for following on from agricultural policies of
the 1980s, it was still national policy in 1995 that each elected village
government would be issued a 99-year leasehold over its village area,
in order to be able to sub-lease house and farm plots to village mem-
bers.6 Under the aegis of another Swedish-funded project, villages in
the district were indeed in the process of agreeing the boundaries of
their respective areas, having these formally surveyed. Slowly but
surely Village Title Deeds were beginning to be issued by the Ministry
of Lands.7 New land law in 1999 would reconstruct this arrangement
as shortly outlined.
Restoring Forest Rights to Communities
The Duru-Haitemba initiative went from strength to strength and was
replicated in Mgori and Suledo Forests (1995-1997) (Alden Wily 1995,
Sjoholm & Luono 2002). In the process a great deal of learning-by-
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doing accrued, on the part of villagers, supporting District Foresters, lo-
cal government authorities, and the courts, as the Duru-Haitemba and
Mgori communities endeavoured to establish their authority and
norms. Each lesson would in due course be reflected in the national
forestry policy and legislation, the latter accordingly unusually detailed
in its prescriptions. Seven of the most critical (and sometimes bitter)
learning experiences are listed below.
1 Community jurisdiction over ‘village forests’ needs to take precedence.
The need for this was first felt in Duru-Haitemba when a District
Magistrate ruled in favour of a timber harvesting group evicted by
the community. The group held a licence issued by a Regional For-
ester. Comparable conflicts of interest repeatedly arose in the Mgori
Forest as new village managers confronted corrupt forestry officials.
The superior authority of recognised community forest authorities
(committees) would in due course be entered into the law, bound
merely to ‘give due regard to advice’ from government authorities.8
2 Village powers need to be as inclusive and forceful as those enjoyed by the
government in respect of its own Local Authority and National Reserves.
This included being able to set their own licence fee levels outside
of listed royalties for national forests, to set fines within a fixed
upper limit and to retain income from fees and fines without sub-
mitting these (relatively minor revenues) to the Treasury, sharing
them with District Authorities, or delivering captured illegal timber
to District Foresters.9 Instances of conflicting interests, in which
District or Regional authorities demanded ‘their cut’ of fines and
fees triggered the need for such clarifications and entrenchment of
new norms (Alden Wily 1995, 1997b, 2002b).
3 Forest is both forestland and the trees that grow on the land. The need
for this clarification arose out of the tendency for foresters to ac-
knowledge that while communities might own the land, the trees
were the property of government. This was obliquely the law as laid
out in the longstanding Forest Ordinance.10 This separation of land
and natural trees on the land was done away with by new Forest
Policy (1998) then the law of 2002. The law would additionally lim-
it the application of listed reserved species to non-village land, al-
lowing communities to determine which species in their own areas
needed to be reserved against felling (Section 65 (1)).
4 Community forest rules, traditional or otherwise, need legal status to en-
sure courts uphold these rules. The capacity of elected village govern-
ments in Tanzania to enact Village By-Laws subject to the approval
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of District Councils had existed since 1978 but had rarely been de-
vised by villages themselves.11 The few Village By-Laws promulgated
were usually sent down by District Councils or by the Ministry of
Local Government for rubber stamping and application by the vil-
lage governments (Village Councils).
Duru-Haitemba changed this. The need for communities to turn
their new Community Forest Rules into formal Village By-Laws
arose when concerned Village Councils found their Rules overruled
by the District Court. In the first case, one of the Councils had
taken two offenders to court in 1995 for failing to pay forest fines.
One culprit argued that it was his right to use the forest as he
wished. The other argued that as a non-member of that community
he could not be fined. The Magistrate demanded to know the
authority upon which the community thought it could levy fines.
The Village Forest Rules were duly presented, but the magistrate
declared them lacking in force.12
Following this and another incident involving the right of a large
stock owner to use the protected zone as pasture, every community
establishing forest rules began to formalise agreed decisions in the
form of Village Forest By-Law. They then submitted these for ap-
proval to the local District Council for its endorsement, in accor-
dance with local government law. At that point, the District Forester
ensured that the District Magistrate received a copy and would
decide cases accordingly. Duru-Haitemba villages would thereafter
proudly inform visitors that ‘even the President must follow our By-
Law if he wants to use our forest’ (Alden Wily 1997). The use of Vil-
lage By-Laws entered the Forest Act, 2002 as a major governance
instrument (s.34-35 & 37). Of necessity, Village Forest Management
Committees also became formally designated Sub-Committees of
the elected Village Council in order to be able to legally apply the
local By-Law.
5 A simpler process than gazettement is needed to make a Village Forest
Reserve official and to remove the need for costly formal surveys of
boundaries. As more and more villages established Reserves in Baba-
ti District where the flagship community forests of Duru-Haitemba
were located, the District Council opened a Register in which to
record the details, referenced to files containing the approved Forest
Management Plan and By-Law. A detailed description of the forest
boundary agreed and witnessed by village authorities and boundary
committees with affected neighbouring communities was consid-
ered sufficient for registration. This entered the law as Village For-
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est Reserve Declaration (s.34 & 41). The new law retained formal ga-
zettement as an option but not necessity. Only 64 communities
among 395 have found the survey costs of gazettement worthwhile
by the time of writing (2008) and nearly all of which are located in
donor-assisted project areas (MNRT 2008).
6 The accountability of villagers appointed to regulate the forest, collect
and expend fees and fines needs to be water-tight, as does the account-
ability of the community as a whole to follow the plan and regulations it
devises. This became steadily more important as declarations of Vil-
lage Forest Reserves multiplied after 1995, with a proportion of fail-
ures emerging over fines and fees money management or failure to
regulate timber use as pledged. One Village Council was taken to
Court in early 1996 by the District Council and ordered to act upon
its commitment to clear the forest of illegally constructed houses,
one constructed by the Village Chairman himself. The new forest
law would provide for District Authorities to take over the manage-
ment of a community forest on a temporary basis where the com-
munity is shown to have failed to improve its performance after
due warnings by the District Forestry Officer (s.41). Communities
themselves also learnt to make use of their right to fire corrupt vil-
lage leaders or forest committee members, already long laid out in
local government law (Alden Wily 2000).
7 Communities should be given the opportunity to manage not just forests
on their own lands but on non-village land. The need for this arose in
Babati District in respect of National Forest Reserves. Already
managing its own Village Reserve, Ayasanda Village Council offered
to manage the adjoining area of Bereko National Forest Reserve,
and would in the event successfully do so. Villagers adjoining the
National Forests of Ufiome and Nou followed suit, adjacent com-
munities being designated Managers of respective areas of those
National Reserves which abutted their village lands.
During debates around the new forest legislation, the question ar-
ose as to whether in fact these forests should be deemed national or
community forests. This was particularly relevant in districts like
Babati where the boundaries of Village Areas were being mapped
as inclusive of National Forest Reserves. Removal of the implication
in new forest law in 2002 that a National Reserve is by definition
national property was never fully obtained. However national land
law is contrary on this matter, rigorously exact that definition of
reserves and parks reflect the conservation legislation under which
they fall, not their tenure provenance. This opened the way for a
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National Reserve to be acknowledged as either national or commu-
nity property depending upon the circumstances.
In the Forest Act, 2002, areas of National Reserves placed under
the guardianship of adjacent communities were referred to as
‘Community Forest Management Areas’ to distinguish them from
Village Land Forest Reserves. As recorded above, 246 National and
Local Authority Forest Reserves were under community manage-
ment by 2008. In the law, the Minister is granted power to re-
gazette a national forest as a community forest as appropriate (s. 22
(2), 29). No such cases had occurred by 2008.
Making New Policy and New Law on the Basis of Working Experience
Following the pioneering initiatives supported by Swedish aid,13 com-
munity-based forest management rapidly evolved as a mainstream
route for forest conservation and management. Most initiatives have
been facilitated by donor-assisted programmes, all of which adopted
the Village Forest Reserve approach as a core element. At the same
time that Duru-Haitemba Forest was coming under acknowledged vil-
lage jurisdiction, programmes in central Tanzania were also encoura-
ging farmers to set aside parts of their private farmlands for natural
woodland recovery (ngitiri) (Alden Wily & Dewees 2001, Mlenge
2002). As these began to multiply in some thousands, this would
shape how Private Forests were defined in the new law (s.15 & 19).
Later, a German-funded project explored how a large commercial indi-
genous plantation could be brought under joint state-people regulation
(Alden Wily 1998). The trial was not entirely satisfactory, but the idea
of a community being able to manage a commercial plantation for the
government or a private investor took root in the law (s.16 & 27).
With supporting expertise from the German Government, a new
Director of Forestry began the process of drafting a new National For-
est Policy in 1997, eventually published in March 1998. This took close
notice of developments on the ground from 1994. The creation of Vil-
lage Forest Reserves was made one of the strategic priorities.
The legal framework for the promotion of private and commu-
nity based ownership of forests and trees will be established...
The communal tenure of village lands which are administered
by elected village councils provides a good legal environment for
the development of community based forest and woodland man-
agement.
(Forest Policy 1998: 4 & 21)
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By 1999 there were sufficient numbers of community forest reserves
in place and for demand to be escalating for this author and 13 in-
volved Government Foresters to compile guidelines for other foresters,
communities and NGOs to follow. This resulted in the first Guidelines
for Community Based Forest Management in Tanzania, duly adopted
by the government as official Guidelines (MNRT 2001).
The drafting of the new forest law followed. This would give legal
force to the above guidelines. A task of the law was to acknowledge ex-
isting Village Forest Reserves as duly formalised (s. 32). While these
had not been illegal since the first three were declared in September
1994, they had not enjoyed definitive legal support as community
owned and managed estates. Such support as they had enjoyed derived
from the Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982.
The Guidelines of 2001, the outlines of which were embedded in
the Forest Act 2002 and its Regulations (2004), have on the whole
proved serviceable, and have recently been reissued with minor proce-
dural amendments (MNRT 2008). Creation of Village Forest Reserves
has continued apace and is likely to continue until most of the 18 mil-
lion hectares of unreserved forest is under village tenure and govern-
ance. An upcoming concern of facilitating agencies and government is
to assist these communities to revisit their initially conservative forest
use plans, to allow for more lucrative revenue flow to still poor forest-
owning communities (Blomley et al. 2008).
The Supporting Role of the Changing Land Tenure Environment
Although ‘leading factors’, neither positive political and administrative
will, nor practical learning by doing were alone responsible for the suc-
cess of the new forest law in offering legal paradigms and procedures
so precisely tailored to locally perceived needs, and in enabling an unu-
sually seamless transition from law to application and uptake.
There was in the first instance, the useful background of institutio-
nalised community government in the form of Village Councils,
launched in the 1970s and embedded legally in local government legis-
lation of 1982. Unlike so many community committees around the
continent, Tanzania’s Village Councils were formal and elected local
governments, empowered to regulate on a range of subjects, broadly
inclusive of land and resource matters. By 1994 Village Councils in
Tanzania had acquired substantial governance experience, although
this had been applied only mildly to resource matters, largely con-
trolled in practice by district and central government authorities. The
awakened environmental consciousness of the 1990s and related hu-
man rights considerations also have served their purpose, albeit largely
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mediated through international advisers into ubiquitous new forest
action plans and policies.14
Most effective of all was the changing land tenure environment in the
1990s, apparent in Tanzania and elsewhere on the continent (Alden
Wily & Mbaya 2001). A short background in order, for the key incentive
for rural communities to declare Village Forest Reserves today is not
difficult to identify. This is to enhance their shaky security of tenure
over off-farm assets, and to be able to exercise the primary advantage of
ownership, to be able to determine how their land resources are used
and by whom. This is a concern for rural communities who endured re-
peated invasion and over-extraction of local forests by outsiders and
those licensed to fell timber by the Forestry Department. It would prove
to be the changing status of customary land rights that provided the
key legal facilitation for communities to take control of their forests.
Threatening Final Demise and Last Minute Rescue of Customary Rights to
Land
In Tanzania, ‘villagisation’ between 1973 and 1978 had placed new
stress on customary tenure. It is debated whether these newly recog-
nised villages (most of which were in fact already in existence), occu-
pied lands in accordance with custom or were rather reconstructed on
a new tenure basis which set aside customary rights. The colonial
legacy begun by the Germans in the 1890s and refined by the British
in a 1923 Land Ordinance still established the position of customary
land rights in the 1970s. This held that Africans occupied lands by the
permission of the State and did not amount in themselves to private
property rights (Alden Wily 1988). A landmark case in 1953-57 had
ruled as much (Mtoro Bin Mwamba v. Attorney-General). Nonetheless,
this lawful possession was to be respected.
By the 1980s rapacious policies were seeing large areas of land
appropriated by the government for mainly Canadian-funded wheat
schemes (Lane & Moorehead 1994). Between 1986 and 1989 new Reg-
ulations under an old 1973 rural planning law systematically extin-
guished customary rights in nine affected areas.15 This was despite
such extinctions being ruled unconstitutional in 1985.16
Just before a high profile Land Commission mandated to develop
land policy was to submit its report to the President in 1992, a new
law was enacted extinguishing customary rights throughout the coun-
try and prohibiting payment of compensation, on the grounds that cus-
tomary rights did not amount to property.17 The motive was broadly ad-
judged to be the land grabbing ambitions of politicians and senior offi-
cials combined with donor pressure to free up land for investment
(Peter & Kijo-Bisamba 2007). A year later, this new law was ruled null
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and void in most of its parts by the High Court (1993).18 The Attorney-
General appealed in 1994 declaring customary rights to amount ‘to
mere occupancy on Government land.’19
The ruling of the Court of Appeal on this matter in 1994 was a
watershed. This placed customary interests on an unambiguous foot-
ing as property. ‘Possession and use of land constitute “property”’.20
Inter alia it was ruled that customary interests are protected by the
Constitution and that deprivation without fair compensation is prohib-
ited. While it was acknowledged that the President holds the radical ti-
tle to all land, this holding was to be seen as only in trust for the indi-
genous inhabitants. As trustee, Presidential powers were to be limited.
‘We have considered this momentous issue with the judicial care it
deserves’, Judge Nyalali wrote challenging the appeal by the Attorney-
General. He continued by saying that, ‘We realize that if the Deputy
Attorney General is correct, then most of the inhabitants of Tanzania
Mainland are no better than squatters in their own country. This is a
serious proposition’.
The ruling was almost certainly greatly influenced by the findings of
the abovementioned Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land
Matters. Chaired by Professor Issa Shivji, the Commission had
laboured long and hard for a full two years (1991-1992) and arrived at
the principles of fair new land policy (MLHUD 1994). A large part of
the inquiry had been devoted to visiting communities throughout the
country. Communities in the north which had been evicted from their
customary lands to make way for the Canadian-funded commercial
wheat schemes made a clear impression on the Commission.
Giving Legal Force to Customary Tenure
Not all the recommendations of the Shivji Land Commission were
adopted into new National Land Policy in 1995 or eventually into the
new land law, comprising The Land Act 1999 and The Village Land
Act 1999. The key recommendation not accepted was advice to do
away with separation of ownership of the land and ownership of rights
to the land, such as Uganda had done by its Constitution of 1995.
Therefore all land in Tanzania remains the property of the nation,
vested in the President as Trustee.21 Land rights are accordingly rights
to occupy and use parcels of this nationally-shared property. This
explains the terminology of land titles in Tanzania as Rights of Occu-
pancy. In the case of customary rights (unlike those granted by the
State) the law confirms that these may be held in perpetuity and regu-
lated by customary norms.22
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Overall the law was at pains to give customary rights the full force of
law as private property interests in land. As well as acknowledging that
these exist whether they are registered or not,23 The Village Land Act is
clear that a Customary Right of Occupancy is ‘in every respect of equal
status and effect with a Granted Right of Occupancy’ (Granted Rights
being those issued directly by the state, not the community, and mainly
applicable in urban areas).24 Moreover, rights which elected Village
Councils had obtained as owners of village lands on behalf of their
communities were extinguished; the new legislation returns the role of
Councils to roles of land governance only. Councils are to regulate land
relations and may set up Village Land Registers into which customary
rights within the area under its jurisdiction (‘village land area’) may be
recorded, along with subsequent transactions affecting those rights.25
Critically, the law is abundantly clear that a customary right may be
held (and registered) as belonging to not only individuals, but couples,
families, groups or whole communities, or even several communities if
the ownership is so shared, such as might be the case with forests or
pasturage.26
In general there has been little in law since 2001 (the year the land
laws of 1999 came into force) that would suggest to communities that
their ownership of forests within their respective village land areas is
not assured. Furthermore, the new land laws provide for customary
land rights to be acknowledged as existing in areas reserved for conser-
vation or other public purposes. This has two critical implications: first,
should a village ‘reserve’ its forest area (as the new Forest Act would
subsequently promote in 2002) this does not remove such lands from
customary tenure; communities may be lawful owner-managers. Sec-
ond, where gazettement of national forest reserves did not extinguish
customary rights then the potential exists for the customary owners of
such nationally important areas to retrieve these as their own collective
property, although the area need not lose its status as a protected area
of national importance. At the time of writing no community has at-
tempted to retrieve a National Forest Reserve as community property,
although no fewer than one thousand communities co-manage these
areas, as shown above.
Limitations
There are however more practical constraints to community secure-
ment of local forestlands as their rightful property. The first lies in the
process of voluntary registration of rights and to which much of the
Village Land Act is devoted. While allowing for spousal co-ownership
and other timely innovations, the classical focus of titling remains, that
is, as geared towards registering the ownership of private homes, farms
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and other fixed assets like shops.27 Communal properties like forests
and pastures are placed in somewhat uncertain territory. Helpfully, the
law implies that before an individual property may be registered, the
community is bound to first identify and describe every communal
area within the village land area in the Village Public Charges Regis-
ter.28 Although there is nothing actually preventing the Council issuing
the community with a Customary Right of Occupancy for these com-
mons, there is no developed provision in the law to encourage and
guide them to do so. Some communities might well wonder if the re-
gistration of these properties in the Public Charges Register represents
more ‘setting-aside’ of lands against entitlement, than acknowledge-
ment of these as private, collectively-owned community property.
A greater constraint to securing communal property arises from the
manner in which the land area of each village is defined. Although the
Village Land Act is explicit that this may include land other than lands
which are farmed (s. 7.1) it takes into account the habit of some district
authorities of the past as excluding much of the woodland and pasture
of communities from the registered description of ‘Village Land Area’.
This was a routine occurrence during the 1980s when District Coun-
cils and Village Councils were trying to limit the survey costs involved
in defining and registering Village Land Areas. As a consequence some
communities have found that their traditional forest areas were ex-
cluded from the recorded definition of their Village Land Areas.
The new law is also not helpful in offering contradictory definitions
of General Land (in effect Government Land). In the Village Land Act,
this is described as a residual category as ‘public land is land which is
not reserved land or village land’. Contrarily, the definition of the sister
Land Act adds ‘… and which includes unoccupied or unused village
land’ (s. 2). Most communities try not to occupy their forest lands and
many try to declare key areas out of bounds for use, in order to rehabi-
litate or protect them. A too literal interpretation of occupation and use
could deprive communities of substantial rangeland, wetland and for-
est lands.
A more concrete threat to collective tenure security derives from the
inclusion of ‘investments of national interest’ as specific grounds on
which the President may acquire village land, albeit through elaborated
modern compulsory acquisition procedures (s.4). The Investment Pro-
motions Board has been working hard in recent years to find land for
foreign investors, who are now permitted to directly own and transfer
land for such purposes (by amendment to the Land Act in 2004).29
The Board’s Land Bank Scheme seeks ‘unoccupied and unused’ land
from villages to provide to investors, backed up by periodic ‘instruc-
tions’ from the government to make such land available. As of 2006,
2.5 million hectares had been acquired from villagers through this
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scheme (Odgaard 2006) and there is no reason to think that this will
not rise as investor interest grows and government persuasion hardens.
This is much easier than compulsorily acquiring (and paying for) cus-
tomarily-owned village land as communities are simply encouraged to
surrender these areas.
Meanwhile World Bank and other donor supported programmes
have been actively supporting titling programmes on village lands but
which unfortunately once again focus upon house and farm entitle-
ment, and largely for the purposes of collateralisation. As of old, such
programmes ignore collective lands within Village Land Areas, despite
these being self-evidently most at risk of wrongful appropriation. Pri-
vate farm titling also tends to encourage a flurry of expansion into vil-
lage communal lands.30
A further threat to communal properties derives from the wildlife
sector. Unlike the forestry sector, the values of wildlife for hunting con-
cessions have been so high over the last two decades that the Wildlife
Department has exercised little constraint in allocating swathes of cus-
tomary property (village land) in northern Tanzania to foreign interests,
on the grounds that the state, not communities, owns wildlife. This is
a strategy embedded in the Wildlife Policy 1998 and 2002 Regulations.
The vast village domains of pastoralists have been primarily affected,
adding to existing threat from the National Livestock Policy 2006. This
echoes the government’s plan to sedentise nomads, bringing their pro-
duction under ranching schemes (Odgaard 2006), an attempt last tried
and failed in the 1960s and 1970s.31 Needless to say, many of the pas-
toral lands are wooded, as are many integrated pasture and woodland
areas in other drier parts of the country. Through the allocation of
hunting concessions by the Wildlife Division, rural communities in the
north of Tanzania have lost literally millions of prime collectively
owned property, even though in law it is only control over the wildlife
that they have lost.
The Role of Village Forest Reserves in Customary Land Security Today
It is into this pool of vulnerability of collectively owned customary
properties that the Forest Act’s accessible construct of Village Land and
Community Forest Reserves shows its exceptional utility. As law and
policy currently stand, and/or are interpreted, this represents the most
tangible mechanism through which rural communities may clarify and
entrench their customary possession and jurisdiction of common
lands.
At a minimum, declaration of Village Reserves removes large areas
of community land from potential designation as ‘unused or unoccu-
pied’, demonstrating these as purposely unoccupied. Creation of Vil-
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lage Reserves additionally triggers precise inter-community boundary
definition within previously broad wooded boundary areas and which
would have run the risk of being declared owned by neither commu-
nity and made directly vulnerable to Government claims that these
lands are unowned or unused. Declaration of Village Land Forest Re-
serves has for some time enabled many communities to re-align
boundaries where incautious earlier mapping of Village Land Areas by
district authorities had deliberately or inadvertently removed their col-
lective properties.
Still, the lack of an explicit land law construct through which a com-
munity is not only encouraged but bound to register its communal
assets as collective private property may be seen as a dangerous legal
lacuna for communities. Until such a mechanism is provided rural
communities in Tanzania are quite right to look to the village forest re-
serve construct to help secure these resources.
A Final Word
The case elaborated in this chapter, forest land rights in Tanzania, is
not the only occasion whereby fairer and more workable natural re-
sources law has been pursued through an experiential and community-
based approach, extending well beyond public consultations.
Benin is another case where a new land law is emerging out of sub-
stantial piloting in villages (Lavigne Delville 2004). Cases most familiar
to this author include Afghanistan and Sudan (Alden Wily 2008b). In
Afghanistan the issue at stake is the ownership of the massive pasture
resource, which embraces anywhere from 45 to 65 percent of the na-
tional land area and supports millions of rural families. Unclarity as to
its ownership has blighted state-people and inter-tribal relations for the
last century and was one of many drivers to civil war in the 1980s. The
early post-conflict administration from 2001 remained resistant to
amending the status of pasture as government property and which it
had chosen to allocate to favoured Pashtun nomadic groups, thereby
overlaying rights often anciently held by settled populations. It fell to
interested conflict resolution actors working with local communities to
trial more workable paradigms, gradually involving key government de-
partments. The result in 2008 is a quite radically altered draft Range-
land Law sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture. It remains far from
clear that sufficient support can be garnered from other government
agencies, politicians (and conservative foreign advisers) to see these
proposals into law, and from law into active application. Reluctant gov-
ernment support in the piloting exercises which underwrite the new
proposals suggests that willingness to genuinely devolve even the regu-
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latory powers communities need to be effective, is hard to come by, in
an environment which remains determinedly centralised. While gains
have been made it is unlikely at this point that community-based pas-
ture management will be underwritten with acknowledgement of com-
munities as pasture owners (Alden Wily 2008c).
In 2004-05, a comparable learning by doing initiative was launched
in central Sudan to tackle contested relations between Khartoum and
communities over the ownership of invaluable plains lands (Alden
Wily 2008b). This proved even less successful in that resulting drafted
legislation in the two states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile never
reached their legislatures and showed no sign of doing in the years
since. Nevertheless, the process of working in the field with commu-
nities to devise fair and workable new tenure law has had other positive
outcomes; many tens of rural communities have used the exploratory
experience to clarify inter-tribal and cultivator-nomad disputes over
lands and to harden their claims for restitution of millions of hectares
of wrongfully appropriated plains lands before and during the civil war.
Meanwhile Southern Sudan adopted many aspects of the un-adopted
legislation in the north into its own land law provisions, in draft in
2008. Most particularly, these drafts fully acknowledge that customary
land rights, including those affecting commons, are property interests
and must be fully upheld by courts and administrations alike.
These cases demonstrate that workable legal paradigms can emerge
out of practical engagement with those citizens most affected by land
and resource legislation and particularly from processes which seek to
do more than consult, but to learn by doing. By ensuring that
appropriate officials are brought into the process, real progress may be
made in breaking down the traditional resistance of officialdom to new
paradigms and fostering waning administrative and political will. In
this manner, people’s law rather than government’s law has a better
chance to evolve and to be more useful and lasting. Where state-people
differences over land rights have shown themselves able to all too
easily spill into open conflict, as in Sudan and Afghanistan, the adop-
tion of a people’s law-making approach is even more urgently required
– although it may surely take much longer to bring results than has
been exampled in the positive historical environment of Tanzania.
Notes
1 This paper was drafted in February 2008.
2 See Alden Wily, Chapagain & Sharma 2008 for a global review of land reform.
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3 Some refer to tiny proportions of national populations, such as Norway’s Finnmark
Law 2005 recognising Sami land rights and India’s Forest Rights Act 2008 limiting
its scope to India’s 10 million forest dwellers.
4 Around three in ten villages do a poor job of carrying through on their plans and one
fails altogether; Alden Wily 2002. Also see Blomley and Ramadhani 2006.
5 A sample Village Forest Management Plans is provided in Alden Wily 1995.
6 The Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act 1992.
7 The Land Management Programme (LAMP).
8 Sections 8 (2), 14, 30 (2), 34 (5) (6).
9 Sections 14, 34, 65, 78, 79.
10 More dramatic use of this separation of trees from the land had occurred in a num-
ber of other African states, such as in Liberia (Alden Wily 2007).
11 The Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act
No. 21 of 1975, superseded by the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7
of 1982, amended significantly in 1992.
12 These cases are reported upon in Alden Wily 1997.
13 The Duru-Haitemba and other early community-based forest management projects
in Arusha Region were initiated under the Swedish Regional Forestry Programme
but sustained and expanded by the Swedish-funded Land Management Programme
(LAMP), continuing until the present (2008).
14 Among which the non-binding Forest Principles and Agenda 21 under Rio in 1992
must prominently rank as globally highly influential. Refer FAO 2002, Ch. 10 for
treatment. ILO’s Convention No. 169, adopted in 1989 on Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples has also been influential.
15 Government Notices 656 of 1986, 88 of 1987, 338 of 1988 and 260 of 1989, made
under Rural Lands (Planning and Utilization) Act No. 14 of 1973.
16 In a case brought by Barabaig against the State, High Court of Arusha Civil Case 27
of 1985.
17 Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act No. 22 of 1992.
18 Lohay Akonaay and Another v. The Hon. Attorney-General, High Court of Tanzania
at Arusha Misc. Civil Case No. 1 of 1993 (unreported). Akonaay and his son had al-
ready successfully appealed against their eviction under the 1987 Government Order
which cancelled customary rights in 92 villages, and were threatened with eviction
again under the new act.
19 Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1993. Reported
in 1995 2 LRC 399. The full opinion of this landmark ruling is reproduced in Peter
1997.
20 Judgment by C.L. Nyalali, Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1994, Court of Appeal of Tanzania.
21 The Land Act, s. 3 (1) a.
22 Village Land Act, s.18.1.
23 Village Land Act, s. 2.
24 Village Land Act, s.2.18.
25 Village Land Act, s.7.6 and 7.7.
26 Village Land Act, s. 11, 12 and 13.
27 Village Land Act, Part IV Sub Part B.
28 Village Land Act, s.12 and 13 and Village Land Act Regulations.
29 Amendments to sections 19, 20 and 37 of the Land Act, 1999 by The Land (Amend-
ment) Act No. 2 of 2004 (s. 2-6).
30 The two main programmes are a World Bank funded programme known as SPILL
and a programme launched under the guidance of Hernando de Soto, MKURAMBI-
TA, funded by the Norwegian Government.
31 Under the Range Development and Management Act 1964.
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5 Future Cadastres
Paul Van Der Molen1
Introduction
Significant differences are currently exhibited between the cadastres of
the world’s some 30 to 50 countries which either possess, or will
shortly possess cadastres with an appropriate performance, and the
other 140-160 that will not have implemented appropriate systems
within the near future (van der Molen & Lemmen 2005). Many coun-
tries still have a great deal of work to do before they can meet the chal-
lenges laid down in ‘Cadastre 2014’ (Kaufmann & Steudler 1998),
although they could adopt its propositions as guiding principles.
An enlightened view of the current situation would be to perceive
the cadastral systems (for a definition of a ‘cadastre’ see FIG2 State-
ment on the Cadastre 1995) of all countries as being in a phase of de-
velopment; the only difference between them is that they are not all in
the same phase. However, an inventory of the status quo of cadastres
(see second section) reveals significant differences between two cate-
gories of countries, i.e. those in which cadastres could develop as an
integral element in the continual evolution of their country’s institu-
tions, and those countries in which this was either not possible, or did
not take place. The first category have implemented cadastres with a
national coverage and within an accepted structure of public adminis-
tration and legal frameworks; the second category is confronted with
legal pluralism (Von Benda-Beckmann 1991), and their governments
are currently fully occupied with providing for nation building, govern-
ance, and the enforcement of their legislation. The different situations
confronting the countries in these two categories give rise to the expec-
tation that their perceptions of ‘Cadastre 2014’ will also be dissimilar.
However, if it can be assumed that the world’s community is serious
about the requirement of appropriate cadastres for the eradication of
poverty (World Bank 2003, UN/Habitat 2004, FAO 2002), sustainable
development (Bathurst 1999, FIG 2001) and economic development
(De Soto 2000, World Bank 2008), it will be evident that attention
should be devoted primarily to the future cadastres of countries in the
second category. These countries’ cadastres will not necessarily be ‘Ca-
dastre 2014’ compliant; they will probably be simple systems, designed
to make the appropriate contribution to the basic security of land ten-
ure, basic land markets, and basic government land policy. The degree
of simplicity of these cadastres will be determined by the purposes for
which they are intended.
This chapter begins with a brief analysis of the potential purposes
and continues with an outline description of a potential migration path
that would allow for the incremental development of systems in re-
sponse to society’s needs.
Background
At present, there is no systematic worldwide monitoring of cadastres,
although Commission 7 of the FIG is attempting to provide for moni-
toring of this nature (Steudler & Kaufmann 2002) and the standar-
dised country reports.3 For Europe, the Working Party on Land Admin-
istration of the UN/ECE publishes a Land Inventory4 and the annual
World Bank Doing Business Reports comprise a chapter on registra-
tion of property rights in some 178 countries (e.g. World Bank 2008).
Nevertheless, the findings from Van der Molen & Lemmen (2005) pro-
vide a basis for some cautious conclusions.
Cadastres are almost always restricted to land tenure, based on Wes-
tern common law and civil codes (statutory land tenure); cadastres
would appear to have difficulties with catering for other forms of land
tenure (Toulmin & Quan 2000, Burns 2007, Payne et al. 2008).
Land tenure arrangements are both complex and locally determined,
and they cannot readily be replaced by statutory forms of land tenure.
Many examples are known of populations which continue to exhibit
their traditional conduct even after their government has introduced
new statutory forms of land tenure and registration (Von Benda-Beck-
mann 1991, Bruce & Migot-Adholla 1993). In other words, these new
forms of land tenure are alien to the population, probably because they
are not compatible with the country’s traditional societal structure.
Consequently the reform of land tenure needs to take more account of
the prevailing standards and values in the country’s society.
The allocation of duties, responsibilities and competences in public
administration (inclusive of cadastres) is not always commensurate
with the public’s understanding of the structure of their society, as a re-
sult of which they do not always have affinity with the organisation of
their government. Consequently cadastral agencies need to take more
account of the population’s perception of their governance structure
(World Bank 2003).
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Political Aspects of Cadastres
A cadastre is not an end in itself. It is a tool to serve society. What the
society requires is a matter of political choices about ‘the legal and so-
cial prescription that dictate how the land and the benefits of the land
are to be allocated’ (UN/ECE 1996). Manji (2006) demonstrates that
this is not common thinking and that some countries ‘were faced with
a new land law before any true political discussion’. The political nature
of the land issue relates to different approaches, in the whole spectrum
from a communist to liberal ideology. Neo-liberal approaches appear to
be promoted by De Soto (2000) and the World Bank (2003), while
many experts challenge this approach, amongst them Manji (2006)
and Benda-Beckmann (2003).
Meanwhile, the relationship between land policy and cadastral sys-
tems has not been explored much, at least not during two meetings or-
ganised by the ITC/Kadaster School for Land Administration Studies
(UNU Windhoek 2005, UNU Tokyo 2006), where decision-makers on
‘land’ in Africa and Asia reflected on the issue, concluding that the re-
lation was a difficult one. This relationship by consequence is a field
for research (Van der Molen 2006), because the way a government
wants to deal with access to land and land related benefits will have im-
pact on the choice of the cadastral concept, design and content of the
information system, processes, and legal meaning of the data (Van der
Molen 2002). Development of laws governing cadastres therefore re-
quire adequate political consideration and consent, embedded in an ac-
ceptance of societal groups ensuring that the new law is fair. The ba-
sics of cadastres are simple: the registrar writes in the land book the
name of an owner, and the land surveyor surveys a boundary and
draws it on the map. However, if it is the wrong name, and the wrong
line, then citizen’s trust is lost and the system will be obsolete. This is
proven to be extra manifest in post-conflict countries (FIG/UN 2003).
Development of the Cadastre
The implementation of cadastral concepts imported from other coun-
tries has often proven to be unsuccessful. Many problems are encoun-
tered due to the incompatibility of these concepts with forms of land
tenure based on the country’s history and cultural development, an in-
compatibility which results in a cadastral system that is often totally in-
adequate for the community’s needs This sometimes leads to the as-
sumption that it would be preferable for governments to begin with
the ‘introduction of land information systems that do not include a ca-
dastre’ (Fourie 2001). Although ‘Cadastre 2014’ offers these countries
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significant guidelines, they are still far from the achievement of the
vision as phrased in this document.
Basic Concepts of Traditional Land Administration
Cadastral systems are based on the immovable nature of land, where
‘land’ should be understood as the surface inclusive of all the space
above the surface, all the layers below the surface, all groundwater, and
all fixtures. The concept of land ownership employed by the various
groups of Western legislation is based on this broad interpretation of
what ‘land’ is.
The key is the conventional concept of ownership; for example, the
Netherlands’ Civil Code (Articles 5:20 and 5:21) defines ownership of
land as ownership of the ‘ground’ including ‘ownership of all space
above surface, all earth layers below, all groundwater, and all fixtures’.
Similar definitions are employed in Germany, in the Bu¨rgerliches Ge-
zetsbuch (§ 905), in the UK, in France, and in Belgium (RAVI 2000).
Consequently ownership constitutes the most comprehensive right a
person can possess with respect to an object, being comprised of the
following characteristics (UN/ECE/Trade 1995):
– The owner is free to use the object, whilst observing the rights of
other persons and the restrictions pursuant to the law or the rules
of unwritten law;
– Ownership is an exclusive right, i.e. no other person may exercise
any right over the object unless pursuant to legal or contractual
grounds;
– In principle the owner is entitled to all his property.
However ownership may be subject to the following restrictions:
– The rights of other persons with respect to the object, both in terms
of real rights and personal rights;
– Restrictions pursuant to the applicable legislation;
– Restrictions pursuant to unwritten law.
This concept of ownership largely determines the nature of the cadas-
tre: the right of ownership is exercised by an individual person. The
broad concept of ownership is often understood as a bundle of rights
that can be sub-divided into separate rights: other persons can possess
parts of the bundle of rights, if these rights can be separated from the
strict ‘ownership’ of land. Examples of these subdivided rights are
rights of superficies, accession, mineral rights, rights of apartment,
and rights of condominium. Modern approaches speak about ‘RRR’,
which stands for rights + restrictions + responsibilities on land (Bennet
et al. 2006).
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Consequently the first basic concept of conventional cadastres per-
tains to the unambiguous identification of persons who exercise real
rights.
Since the objective of cadastral systems is to register real rights within
the statutory system of real rights (the Roman-law family actually incor-
porates a numerus clausus of real rights) the registration will be limited
to those rights, as will the mapping of boundaries on the cadastral
map. It should be realised that the cadastre endeavours to record or
register rights to and interests in land because the law recognises these
rights and interests as a legitimate relationship between a rightful clai-
mant and a specific parcel of land. Consequently this relationship has
a legal significance, i.e. a legal definition has been drawn up of the re-
lationship that is legally binding to other persons (third parties). This
is due to the fact that although land rights refer to the relationship be-
tween man and land, society perceives this as a man-man relationship
with respect to land. As a result other people will need to have access
to information about the legal status of land so as to determine their
approach to the purchase of land, creation of derived rights, etc. In the
absence of a legal definition of property rights and legally-defined me-
chanisms for their acquisition, transfer, protection, restriction or crea-
tion the recording or registration of these rights and interests would be
legally meaningless.
Consequently the second basic concept of the conventional cadastre
pertains to the unambiguous definition of the rights to land, either
pursuant to statutory law (in the French and German-law families) or
pursuant to common law (in the English-law family).
Western jurisdictions employ a legal concept whereby the object on
which rights are exercised, the land, is a known spatial unit. So as to
render this spatial unit unambiguous to both the owner and third par-
ties it is required to possess an explicit definition, and to be specified
by geometric determination based on measurements of the boundaries
determined by either approximate (‘general boundaries’) or accurate
(‘fixed boundaries’) means. This is also applicable to elements of the
bundle of rights that are segregated and assigned to other title-holders,
if the specific object on which these title-holders exercise their rights
are also established by geometric means.
Consequently the third basic concept of a conventional cadastre per-
tains to the object on which rights are exercised being provided with
an explicit definition and being capable of determination by geometric
means, segregation from other objects, and mapping.
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Henssen (Henssen 1996) summarised these basic concepts, as ela-
borated by Kaufmann & Steudler (Kaufmann & Steudler 1998), in the
diagram shown in Figure 1.
This diagram can be further elaborated on the basis of the discussion of
the substance of right holder, relation, and land. So as to render the con-
tent more specific, ‘right holder’ – as the exerciser of rights – is defined
as either an individual or a group of specific members comprised of a
legally-recognised number of individual members, because they assign
legal representation of the collective. Interestingly, ultimate legal cer-
tainty about this relationship collective-individual member is normally
provided by chambers of commerce-type of registers (‘trade-registers’).
‘Relationship’ is defined as a real right (right in rem) that is provided
with a strict legal definition. ‘Land’ is perceived as a defined parcel of
land, i.e. a parcel of land which possesses demarcated boundaries estab-
lished either by an approximate or accurate determination, but always
with specified boundaries. The modified diagram is shown in Figure 2.
With the growing awareness that collective right holders (apart from
private law bodies like companies and foundations) more and more in-
clude public organisations, another development is evolving, namely
that rights to immovables exercised by public bodies often regard other
land objects than cadastral parcels (such as zoning areas, soil protec-
tion areas), so that the cadastral parcel box should be enlarged with
other legal objects. This is also envisaged by ‘Cadastre 2014’. This is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper (Figure 3).
Figure 1 Conventional cadastral concept
Right holder
Land
Relationship
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New Insights into the Man-Land Relationship
Although the rigidity of the ‘Western’ approach is often challenged (e.g.
Bruce & Migot-Adholla 1993) the four World Bank seminars on Land
Policy in 2003 held in Budapest (3-6 April), Kampala (April 29-May 2),
Pachuca (19-22 May) and Phnom Penh (4-6 June) exhibit a major
breakthrough with respect to the recognition of what has been referred
to as indigenous systems of land tenure, i.e. customary tenure and
other forms of non-formal tenure (e.g. informal ‘rights’). The World
Bank states that ‘it now is widely recognised that the universal provi-
sion of secure land rights within a country does not require uniformity
of the legal arrangements, and that there is some form of consensus
on the desirability of having legal recognition of customary forms of
tenure and land right for the indigenous people. The Bank devotes
greater attention to the sustainable management and evolution of cus-
tomary tenure systems. Communities should be allowed to choose be-
tween different types of tenure’ (World Bank 2003).
Research reveals that some countries develop land legislation which
endeavours to integrate customary tenure within the formal system
(Van der Molen & Silayo 2008). For example, Bosworth (2002) reports
on Uganda, where the Land Act (enacted in 1998) provides for meth-
Figure 2 Elaborated conventional (Western) cadastral concept
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Statutory right ’in 
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Figure 3 Extension of the concept of cadastral parcel toward legal cadastral object
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ods to adjudicate customary landrights and comprises the issuing of
(a) certificates of customary ownership; and (b) occupation-certificates
for tenants on mailo land5, as well as the establishment of a Land Fund
to assist in the market-based transfer of rights between tenants and
landowners. These certificates will be mortgageable. Consequently, the
Act recognises group rights to land by means of the registration of
communal land associations with elected management committees.
Quadros (2002) reports on Mozambique, where the Land Act 1998,
recognises customary rights in the form of co-titling and the need to
consult with the local communities as part of the authorisation process
for new investments. In Namibia, a new Land Law is pending that will
address the broad issues of communal land reform by means of the
creation of regional land boards (Pohamba 2002). Van den Berg
(2000) states that under a new Act in South Africa communal titles
can be granted to Communal Property Associations. In Bolivia the
INRA Act (1996) (Ley Instituto Nacional Reforma Agraria) provides for
the recognition of Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCOs), i.e. land be-
longing to indigenous groups (Zoomers 2000, Assink 2008).
The recognition of customary rights also devotes attention to rights
of sheep and cattle farmers. In many countries (such as Kenya, Tanza-
nia, Rwanda), there are serious conflicts between traditional nomadic
sheep or cattle farmers and arable farmers about grazing and farming
lands. Tanzania’s new village Land Act provides for the sharing of pas-
toral and agricultural land by sheep and cattle farmers and arable farm-
ers on the basis of adjudication and mutual agreements (Mutakyamil-
wa 2002). In analogy with pastoral rights, the problem of overlapping
rights has yet to be resolved in many countries. For Kenya, a solution
is proposed by Lengoiboni (2011).
This brings us to the issue of the nature of the spatial unit which
forms the basis for registration. Objects on which customary rights are
exercised are not always accurately defined (Neate 1999). Within this
context, O¨sterberg (2002) advocates a flexible and non-traditional ap-
proach to the spatial component. Fourie (2002a, 2002b) notes that
non-cadastral information should be integrated in spatial information
systems, since ‘the high accuracies and expensive professional exper-
tise associated with the cadastre has meant that there is too little cadas-
tral coverage in Africa’.
The conclusion to be drawn is that the conventional basic concept is
affected in three ways:
– The subject: group ownership with defined and non-defined mem-
bership;
– The rights: types of customary and non-formal rights (‘informal’
rights);
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– The object: other objects than accurate and established units of ca-
dastral parcels.
The Impact on the Basic Concept of a Cadastre
Do governments bear the sole responsibility for the definition of the
subjects, objects and rights that are to be recorded? The answer is ob-
viously ‘no’, since the government is not the only party involved in the
definition of the relationship between man and land. In addition to
land rights based on statutory and common law, these relationships
can also be based on the country’s customary traditions or its informal
use. As such a cadastre possesses a direct relationship with the prevail-
ing standards and values in the country’s society or community.
In the absence of an in-depth understanding of land tenure arrange-
ments it will prove difficult, if not impossible, to identify the processes
involved in the determination, recording and dissemination of informa-
tion about tenure arrangements. When viewed from a land-tenure per-
spective cadastral systems entail the registration of the existing land
tenure in a manner which imparts a given added value – i.e. the cer-
tainty offered to the persons possessing registered rights that those
rights will remain in force until such time as they might be revoked in
a legal and comprehensible manner. In our opinion the meaning of
the term legal within this context should be understood as any system
of standards and values that offers transparency, reliability and predict-
ability to the relevant community. This in turn implies that customary
rights or indigenous standards should be regarded as fully eligible for
land registration and cadastral purposes. In fact this also needs to
extend to what are referred to as informal settlements (irrespective of
their precise nature); these should also be eligible for the purposes of
registration of titles to land, subject to the provision that the land rela-
tionships are generally accepted and perceived as being legitimate with-
in society – i.e. provided that the relevant society regards the rights to
land as being legitimate, and provided that the population is familiar
with the rules pertaining to the allocation, acquisition and transfer of
land. This once again demonstrates that in essence it is possible to reg-
ister or maintain records of relationships between man and land irre-
spective of the nature of the country’s jurisdiction; this ability offers op-
portunities for the integration of statutory, customary and informal
arrangements within cadastral systems. In fact, the opposite is actually
true: the registration and recording of relationships between man and
land will be meaningless, if those relationships are not accepted and
the standards and values pertaining to those arrangements lack trans-
parency, reliability and predictability. Governments are, irrespective of
the situation in the relevant country, exhibiting an increasing tendency
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to incorporate some form of recognition of customary land tenure in
their land legislation (Van der Molen & Silayo 2008).
These measures provide for the registration of these rights to land in
the existing cadastre or in separate ‘official’ registers (such as native
title registers) (Neate 1999). This would appear to be preferable to the
imposition of a foreign land tenure system on a society with its own
land standards and values, as is also apparent from Bruce & Migot-
Adholla’s discussion of the ‘replacement paradigm’ or ‘adaptation para-
digm’ (1993). However in some situations it may well be necessary to
replace these rights, i.e. in the event of the collapse of customary struc-
tures as a result of:
– Population pressures resulting in the implementation of individual
forms of land tenure;
– The scarcity of land, thereby rendering the traditional allocation of
land impossible;
– The need for formal credit for smallholders;
– The growth in land-market initiatives;
– The increasing migration of the population;
– The development of conflicts between the customary groups at the
periphery of their jurisdiction;
– The need for the deployment of land management tools (planning
& development, lands taxation);
– The need for government-led land and water-resource management.
In such situations preference is given to an inter-disciplinary approach
to the formulation of land administration policy in which land surveyors,
for example, cooperate closely with sociologists, anthropologists and
lawyers (Fourie 2002a). These new insights can now be incorporated in
a further modification of the diagram of the three basic concepts of the
cadastral systems. The modified diagram is shown in Figure 4.
The entity exercising the land rights is now extended to commu-
nities, i.e. a specified group of persons (e.g. tribe, family, village). How-
ever, in this situation the individual members of that group may not be
specified (i.e. in terms of their membership of a tribe, a family, stool,
skin etc.), although in some cases this is an issue, for example in the
US, where certain members belong to Indian tribes in order to enjoy
the benefits given to the tribes by the government (NRC 2007). The
members’ rights pertain to a relationship with the land that is in accor-
dance with the standards and values of the relevant community,
although these rights will need to be defined if it is to be possible to
provide third parties with legally meaningful information. In these
situations the parcel of land, i.e. the object on which the rights are
exercised, may be defined in a manner other than accurate land sur-
veys and geometrical measurements. O¨sterberg (2002) shows pro’s
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and con’s of various perspectives in effect, coverage, costs, technology
and implementation time. For Ghana, Arko-Adjei (2011) provides a
practical solution.
Intermediate Conclusion
Recent developments call for redefining the traditional ‘Western’ basic
concepts of a cadastre. An expansion of these concepts to encompass
customary and non-formal (informal) rights will offer opportunities to
land-policy analysts, land registrars and land surveyors to improve the
incorporation of the world’s large tracts of land in those countries in
which the implementation of a cadastre is proceeding at an excessively
slow pace. The current situation whereby so many countries are unable
to profit from the benefits from a cadastre in the same manner as ‘Wes-
tern’ countries (UN/ECE/WPLA 2005) cannot be allowed to continue,
and consequently the mobilisation of all possible resources is required.
The achievement of this objective will require the development of in-
stitutions and operations that are able to provide for:
– The maintenance of records or registration of social groups with
non-individualised membership;
– The maintenance of records or registration of the various forms of
customary and non-formal (informal) rights;
– The maintenance of records or registration of parcels of land which
are not defined using geometrics, and which possess flexible
boundaries.
Figure 4 Extended cadastral concept
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Particular attention will need to be devoted to the relationship between
customary, non-formal (informal) rights and the formal system, since
these systems should not be designed in isolation from each other
(Fourie 2002a, 2002b).
Purposes of a Cadastre
Investments in the cadastre are related to a justification on the basis of
the intended purpose(s) of the cadastre (the common business-case
approach). The functionality of the system should meet the require-
ments of its users. In the absence of a thorough analysis of the
intended roles to be played by a cadastre, it will be difficult to furnish
an adequate justification for the allocation of the necessary funds.
Although cadastre might have multi-purposes, I mention three main
goals, namely land tenure, land markets and land use.
Improving the Security of Land Rights
Cadastres differ from other geo-information systems in the sense that
they specify more than solely the physical attributes of spatial objects;
they also lay down the relationship between man and land in the form
of the rights, restrictions and responsibilities for the right holders.
These relationships can be based on statutory or common law, custom-
ary traditions, or informal use.
The tools employed in the implementation of a cadastral system are
adjudication and mapping. These tools are focused on the creation of
records of existing land tenure arrangements, i.e. the status quo. Conse-
quently both adjudication and mapping are of an intrinsically static
nature. It should be realised that adjudication entails the definitive and
authoritative specification of the existing rights to a given parcel of land
(Lawrance 1985). Land adjudication does not create rights; it merely es-
tablishes the existing rights (Simpson 1976).
Mapping, in the sense of the determination of a geo-reference for
the object on which the land rights are exercised, also intrinsically re-
flects the status quo. The mapping element of a cadastre needs to pro-
vide a sufficiently-detailed specification of the location of the object. It
would be incorrect to assume that this specification can be obtained so-
lely by drawing up a definition of the cadastral parcel and carrying out
an accurate survey of the boundaries. In fact, any form of geo-reference
that is recognised by the community will be adequate for the purposes
of the specification of the object. Conversely, it would also be incorrect
to presume that a specification of an object that does not make any re-
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ference to the surface of the earth would provide sufficient evidence of
the location of an object (e.g. address without co-ordinate).
In many countries the provision of secure access to land has been
assigned a high priority in line with the recommendations enclosed in
the global plans of action drawn up by Agenda-21 (1992), Habitat
(1996) and Johannesburg Summit (2002), as well as the former
UNCHS Global Campaign for Secure Tenure and recent Habitat Glo-
bal Land Tool Network GLTN. The main goal is the eradication of pov-
erty, as stated in the Millennium Development Goals. Consequently
measures implemented to encourage the security of tenure focus lar-
gely on the urban and rural poor, and on vulnerable groups (the indi-
genous population and women). The use of conventional forms of ten-
ure to provide security of tenure (freehold, leasehold, etc.) has proven
to be a cumbersome approach that ultimately results in lengthy proce-
dures which offer totally inadequate access to the poor (World Bank
2003, 2008; De Soto 2000). Consequently governments have to adopt
an innovative approach with new forms of land tenure and simplified
land rights that can be assigned with relative ease. Examples of these
new forms are certificates of right, occupancy licenses, permission to
occupy, land sharing constructions, corporate land banks, community
land trusts, and anti-eviction orders. All these forms of land tenure
share, to a greater or lesser extent, a common characteristic; they all
provide basic de facto security rather than sophisticated de jure security.
Better Regulation of Land Markets
The transfer of land rights in the market environment is based on the
concept that land is a commodity which can be bought and sold and,
from a legal perspective, the land rights can be transferred from one
person to another. The extent to which cadastres are maintained in an
up-to-date condition depends largely on the nature of the procedures
involved in the transfer of land. The aforementioned global plans of
action severely criticise the manner in which cadastral personnel
design and organise their procedures. For example, in a paper given to
the 1994 Congress of the International Federation of Surveyors, Barnes
(1994) states that the issue of land titles in Ecuador could take as long
as between nine months and five years, whilst the procedure in Bolivia
involved 23 steps stretching over many years, and in Peru the issue in-
volved a procedure comprised of more than 200 steps that required
about 43 months to complete (De Soto 2000). Fourie (1999) is of the
opinion that cadastral and land information systems constitute one of
the most significant impediments to the transfer of land. The systems
are centralised to an excessive degree, are too expensive, are not tai-
lored to the urban poor – the majority of the population – since they
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cannot afford them, are too frequently based on a colonial approach,
are excessively complex, and lack transparency. Van der Molen & O¨ster-
berg (1999) discuss technical imperfections. The land administration
system will – irrespective of the nature and causes of any changes –
need to be able to accommodate all changes in the relationship be-
tween man and land.
The World Bank (2003) states that access to land and access to cred-
it, especially for the poor, should be promoted by the implementation
of simple, rapid and explicit clear procedures, cheap and accessible
information about land, and explicit definitions of land tenure and
property rights. In view of the unequal distribution of income around
the world it is a moot point as to whether the tools possessed by gov-
ernments can regulate the markets in a manner that is not beneficial
solely to the rich. Some East European countries are beginning to give
consideration to the imposition of restrictions in the new open land
market to avoid a situation in which a few privatisation-oligarchs would
rapidly possess the majority of the country’s land. It should be realised
that a true free open market can have disastrous effects. There is no
doubt that the abolition of moratoria on land transactions, the elimina-
tion of restrictions on the size of ownership, the elimination of price
restrictions, the elimination of land use restrictions and the minimisa-
tion of preferential rights for the government will be to the benefit of
the rich. Governments should endeavour to implement a balanced set
of regulations capable of managing the land market in a manner such
that the poor can gain access to land and credit (Dale & Baldwin 2000)
– an opinion based on the belief that land should be regarded as not
just a commodity, but also a scarce communal resource in need of care-
ful management.
The point is that as soon as these restrictions have power against
third parties (e.g. buyers) they must be knowable through registration.
On the other hand, the government cannot monitor – without inclu-
sion in the cadastre – its application.
Better Development of the Use of Urban and Rural Land
The planning of the use of urban and rural land involves the stipula-
tion of a specific use for land. This can result in voluntary or compul-
sory changes in land rights as a result of either voluntary action by the
owners and users (adapting the land use), or compulsory action by the
government (expropriation).
The FAO Guidelines for Land Use Planning (1983) recognise legal
and traditional ownership and usage rights to land, trees, and grazing
areas as one of the important basic elements for the development of
land-use plans. In its study of the role of legislation in land-use plan-
124 PAUL VAN DER MOLEN
ning of 1985 the FAO emphasised that questions like ‘who is the legal
owner of the land’ and ‘who actually controls the land’, as well as to
the manner in which ‘customary rights are incorporated in statutory
law’ are substantial input to the planning process.
Although the attention of international organisations is increasingly
being drawn to urbanisation, they should not neglect the rural areas,
since the complex of food, water and land is important for the resolu-
tion of food shortage (FIG 1999, World Bank 2003, FIG 2004, HLPE
2011).
However, in mentioning urbanisation it cannot be denied that the
growth of urban and peri-urban regions also constitutes a major pro-
blem. Experience reveals that governments are often unable to cope
with the migration of the rural population to the cities, in turn result-
ing in an increasing number of informal settlements. It is estimated
that as much as 80% of the growth in the urban regions may be infor-
mal settlements. This causes rapid exacerbation of problems in the
urban fabric, and results in a lack of services, the absence of an infra-
structure, poor housing and, above all, insecurity of land tenure. The
HABITAT Global Plan of Action 1996 regards security of tenure as
one of the most essential elements of a successful shelter strategy; con-
sequently it is hardly surprising that the former Global Campaign for
Secure Tenure has assigned top priority to its opposition to forced evic-
tion – especially since forced eviction is always associated with the
worst housing conditions, always has the greatest impact on the poor,
is often violent in nature, and ultimately results in victims who are
worse off than they were before. More and more governments are
introducing anti-eviction legislation, which when viewed from a cadas-
tral perspective introduces an innovative form of land rights – i.e. the
right not to be kicked off the land one actually lives on. Consequently
this constitutes a new form of right that needs to be incorporated in
the cadastre! A major duty of cadastral systems is to provide govern-
ments with information about the identity of those with specific land
rights, the location of the land, and the size of the relevant parcel. This
duty is of even greater significance to governments intending to imple-
ment land-use plans; the implementation of these plans will be vir-
tually impossible in the absence of information about the land rights
that will be affected by them.
Better Taxation of Land
Cadastral systems have traditionally served for land taxation purposes
(Youngman & Malme 1994, Bird & Slack 2004, UN/ECE 2001b). All
countries employ information obtained from the cadastre. Land tax is
usually a local tax imposed by local authorities to obtain their revenue.
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In an inventory carried out by the UN/ECE it transpired that of the 40
ECE member countries 95% were operating a land-valuation system
for the purposes of the assessment of land values for taxation (UN/
ECE 2001). Countries in transition also introduce land taxation, a move
which constitutes a combined challenge to their efforts in achieving
privatisation, the decentralisation of state power, and market develop-
ment. For example, in the Republic of Estonia revenues from local land
tax account for 3% of the local budget; in the Czech Republic the figure
is also 3%, whilst in Slovakia the figure is 11%, and in Poland no less
than 13%. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy states that a political
debate is currently in progress in Colombia, and in analogy with many
other countries in Latin America, is highlighting the problems encoun-
tered in the assessment of the land tax base using the present obsolete
cadastral information. El Salvador, which is recovering from a civil war,
is reviewing the introduction of a municipal land tax for the city of San
Salvador initially based on a simple tax rate and later evolving into a
more sophisticated system. Subsequent to signing the Dayton Peace
Treaty the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina, for example, is now
endeavouring to develop a local land tax on the basis of the existing
cadastral records in combination with local public-housing records and
information from the public utility companies.
An up-to-date cadastral system is an essential source of information
for land taxation. The country’s taxation authorities will be virtually un-
able to enforce a system of land taxation in the absence of information
about the persons liable to pay tax, the taxable objects, and the market
values.
The Migration Path For Cadastres
Land Tenure (What Should Be Registered)
Since land tenure is understood as a bundle of rights, it is necessary to
decide which elements of that bundle should at least be registered for
the purposes to be fulfilled by cadastral system, for example:
– If the system is intended for the purposes of land taxation and the
tax legislation stipulates that tax shall be levied solely on ownership,
then it will serve no purpose to maintain records of leases, derived
rights and actual land use;
– If the purpose is to facilitate credit mechanisms and the legislation
defines mortgages as a personal right rather that a right in rem,
then the registration of mortgages might be irrelevant;
– Should the purpose be to promote the land market, and the parties
involved (sellers, buyers, conveyors, etc.) are not interested in en-
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cumbrances and servitudes, then there will be no need for records
of this information;
– Should the purpose be land use development, information about
right holders of ownership, group ownership, communal ownership,
village ownership and the name of the chief, the village headman,
might be sufficient;
– If the government imposes restrictions on land use and the legisla-
tion stipulates that these restrictions are imposed on the owner
rather than the parcel of land, there will be no need for cadastral re-
cording, while conversely records of the restrictions could be benefi-
cial, if specific restrictions are imposed on parcels of land (thereby
imparting them with a legal force on third parties such as buyers).
When assumed that a country is at least of the intention to improve its
land management capability (planning, development, maintenance of
land use, and resource management), it needs access to the names of
persons to contact for the negotiation of planned developments and,
where relevant, for the acquisition of the land. In such a situation a
simple land administration system will be sufficient, which need not
contain more than elementary records of the combination of the names
of the persons in authority (village heads, chiefs, family heads, resi-
dents, and company names) together with some form of definition of
the units based on the location of the land (such as the address, or the
map coordinates). Consequently, no large investments are needed for a
system of this nature. Since much land development is carried out in
the form of projects (such as housing, transport and energy infrastruc-
tures, and nature conservation) the government can, where relevant,
give consideration to the implementation of a project-oriented cadastral
system (for example, when problems are encountered for the public ac-
quisition of land).
A government intending to levy land tax will require a more sophis-
ticated cadastral system which at least contains information on the
parameters used for the assessment of the land tax (Dale 1999, Nie-
minen 2004). The collection of data can be restricted to the informa-
tion the tax legislation stipulates as the base for taxation; this is usual-
ly comprised of ownership and/or use, and not of secondary rights
and interests. Should the tax legislation regard group ownership as
being subject to taxation and the surface area of the land as a taxable
object, the register could include the names of owners (individuals,
companies and groups) together with an identifier and an indication
of the surface area of the land. Substantial investments are not
needed for either very precise land tenure registration or for very ac-
curate boundary surveys.
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In principle a cadastre with the above content is, subject to certain
conditions, suited to the improvement of the land market. Additional
regulations will be required to protect parties in the market (particu-
larly the buyers) since such fiscal cadastre contains little information
about the legal status of land. These regulations should remedy the im-
perfections in the system and could, for example, stipulate that sellers
are under the statutory obligation to furnish complete and truthful in-
formation about the legal status (the rights, derived rights, restrictions,
public encumbrances and boundaries) of their land, such subject to
pain of claims in court in the event of the wilful provision of incorrect
information.
However, if the presence of these rights and interests exert a great
influence on the market prices and values, the operation of the market
will be impeded in the event that the public is not provided with ready
access to reliable and complete information. One measure of the extent
of this problem could be the volume of litigation. Consequently the
cadastral system will need to collect and provide information about the
legal status of land that is as comprehensive as possible, a need which
will give cause to substantial investments in the system. However it
will be possible to pass on the costs of these investments to the market
transactions, since the market will probably possess a strength and
wealth sufficient to bear the additional transaction costs. Detailed infor-
mation about the land will offer sufficient value to the relevant parties
as compared with the benefit the parties gain from the wealth of infor-
mation available to them.
A government which incorporates a specific legal recognition of ti-
tles in its records of rights and interests (for example, in the form of
guarantees for the information, or the acceptance liability with respect
to its correctness) will provide for the legal security of land tenure.
From the above it will be apparent that, depending on the purposes
for which they are intended, cadastres collect, process, and disseminate
information about land tenure in systems ranging from extremely sim-
ple (solely the land use status quo) to comprehensive (all rights and in-
terests) registers.
Cadastral Authorities (Who Keeps the Records)
Many countries perceive a cadastre to be a public duty to be performed
within the mandate of the state. This is also applicable to the allocation
of land to citizens (by e.g. Ministry of Land, Commissioner of Land).
Consequently both duties are performed by organisations at a state
level. These organisations often adopt a decentralised approach to the
performance of their duties; for example, the registration is effected by
the courts, whilst the cadastral duties are performed by the local or
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regional branches of another Ministry (such as Housing, Environment,
Home Affairs, etc.). In some countries (such as France) the municipali-
ties are responsible for the cadastre.
However, it is also necessary to view the division of duties, responsi-
bilities and competences between the various layers of government
from a perspective of the efficiency and effectiveness. Although it
might be extremely efficient to concentrate the time-consuming main-
tenance of registers and maps in one location, thereby employing a
minimum number of staff, this would nevertheless not be very effec-
tive; this is because land policy tools (land markets, land use planning,
management of resources, etc.) are primarily measures of a marked lo-
cal and regional importance, which consequently should be implemen-
ted in the proximity of and in interaction with the public (Fourie &
Nino-Fluck 2001, Alden Wiley 2006).
This dilemma might be resolved by means of ICT. Financial calcula-
tions reveal that central databases are more economic than decentra-
lised databases, since this obviates the need for ICT staff at all the local
offices (for systems management and maintenance, helpdesks, etc.).
However the implementation of data communications simultaneously
provides for the adoption of local responsibility for information man-
agement. This combination provides for the delegation of duties that
need to be linked closely to persons at the appropriate local or regional
level, whilst at the same time keeping the costs as low as possible by
means of the centralised processing and storage of the data.
Consequently, ICT developments have rendered local operations fea-
sible. In view of this there is no objection to the introduction of a
cadastre at a local level – and especially in an analogue environment –
since at some point in the future the local registers and maps can be
made available to all the relevant levels of government, and can serve
as the input for a subsequent central database.
As a result a migration path might begin at a local level, and gradu-
ally evolve into a system of centrally-stored data and remote informa-
tion management with the commensurate responsibilities.
Registration (How the Records are Created)
Governments that intend to provide titles to land guaranteed by the
state are aware that this is a costly operation. The concomitant precise
adjudication processes, in-depth investigations of the legality of land
transfers, and accurate boundary surveys are all capital-intensive opera-
tions. The simplest cadastre is comprised of a shoebox containing sim-
ple transfer documents approved by the seller and buyer and endorsed
by witnesses, together with a reference to a description of the object. It
will be self-evident that a simple system of this nature will exhibit a
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large number of imperfections with respect to its comprehensiveness,
validity, accessibility, etc. Nevertheless it fulfils basic needs of transpar-
ency, albeit in a very rudimentary way – and the system could work.
An improvement to the above system would be the assignment of a
certain legal status to the documents by having them drawn up by a
licensed conveyor, lawyer or civil-law notary. The costs incurred in
maintaining the records can remain low, since the duties of the keeper
of the shoebox (the box will evolve in the direction of a register) are
restricted to filing the documents and keeping them available for con-
sultation. The keeper does not investigate the legal impact of the docu-
ments; in essence this is a simple form of deed registration (registra-
tion of documents without guaranteeing the validity of the transac-
tions).
However, once the keeper of this simple register also investigates the
validity and the legal impact of transfer documents, and has the power
to approve or to endorse them, then he becomes a kind of registrar; his
approval imparts an added value to the records, i.e. the transfer of right
deemed to be valid and is recognised. In essence this is a simple form
of title registration (guarantee of valid transaction). However the costs
incurred in the registration of the documents will increase in view of
the keeper’s additional duties. The additional need for some form of
identification of the relevant object on a map in the registration pro-
cess, in effect constitutes the beginning of a simple cadastre.
Consequently the migration path for a cadastre can begin with a
simple and rudimentary form of recording of documents (‘deeds’), evol-
ving over the years into a system incorporating approval for land trans-
fers (‘titles’); at the same time the ‘keeper’ evolves into a ‘registrar’.
Implementation (When Records Should Be Created)
On the introduction of the system it will immediately be necessary to
devote attention to updating the records. The best method to guarantee
up-to-date cadastre is to stipulate that in the absence of records land
transfers will not be valid, i.e. the buyer will not become the owner or
acquire rights to the land. However this is a fairly stern approach; in
practice the updating requirements will depend on the intended pur-
pose(s) of the system. A system employed for taxation purposes could
require less frequent updating than a system employed in connection
with the land market; for fiscal purposes the submission of transfer
documents by no later than a specific fiscal reference date would ap-
pear to be adequate, whilst for land-market purposes the daily updating
of the records would be more appropriate.
Consequently a suitable migration path could begin with less-
frequent updating and evolve to frequent day-to-day updating.
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The Identification of Subjects in the Cadastral Process
Persons with access to the cadastre must be certain of the identity of
the right holders listed in the records. The ultimate form of identifica-
tion is comprised of records of ID cards and the relevant ID numbers
as verified by the registrar or civil-law notary. Modern options are bio-
metric identification. A simple form entails the identification of right-
holders by witnesses so as to impart the names in the records with a
certain degree of validity. An intermediate form is comprised of a de-
claration from, for example, a conveyor verifying that the persons ci-
ted in the transfer document are indeed the persons they say they
are.
The Identification of Objects
The accuracy with which the boundaries of the parcels of land are sur-
veyed depends on the purpose(s) of the cadastre. Since boundary sur-
veys and boundary mapping are expensive operations, which involve a
given amount of time it could be preferable to opt for an alternative.
If the cadastre is intended to provide for land management then the
government could consider information restricted to the outer bound-
aries of the customary areas and the name of the chief or the village
boundary with the name of the village headman to be adequate for its
purposes. In this instance it will not be necessary to record accurate in-
formation about individual parcel boundaries. If individualised forms
of land tenure are an issue, addresses or single midpoint coordinates
could be appropriate (GPS or map coordinates). In situations in which
information about the approximate boundaries is required the general
boundary rule could be employed, resulting in the visualisation of the
boundaries on a topographic map, orthophoto, or satellite image.
If the cadastre is intended for land taxation purposes and the tax is
not assessed on the basis of the surface area of ownership (in m2), it
will serve no purpose to make accurate surveys of the boundaries, and
once again an address (if available) and/or midpoint coordinates may
be sufficient for the needs. In such situations it is not necessary to
draw up cadastral parcels.
Nor will accurate surveys of the boundaries be required, if the sys-
tem is intended for credit purposes, and the banks require solely the
value of the building in reaching their decision as to issue a mortgage.
Consequently, from a surveying perspective a suitable migration
path could begin with a simple indication of the location of the land
and then evolve via records of general boundaries towards accurate sur-
veys of the boundaries.
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Conclusions and Recommendations for Migration
In view of the challenge confronting many countries in increasing the
speed of the registration of information about ownership, etc., it would
appear to be preferable to implement simple systems that can evolve
into more complex systems over the course of the years. Governments
could adopt the following incremental approach to the implementation
of their cadastres:
– Develop a long-term scenario specifying the land-policy tools ulti-
mately to be supported by the cadastre;
– Assign priorities: in which sequence should tools be provided with
support;
– Decide on the minimum contents of the registers and maps;
– Design simple processes, and accept imperfections;
– Design systems which are scalable;
– Develop a migration path for the evolution towards the intended
long-term use of the system;
– Anticipate ICT resources that can be introduced in the course of the
years;
– Avoid accurate surveys of boundaries whenever possible during the
initial phase;
– Avoid intensive investigations for the guarantee of titles, and accept
the imperfections inherent in the recording of transfer documents
(deeds).
Since countries exhibit differences – as do their attitudes, histories and
societal cultures – it is not possible to draw up a general specification
of the best migration path. However, the adoption of the incremental
approach as discussed above could provide a suitable framework for
the successful implementation and development of a cadastre. The
adoption of an evolutionary approach to the implementation and devel-
opment of cadastres should guarantee the viability of these systems in
developing societies.
Notes
1 The author would like to thank Dr Janine Ubink for her critical comments on the pa-
per.
2 Fe´de´ration Internationale des Ge´ome`tres (FIG) or International Federation of Sur-
veyors.
3 See www.cadastraltemplate.org.
4 See www.unece.org/hlm/wpla/welcome.html.
5 Mailo land is a form of tenure that was created by the 1900 Buganda Agreement be-
tween Her Majesty’s government of Great Britain and the Kingdom of Buganda.
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6 If Not Private Property, Then What?1 Legalising
Extra-Legal Rural Land Tenure via a Third Road
Andre´ Hoekema
Introduction
What kind of land law would best promote economic development and
social welfare in the developing world, particularly in the countryside?
Moreover: what kind of development is that? Is it betting on the large
foreign investor or on the small semi-subsistence farmer and pastoral-
ist?2 If the answer to the delicate tenure position of many rural small-
holders all over the world is not ‘private property’ any more, then what
is it? Doing nothing is not an option either under the mounting pres-
sure on rural land from large-scale investors, urban expansion and pro-
blems with food security. As we saw in the introductory chapter some
intermediate, third way of legalising extra-legal land tenure is in the
making in many places. Governments, donors, NGOs now tend to
shun from the old recipe of trying to completely replace local law but
do not uncritically accept local tenure arrangements either. Instead
recent rural land law reforms follow a mixed course, paying heed to re-
commendations such as the one from Lavigne Delville (2000: 116):
‘Rather than suppressing legal pluralism by absorbing one system into
another, the aim is to retain the most dynamic aspects of each.’ And
this mixing or hybridisation of elements nowadays is done in many
places where governments in designing new land law take local law
into account, but also test and reform it against standards of human
rights, gender issues, accountability of authority and so on.
This plurality of new adaptive policies, in their concrete features de-
pending heavily on local and national specific conditions, leads to a
wide variety of designs of legalisation of rural land tenure for develop-
ment. But their common feature resides in the fact that they somehow
try to bridge the gap between local, customary and state, formal rules,
that is, to build formal state land law on extra-legal ground, if not on
still functioning local law, then at least on local needs, interests and
sensibilities. This ties in with the present day stress in almost any
development project on participation of local stakeholders lest the pro-
ject fails.
I can call these hybrid rural land law designs a bundle of third – or in-
termediate – roads towards land tenure legalisation. In countries like
Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Niger, Namibia, to name just a few,
there is ‘a new wave of land tenure reforms . . . [in which] many recent
laws protect customary land rights and provide or allow for their regis-
tration’ (Cotula et al. 2004: 5). In Latin American countries like Bolivia,
Colombia, and Ecuador, land and water tenure laws as well as forest
management schemes are in the process of being built on local indi-
genous tenure institutions. Indonesia also tries to follow this road.
However, finding a passage between the two extremes of top-down im-
position of private property and leaving things at the bottom as they
are, is challenging. In view of enormous differences in national and
local contexts, goals and means of this operation often are not clear,
concepts of development strongly contested, and the risks of derail-
ment serious and manifold.
One conclusion of this introductory paragraph merits some empha-
sis: also the novel hybrid and locally adapted approach needs strong
state policies and state commitment. But the role of the state is not like
in the earlier days of issuing a complete new package of land laws and
regulations of land management. In the adaptive approach, the state
facilitates the coming into formal being of local, customary land rights
and authorities. In close cooperation with local stakeholders and gener-
ally with civil society actors, state authorities clear up the existing local
land rights, introduce some corrections on the relevant practices, pro-
vide for simple and accessible registration devices, if necessary adapt or
sometimes reconstruct local decision making practices, promote legal
empowerment of the smallholders – among many other items that we
will encounter in the description and analysis of the cases I am going
to present below. In this new paradigm in land tenure regulation it is a
matter of reconciling state perspectives of a programmatic, national
and legal nature with people’s perspectives on local land law, on law
and land use. Sometimes however the state tries to reconstruct local
patterns so drastically that it seems that the old top-down centralist
land law policies are making a come back. We will see these trends in
the next paragraphs.
I venture to say that at least in rural areas in developing countries,
the third paradigm has won.3 The need to plead for this paradigm is
over now. Rather it is time to analyse and evaluate in detail different
legal designs aimed at reconciliation between state and people’s per-
spectives on land use and land law and how this works out on the
ground. This is the main thrust of this chapter, and will be explored in
the third section. However, before we study some of these bridging ef-
forts, a more general overview of the main types of third road designs
will be given (second section).
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A Variety of Third Roads
The variety of intermediate approaches can be broken down into two
types of legalisation: either providing smallholders with individual (or
family based) long-term use rights coupled with a decentralised land
management institution; or recognising and partly remedying existing
local communal tenure arrangements, the communal type.
The first, individual way is followed e.g. in Ethiopia where farmers
had been completely at the mercy of politicised village and district
authorities for a long time. Rahmato (2009) describes how communal
tenure practices had practically died out after 17 years of the military
regime of Mengistu (1974-1991) with its huge resettlement pro-
grammes and harsh centralising policies. Farmers experienced almost
fatal insecurity of tenure. In some states of the Ethiopian Federation
state law recently (2004) ordered to officially title and register long-
term use rights to plots of land in the name of the head of a house-
hold, to do this in simple ways and leave general management compe-
tences in the hands of village and districts authorities. While this is not
a grant of individual private property it is a grant of individual title
documented in writing in accordance with national law. Where com-
munal tenure arrangements have crumbled, this individual road of le-
galisation of long-term use rights is practically the only one viable.
The second, communal way, leads to the introduction of a form of
communal title in the hands of a community as such, recognising there-
by the communal character of existing arrangements and often at the
same time amending these. In Mozambique local communities are
granted rather strong ownership rights to their lands, even to the point
that investors have to negotiate with the local leaders for permission to
use part of these lands for, say, tourist facilities. Communities are
allowed to continue managing their lands in their own way, regulating
access, use and transactions. In this case state interference in the inter-
nal affairs is minimal (see section, ‘Mozambique, a radical community-
based approach’). In various countries, like in Bolivia, indigenous peo-
ples have obtained collective ownership title to their lands (Pacheco
2009, Assies 2009), while in Tanzania, the Village Land Act accords
to Village Councils the competence and task to recognise, title and reg-
ister customary land rights, assign and withdraw these use rights and
generally to manage the village land in its totality. State interference
with the local arrangements is much more intense in this case (see be-
low). This is roughly what Senegal did already back in the 1960s (Hes-
seling 2009). In these communal examples, the local tenure arrange-
ments and the local institutions of authority are recognised as parts of
official law and official public administration.
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The current section will sketch some general features of the commu-
nal, or community-based way. I have a preference, perhaps a bias, for
the grant of community-based title in situations in which local tenure
arrangements are still resilient, while I am convinced that this nor-
mally cannot be done without introducing some corrections and at
least regulate officially the relation of this new jurisdiction with the na-
tional legal order.4 My preference stems from the fact that in the vast
majority of community-based arrangements social security principles
are embodied: a morality of mutual care as well as care for nature and
future generations, briefly to be called an ethos of reciprocity. In my
view before setting off for rural land law reform one has to study care-
fully if these local arrangements are still present and, if so, how they
function on the ground, including this moral element. Such empirical
studies have a supplementary benefit. In modern times in which deple-
tion of nature and rampant individualism are problems of the first or-
der, it is important to try to learn some lessons from these community-
based arrangements even if one knows that the specific communities
involved perhaps are dying out or at least cannot be taken for granted,
even less so in Western countries. To get a feeling for what this moral
element could mean, how it may function, and why it is significant for
sustainable land management all over the world, I need first to pre-
sume familiarity with the main features of communal land tenure ar-
rangements (see box 1 for some basics), explain the important phenom-
enon of secondary rights and then elaborate on the moral element.
Box 1. Communal or Community-Based Tenure
The communal title approach purports to build on socially existing
extra-legal tenure arrangements, sometimes called: customary tenure.
This however is a misnomer, as it suggests a rather static and only
slowly and organically developing phenomenon. Often such ‘cus-
tomary tenure’ is a rather recent and sometimes a wilfully designed
product of encounters between on the one hand state and on the
other hand local community leaders. Communal land tenure, a ter-
minology often used in legal anthropology has other terminological
flaws. Communal is often equated with ‘collective’ which term car-
ries the false suggestion that the land is held by a collective subject
only, a group of people as such, without specific individual, family
and (sub) clan land rights. I prefer ‘community-based land tenure’
(after Lynch and Talbot 1995), which leaves the question open who
is holding the various rights in land while it rightly points towards
the social corporation, the community, which lends legitimacy and
effectiveness to the regime. It comprises both common pool
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resources shared and held by the collective, as well as land on
which, next to community rights to manage and control the land, in-
dividual and family use rights exist. Often these rights are long-term
use rights. Typical for these systems is the role of kinship, territory
or generally possessing the ‘identity’ of the community (status) as a
condition for being entitled to land. Let me define this institution of
community-based ownership of land as a ‘complex of values, prac-
tices and procedures developed and enforced within a specific non-
state community or people, regulating legitimate control & manage-
ment rights as well as use, transaction and inheritance rights over a
variety of forms of land like arable land, grazing areas, trees, forests,
reserve lands, waters etc., thereby combining rights in the hands of
individuals, families, clans and the community itself or its authori-
ties, often in the form of rights that with regard to a specific piece of
land overlap in time or in place.’5 This overlap manifests itself in
the existence of a wide variety of so-called secondary rights (see im-
mediately below).
Secondary Rights
Community-based tenure arrangements allow for considerable overlap
of rights in terms of time and space. Important categories of rights
people may hold are grouped together as secondary rights. Regarding
women under customary systems for instance ‘land usually belongs to
and is managed by a patrilineal group, so that women are always sec-
ondary users (…). Their rights of access are highly dependent on the
social ties which link them to those with primary rights over land.
Hence, for example, on divorce or widowhood, a woman may be forced
to leave the land behind and move away’ (Toulmin and Quan 2000:
24; see about gender also Cotula, this volume: 65). Furthermore, sec-
ondary rights holders – also called derived rights to land6 – are charac-
terised as those people whose access to land is based on arrangements
like sharecropping, borrowing of land, pledging, renting, leasing, and
‘mortgaging’ the land, or the right of people to let their cow graze on
land cultivated by another, after the harvest. Sometimes pastoralists’
rights to graze their herd on common grazing land and walk the herd
over agricultural land after the harvest (in exchange for dropping man-
ure on the land) are called secondary rights too. Within pastoralist
zones rights to graze are even further distinguished e.g. in primary
users, secondary users etc. (Cousins 2000: 158; about the rights of pas-
toral groups see also Cotula, this volume: 68). A next category of sec-
ondary right holders consists of people who have forms of rights to use
trees while not being the owner of the tree. Dubois (1997: 5-7) is one
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of the few who provides an analysis of the various often most compli-
cated forms in which the multiple use rights of trees are organised. Fi-
nally, a right to gather fruit on land owned by another7, or collect fire-
wood over there, is yet another example of secondary rights.
In legalisation designs usually secondary right holders are neglected
(see Platteau 1996: 40 ff) The same goes for rights to use resources to
be found in the commons (also called common property resources like
woodlands, ponds, steep hilly slopes, water for fishing, wetlands, graz-
ing land etc.) where different use rights for various categories of users
have to be distinguished (Cousins 2000: 157). Van der Molen (this
volume) discusses the need of and possibility of expanding the tradi-
tional Western notion of registration (cadastre) to find ways to adapt
registration procedures to non-Western concepts such as community-
based title, secondary rights, etc.
Community-Based Land Tenure Arrangements and Moral Economy
In community-based rural tenure arrangements usually a local corpo-
rate entity is expected to act as a kind of trustee for the commoners,
the villagers, the indigenous members. Be it a chief, another traditional
authority, a ‘government’(cabildo8), it is this entity that has socio-politi-
cal power over the land and is supposed to determine the general uses
the land is put to, to solve conflicts, to control transactions among the
insiders, to permit or refuse outsiders to acquire a piece of land, to re-
present the people before the outside world. These management rights
are justified by the need to keep the landmass intact, to preserve the
land for the local people, to prevent absentee ownership of the land
(‘all the land to the tiller’) and to care for ex-villagers or members who
return from the urban areas or from war. Within the community occa-
sional redistribution takes place in case a family sees its subsistence
threatened because their children are running out of land. In this
arrangement long-term use rights are assigned to individuals and/or
families.
Often the use right holders also have the right to bequeath the plot
to children (although strictly speaking under control of the local
authority) and sometimes to rent or lease out for a short period. Sales
and other long-term transactions of alienation of land to outsiders
usually are forbidden. While in these regimes notions of growth of pro-
duction and individual market orientation are not absent, first of all
these systems aim at social security of a group. This is captured well
in the title of an IIED (2004) brochure: Land in Africa, market asset or
secure livelihood? (Quan, Tan & Toulmin 2004). The need to survive, to
help each other out, render each other crucial services in harvesting
and preparing fields, and the important element of having the certainty
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in case of landlessness to obtain some piece of land somewhere, these
are features of livelihood security. General development notions as well
as dynamic investment behaviour are still far away from these minds.
In these rural smallholder communities it is not just the hardship to
survive or the need to resist a common enemy that explains the orien-
tation on livelihood security. Community-based land tenure often rests
on a very specific perception of man, nature and society, a set of beliefs
and values about spiritual relations between man and nature – in Latin
America often called a cosmovisio´n.9 Many non-Western people nurture
a meaning of what it is to be human which contrasts drastically with
Western individualism. Studying ways in which for instance indigen-
ous peoples solve their problems of keeping order and restoring har-
mony between man, nature and the spirits, one encounters the notion
of reciprocity in almost every relation between humans, animals and
the supernatural world of spirits. Reading the account by Rupert Ross
(2006) about aboriginal thinking in Canada (Dancing with a Ghost),
one immediately grasps the wide gulf between the West and the abori-
ginal world with regard to the often implicit feeling and knowledge
about how to live decently in a community and how to relate to others
and how to relate to nature. The aboriginal emphasis on caring for
others as well as for nature does not mean, however, that any notion of
a personal self and of individual agency, desire and emotion is rejected.
Rather it is another way of perceiving the right balance between indivi-
dual and general interests in caring for an integrated and just social
life. Obviously these notions permeate also in the nature of the land
rights and the obligations they carry with them.
But with or without such a specific cosmovisio´n, attached to every
right in the community-based arrangement we find obligations that
can be called a ‘social mortgage’ on your right. Others call it a ‘moral
economy’ (Robbins 2004: 151). Authorities and ordinary people alike
who possess the status of belonging to the community or to the people,
carry the moral obligation of stewardship for the benefit of present and
future members of the community and the community at large.
Okoth-Ogondo (2001: 2) points to the fact that land access rights are
transgenerational, hence ‘carry an obligation of stewardship for the
benefit of present and future members of the community’. These obli-
gations are internal obligations which are assumed on the basis of re-
ciprocity by and to each member of the community.10 These obliga-
tions cannot be exhausted in a set of precise rules; they are unspecified
and oblige people in a general way to care for the community and the
fellow insiders. Everyone is supposed to have the tact to know what this
duty entails in some concrete setting and to respond to peer pressure
to live up to it.
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In (legal) anthropology this set of obligations is analysed as the em-
bodiment of a principle of reciprocity. The principle of reciprocity im-
plies an obligation of any right holder in times of distress to restrain
somewhat the pursuance of his individual interests, redefine these and
take care for the greater benefit of the community, out of ‘free will’.
But neither is this behaviour free in the sense of having a choice, it is
enforced by the community, nor is it free in the sense that it is just a
completely altruistic gift to others. On the basis of this contribution
one helps to maintain the social integrity of the community and may
reasonably expect to be cared for in case it is his/her turn to get
stranded in adverse conditions. One is socially bonded, and this bon-
dage embodies a specific solidarity.
Particularly the new institutional economists have taken up the
anthropological insights into the important impact of ‘moral economy’
on people’s behaviour (North 1990). People all over the world are defi-
nitely not ‘organising their lives in remarkably similar ways’11, let alone
only along individualistic economic profit-making ways.
Not in all cases of community-based tenure arrangements a moral
economy is still alive, but in many it is. This morale explains fierce re-
sistance against the introduction of full private property (Platteau
1996: 55-56) and it makes us understand why and how local small-
holders often feel secure under present extra-legal arrangements. They
feel themselves more or less secure in their livelihood and prioritise
this over investments and individual market orientation. The presence
of this moral economy in social life means a rather strong element that
promotes the survival of the community as such. People perceive land,
water and other resources as part of their very existence and identity
and also as a guarantee for the continuity of social relations. In modern
times the term ‘social capital’ has appeared to describe this cohesive
potential (Putnam 2000). This existence and importance of a moral
economy is not often mentioned in studies about land tenure, legalisa-
tion and development.12 While there is every reason to be wary of the
ideological – perhaps romantic – distortions in one’s perception of the
nature of communal land tenure arrangements, unmistakably these
arrangements are usually glued together to some degree by obligations
based on the principle of reciprocity between people of the same status.
Because of this element these institutions not only have strong self-
regulatory potential, but also foster strong resistance to some private
property oriented development projects. Particularly in legal designs in
which local institutions of authority are brushed aside and compe-
tences are vested in new state-imposed committees, councils, associa-
tions or land boards, there is a risk of losing out on moral economic va-
lues and corresponding behaviour. Such loss of ‘social capital’ may
‘lead to violation of traditional constraints on resource use, and de-
142 ANDRÉ HOEKEMA
creasing accountability in natural system regulation’ (Robbins 2004:
151).13 This risk is rarely taken into account in the design and imple-
mentation of designs for land tenure legalisation.14 A moral economy,
however, has another face too. It may paralyse people, force them to
stay within low level subsistence economies, block initiatives and pro-
duce a closed community.
New Community-Based Tenure Arrangements?
My sketch of the ins and outs of communal land tenure arrangements
is very sketchy indeed. Moreover, it is well known that in many such
communities tendencies are at work towards individualisation of land
tenure,15 while in others traditional authority has degraded into a non-
accountable despotic kind (see Ubink 2009, about Ghana). Notwith-
standing these deficiencies taking communal land tenure arrange-
ments seriously is a promising approach. For one, the moral bonds of
reciprocity are an important brake on unfettered individual exploitation
of nature and on mounting inequalities within the communities. Sec-
ondly, an ethos of reciprocity has regained relevance in new construc-
tions of community-based management institutions not only in devel-
oping countries, but also outside. Alden Wily (this volume) describes
such a newcomer in Tanzania. She illustrates vividly the failure of cen-
tralised top-down state policies of forest management. She then shows
how empowering the local communities and creating institutions that
foster a partnership between the local stakeholders and public authori-
ties lead to far more successful management. Secure tenure and re-
source rights for local users are crucial to guarantee their position and
motivate them to overcome partially deep distrust of state power. Such
cooperation is not forthcoming unless people are motivated by a sense
of reciprocity, the need to give in on one aspect of their direct interests
and partly orient themselves on the well-being of the community at
large. In this case one could build on still existing village communities
and the reciprocity people are familiar with. But the new construction
has a far wider scope. This Tanzanian experiment is not restricted to
this specific situation. It is in tune with now widely applied develop-
ment policies stressing participation of local stakeholders and civil so-
ciety actors in designing and executing public policies. These new plat-
forms are supposed to promote cooperation between former antagonis-
tic groups and corporations and thereby bring more successful
management of natural resources.16
Reciprocity is making its comeback also in the Western world. Com-
plicated problems – ‘intractable problems’ as these are called (Scho¨n &
Rein 1994) – such as how to regulate fishing effectively and save fish
stocks from total depletion, get tackled now by new coordinating insti-
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tutions designed to foster partnership between all stakeholders.17 Re-
cently the concept of governance has become popular to indicate such
‘horizontal’, ‘negotiated’, ‘cooperative’, ‘participatory’, or ‘interactive’
ways of defining and trying to solve these public problems. Governance
is defined as ‘a new mode of governing that is distinct from the hier-
archic control model, a more cooperative mode where state and non-
state actors participate in mixed public-private networks’ (Mayntz 1998:
7; more about these networks in Hoekema 2001). Under favourable
conditions18 this new mode of governing may lead to a kind of ‘new
community’. Antagonistic public-private may slowly turn into more co-
operative relations and these in turn may foster mutual trust and in
the end a renewed sense of reciprocity.
Reciprocity which is only another word for a spirit of connectedness
between people, possibly has the key for the future of public problem
solving in the Western countries too. The rugged individualism in this
part of the world is powerless against the serious and complicated pro-
blems that face our societies and the world. There is need for the learn-
ing anew the kind of behaviour that Scho¨n & Rein (1994: 179) so ni-
cely captured as ‘to be prepared to act as though your counterparts will
behave cooperatively in spite of the risk that they may not do so and in
advance of evidence that reveals how they will behave’.
While ‘old communities’ and their ethos of reciprocity are tied to
very specific conditions, that cannot be reproduced in highly devel-
oped countries, there is something to learn over there. Providing com-
munal title to these communities may not only be a way to empower
these and provide tenure security to smallholders against inside and
outside threats, but also a way to bring the ethos of reciprocity to bear
on present day problems of sustainable management of resources.
Getting to know this ethos better as it binds indigenous and other clo-
sely knit communities together, helps to understand better the poten-
tial of new forms of common property resource governance as this is
introduced to overcome the inexorable depletion of the natural re-
sources in the Western world. Clearly this line of thinking falls out-
side the scope of this article, but the case of land tenure (in)security
in Lampung (Sumatra) which I discuss briefly below illustrates the
potential of the new community-based institutions of governance of
natural resources.
Designs of a Third Road to Land Tenure Legalisation
Coming to the heart of the matter I will now discuss third road designs
in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia while also briefly passing a
quite different tenure situation in Indonesia (Sumatra).19 My main
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yardstick for my evaluative remarks is threefold: Has real tenure secur-
ity for all categories of smallholders improved? Are there adequate in-
stitutions for legal empowerment to the smallholders? And finally, are
authorities in charge of land management accountable and are these
positions of authority legitimate in the views of the rank and file?
Mozambique, a Radical Community-Based Approach
The Socio-Political Context
The complete chaos, in which Mozambique found itself in 1992 and
the fact that traditional structures turned out to be still well and alive,
at least in big portions of the rural countryside, made it almost neces-
sary to build new (land) law on this basis and to accept the validity and
legitimacy of the local institutions of community-based land tenure. A
plea to resort to private property c.q. freehold and to introduce there-
fore the costly and extremely slow procedures of demarcating, titling
and registering of individual land got no serious foothold in the de-
bates. Land grabbing in the fertile river basins, beginning tourism in
the coastal areas, returning plantation owners, all these actors en-
croached already on the rural land mass. ‘An uncontrolled land grab
would result in a rural exodus and a huge increase in peri-urban pov-
erty in a country just emerging from war and already with serious un-
employment problems’ (Tanner 2002: 13). The only way forward was to
build formal land law on customary land tenure systems. It may come
as a surprise that such a broad view took hold instead of only the views
of an urban elite group preparing the way for freehold titles, absentee
ownership and huge profits. Probably the amazingly broad processes
of prior consultation prevented such one-sided elite approach.
The New Regime
The 1997 Land Law of Mozambique (and its Constitution) grants a
group tenure right to rural communities. A ‘title for the use and im-
provement of land’ (DUAT in the Portuguese acronym) is granted by
law to communities for all the land they are using and have tradition-
ally occupied. Even without an official piece of paper, the legal title to
the land is perfect, legally speaking. It concerns a kind of lease right,
as the state retains full ownership of the land. The lease has no time
limit. In a way all the land now granted to the communities remains
trust land in the hands of the state, but the state cannot easily take that
land back.
The community as such has full competence to regulate land use
rights within its territory and thereby apply the communal land tenure
regime. The legal definition of a community is vague and intriguing
and may also cover groups of families or even a group of neighbours,
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apart from the usual category of traditional communities with tradi-
tional leaders (called: re´gulos).20
Communities can ask for delimitation and for a certificate (or, after a
more elaborate procedure, for formal title). The delimitation as well as
the formal demarcation procedure is expensive and seldom executed.
After delimitation the state cannot grant an investor/outsider land
rights in that territory without full consent of the community. For the
large majority of communities with unregistered rights the law only
prescribes consultation. This condition can be circumvented easily un-
less the state officials are willing to empower the community and see to
it that the consultation is not just a sham. About this provision an im-
portant debate is going on. Some authors think that also in these unre-
gistered cases the community holds a veto right. Should it declare the
lands an investor wants to use, ‘occupied’ or ‘in use’ by the community
(‘in use’ thereby to be understood very broadly, commentators tell me),
the investor has to leave. Others, however, remark that in such a contro-
versy the district administrator, a state official, can and often does allow
the investor to go ahead. (Hanlon 2002: 22, Tanner & Baleira 2006: 11)
Investors can only get DUAT and not private property in community
land, while any transfer of a part of the communities’ use rights on the
land to the investor is only provisional for two (foreigners) or five (na-
tionals) years. After this period a 50-year title may be issued by the state
agencies. This system means that once the community gives up part or
all of its right, it has no means whatsoever to get it back.
Internally, within the community all kinds of transactions take place
between the ‘members’ of the community, following local practices of
the communal tenure regime prevailing there. Individuals can ask for
personal title to their plot of land, but it is not clear how to do this nor
what kind of right this would be. It is doubted if individual community
members can transfer their individualised use right to outsiders, or
mortgage it. Non-members that have been using land of the commu-
nity in good faith for ten years or more automatically get DUAT. This
may undermine the integrity of the land base of the community.
Experiences
Mozambique has gone through an intense debate about whether or not
this more collective system provides enough tenure security for the
communities and its members while at the same time being suffi-
ciently attractive for outsiders and investors. It seems that investors
although not getting full private property can always ‘sell’ the land not-
withstanding the general prohibition on selling (and mortgaging) land,
because they can sell the improvements, buildings, etc. Selling these
improvements seems to imply an automatic transfer of the land itself
as well. This even opens up possibilities for using this land cum im-
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provements as collateral for a mortgage. At the country level, the gov-
ernment has to approve such transfers, but the criteria with which the
government should decide on these matters are vague. At the time of
writing of this analysis, it was not yet clear how this ‘selling of im-
provements’ will work out in practice.
Generally speaking, experiences with the system as a whole are still
rare. The few experiences available suggest that the consultation proce-
dure between the community and a potential investor derails often.
The regulations ask for a thorough and broad representation of com-
munity people to be present in the negotiations (and to sign the final
document), but often just one or two traditional leaders do the job or
even some kind of outsider usurps the representation, by bending
some technical rule in collusion with state personnel which sometimes
threaten the community ‘that they want no trouble’. These state offi-
cials seem to get away with this interpretation of the land law system.
Moreover, investors sometimes bribe community people into agree-
ment. Like Cotula (2009: 4) writes on the basis of reports on the way
the system functions in practice: ‘In Mozambique, there is a rather
vague legal requirement that investors “consult” local people before ob-
taining natural resource rights. This is often fulfilled through a brief
meeting between investors and local elites where community lands are
exchanged for one-off compensation and vague (and therefore unen-
forceable) promises of jobs and facilities’.
This abuse of the new land law system is supported by the wide-
spread lack of awareness of rights among the rank and file community
members, or even the leaders. Moreover, enforcing these rights against
investors not living up to their promises, or against state officials
short-cutting the procedure, is hardly possible as an independent court
system does not have a serious presence in the countryside.
Sectoral Laws are not Coordinated with the New Regime
Finally, it is reported that the Forest Act at some crucial points deviates
considerably from the Land Law. The Forest Act limits the communi-
ty’s rights to timber exploitation to subsistence purposes, excluding
commercial exploitation by the communities themselves. In commer-
cial foresting communities are accorded a place on a kind of forest
management board only. So, ‘even after communities have registered
their land, their control over valuable resources like timber remains
limited’ (Cotula 2007: 67.) Here we meet the familiar problem of the
presence of sectoral laws that undermine the promises of the new offi-
cial land rights.
I am not aware of other sectoral laws like water law, mining law,
environmental law, but chances are that in those areas the same pro-
blems abound.
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Internal Deficiencies
As the community is the bearer of important land rights and regula-
tion of tenure and decision making one meets two crucial questions
in any state recognition of community-based land tenure.
1 What is ‘the community’: criteria for being considered a commu-
nity, membership, territorial limits, among others.
2 Who is the legitimate authority: how to find out, how to legitimise
a candidate within the community, what role do state agents play in
recognising someone as the representative of the community,
among others.
On both scores the experiment in Mozambique shows major weak-
nesses. In the land law we do not find criteria what entities count as a
community. Neither are these to be found in the Decree 15/2000 pro-
viding community leaders with competences to regulate local matters
and nominating them as part of the state’s public administration. Buur
& Keyed (2006) describe how ‘state recognition of traditional authority
in Mozambique’ recently went about. Not only the concept of a com-
munity is not specified, but the way to nominate and recognise these
leaders is left completely open. As they describe vividly this decree sug-
gests that ‘traditional leadership’ has survived the civil war, is still in
place, is legitimate in the eyes of the villagers, not contested and there-
fore easy to recognise. This, however, is a myth. Traditional leadership
hardly ever is uncontested, changes in power structure and often fierce
competition for power are a regular event, everywhere. The more so in
communities that have suffered years of civil war, got squeezed
between two powerful fighting parties, and often have disintegrated to
some extent. Therefore any recognition of someone claiming to be the
re´gulo is a thoroughly political or at least contested event, and often tra-
ditional leadership is a creation of state officials. Those leaders possibly
serve state interest more than community interests as the villagers per-
ceive it. Therefore this generous grant of autonomy poses another pro-
blem: what if local tenure arrangements are treating women badly, or
riddled with rather authoritarian re´gulos?
Summarising the Case of Mozambique
The case is a radical version of recognition of community-based tenure.
In itself it is a highly interesting and challenging way of legalising
rural land tenure, unique in the world. The legal fact that the commu-
nities do possess ownership titles even if not officially registered is an
important provision. And so is the generous recognition of local
authority without imposing a whole set of requirements. The matter of
secondary rights holders is not touched upon in the design as it
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accords practically all management competences to the communities
without imposing (new) rules. Neither do we find requirements to
remedy specific deficiencies in the internal functioning of the various
communities and their authorities.
Although the new design has still to prove itself, weaknesses are al-
ready clear to see.
‘Real Tenure Security’
– There is unclearness about the important question whether or not
the communities have a right to veto investors’ plans.
– There are loopholes in the protection of community land, as it is
possible for investors having obtained DUAT to ‘sell’ (and mort-
gage) the land and thereby take it out of the grip of the community.
– Sectoral laws are truncating seriously the (semi) autonomy of the
communities, at least on the level of formal law. How it will work
out in practice remains to be seen but experiences in other coun-
tries do not warrant any optimism here.
Accountability and Legitimacy of Authority
– Unclear definition of what constitutes a community and unclear
provision how to recognise (or assign) traditional leaders.
– State officials possess non-transparent discretion to manipulate the
rules for instance in cases of consultations about investors’ plans.
– Much is left to local authorities, as this design is an example of the
‘minimalist’ way of recognising community land ownership. There-
fore there may be quite different situations oscillating between lea-
dership which is accountable along the customary lines, and leader-
ship that functions rather dictatorially.
Legal Empowerment
– There is no independent and viable court presence to enforce the
new land rights.
– In general legal awareness is still low, NGOs providing legal sup-
port for communities or members thereof are not present. The dif-
ference in power between the rank and file and public officials as
well as investors is serious and tends to derail the new regime.
Forest User Groups in Sumatra, Indonesia21
Villagers from Langkawana village (Lampung Province, South-East Su-
matra), mostly Javanese and Sundanese immigrants, used to exploit
plots of land in a forest, but then the forest was declared officially a
conservation forest. Formally no individual (use) rights can be granted
within such conservation forests. Nevertheless the villagers continued
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their practice. After a while evictions followed but the villagers re-
turned and resumed their work on their forest garden plots. Finally
some active anthropologists, NGO workers and academics helped in or-
ganising the villagers into a Forest User Group (FUG) and in pushing
the Forest Service to grant a community forest license (in 1999). This
license officially permits local people to manage and use the forest re-
sources. In the course of time the villagers developed some local rules
how to use the forest in a sustainable way. The FUG also settles con-
flicts between the users, and sets up cooperation among the users to
conserve the forest resources. Apart from these new rules, local norms
and practices of land tenure and land transactions still hold sway, in
(and also outside) the forested area. These ‘traditional’ practices regu-
late matters of bequeathing land, ways of acquiring rights to land, ar-
rangements of sharecropping, renting in and out and similar transac-
tions. Sales are a regular phenomenon, at least between the villagers.
But there is a customary ban on sales to outsiders. Transactions are not
registered, they remain in the form of verbal agreements only. From
the case study it is not quite clear how the tenure arrangements are en-
forced and changed but quite probably this is done by the FUG bodies,
leaning perhaps on some informal leaders among the immigrant
groups.
After five years of practice the license expired, the province had ruled
out licensing in conservation forest and the villagers continued again
as illegal squatters. This situation however was condoned by the autho-
rities against collection of a levy and some bribe money. Certainly for
the villagers themselves there was nothing ‘illegal’ in this situation.
Analysis
Granting a community forestry license for the agro-forest gardens
means indirectly recognising the existence of local use rights, some
transaction rights as well as management rights. It boils down to a
kind of de facto recognition of a community-based land tenure arrange-
ment. In a roundabout way a collective title is granted to a specific
community represented by a new corporate body, the Forest User
Group. This latter element should draw our attention. It may make a
lot of difference if the corporate body getting the collective title is a tra-
ditional body or a newcomer. Of course, in real life the difference may
fade away as local authorities possibly take over the new organisation.
Also it may make a difference whether or not the villagers united in
the FUG do form a distinct, ‘traditional’ community living there for a
long time already, or, as in Lampung, a more heterogeneous grouping
of various people having migrated into that area rather recently. More-
over we have to bear in mind that it is still the government through
the Forest Department that holds an overarching right to the forest
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(although the nature of this right seems to be unclear, legally speak-
ing). One could expect this Department to put and enforce conditions
on the way the villagers and/or its representatives use the agro-forest
gardens but they did not.
Although officially the collective title has been repealed, in practice
local use and management goes on as before.
Evaluation
Evidence after five years of official license and some more years of in-
formally condoning this situation, shows that people feel more secure
(Safitri 2010). They have diversified their production, they now culti-
vate crops that yield more and thereby raise their income significantly.
Transactions with these plots, however, instead of rising in numbers,
are diminishing. So, the better tenure security does not produce more
market behaviour. The author of this case study explains this by point-
ing to the high yields of the plots which make people cling to their
land, as well as to the local practices banning sale to outsiders. The gar-
dens provide by far the best part of their income and therefore the villa-
gers are not eager to engage in transactions with their plots.
It is important to note that the villagers, as explained in the evalua-
tion, still feel secure in their tenure even after the license was with-
drawn. For them the strictly formal situation of ‘illegality’ does not
count. Although local transactions are not confirmed and neither
backed up by official legal rules which define and protect the position
of, say, a buyer, or a ‘heir’, villagers do not care. Security of their right
depends on the resilience of the local practices and authorities. What
strikes me as well is the general attitude of the Forest Service which
does not interfere with the local forest use and management neither
during nor after the formal license period. Also one may ask how FUG
obtained the legitimacy within the communities involved to issue rules
and settle conflicts. Quite likely the situation forged new relations be-
tween the villagers, creating a kind of neo-community of users with
sufficient social capital to be able to successfully rule the use of the for-
est. Therefore I mentioned this case earlier as an example of the ‘new’
community-based tenure arrangements where ‘community’ does not
exist already but is created through the practice of cooperating together
and thereby solving pressing general problems.
From this case, finally, we see how different each situation of a mix-
ture of local tenure arrangements and state legal and factual policies is.
Official legalisation of community-based forest tenure did not take
place but on the ground the situation pretty much resembles such a
recognition. At least tenure security as perceived by the villagers has
improved considerably. And it seems that the Forest garden area is still
alive and kicking.
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Summarising the Sumatra Case
This case illustrates a de facto ‘recognition’ of a new form of commu-
nity-based tenure. Although local tenure practices take place in a grey
zone between on the one hand official law and authority and commu-
nal practices on the other, it may well be that the introduction of a
Forest User Group has nurtured new relations between the forest users
and created a new community of stakeholders sufficiently cohesive to
manage the forest successfully. On the other hand, the vagaries of the
official policies put the new system at the constant risk of suddenly
being repressed or overruled by the formally competent state authori-
ties, a threat that bears the risk to wreck the basis of trust that might
have grown between users, other civil society actors, and public
actors.22
Tanzania, Between Community and the State
The Tanzanian recent land law reform will now be scrutinised at some
length, because it is a good example of legal recognition of existing
extra-legal customary use and lease rights, while at the same introdu-
cing a great number of new rules, new corporate bodies and very de-
tailed procedures for local land management and conflict resolution.23
What went before? A long political process of debate about reform of
a chaotic land tenure situation eventually led to a drastic revision of the
legal position of (rural) communal land tenure, confirmed in 1999 by
the introduction of two acts: the Land Act, and the Village Land Act.24
Before, customary tenure was outlawed and all not-officially titled and
registered land declared state land (more details in Alden Wily, this vo-
lume: 100ff.). But in 1999 the reverse position took hold. In the new
legal design ‘customary land rights are recognised by the present land
acts whether such rights are registered or not’ (Odgaard 2006: 18).25
The plot holder has only to show ‘long and uninterrupted possession
of the land’ to have title.26 Existing de facto legal pluralism is turned
into legalised, or formal, legal pluralism.27 There is still some doubt
whether or not the Village Land Act recognises communal land tenure
only in the form of individual and family holdings. This would negate
and frustrate the typical community elements of any communal tenure
arrangement. But according to Alden Wily, there is nothing in the Vil-
lage Land Act which prevents a Village Council from issuing a specific
title for collective ownership by the community as such28 of parts of
the village lands, like the commons, rangelands and forests. However,
the question is not settled what body owns (or manages) all the lands
which are outside specific individual and family plots (the ‘reserve
lands’). The law does not say: it is community land. Perhaps, as Alden
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Wily suggests, the new concept of Village Forest Reserve may partly fill
this gap (see below).
The Main Features of the New Legal Design (see Alden Wily 2003)
Although all the land in Tanzania is still being declared public state
land, in village areas in the countryside, management29 of land is
decentralised firmly to the already existing village authorities, notably a
Council which is an executive body – its members are elected – and an
Assembly to which all the adult villagers belong. The councils are sup-
posed to respect the customary practices as the basis for their titling
and regulation (provided they do away with discrimination of women,
and impose some other conditions). Generally speaking the Council
has by far the greatest weight in matters of defining, granting, with-
drawing, administering, controlling land rights, land use and land
transactions. This in itself immediately raises the question how trans-
parent and fair decision making is or will be.
Although not the owner, the village’s managerial competences are
vast. The Council has competence to administer the existing customary
rights and to grant ‘Certificates of Customary Occupancy’. This proce-
dure provides the holder with a certificate of a ‘Customary Right of
Occupancy’. This right may be held for an indefinite period.30 Not only
villagers but also non-villagers can apply for such certificate. In all
cases of issuing such a certificate it is the Village Council, that decides.
There is no provision requiring the Council to put the case before the
Village assembly. These lands are basically for cultivation (or grazing).
But the Council can also set apart land for public use as well as reserve
land thereby excluding it from being occupied by farmers and from
being officially titled in their name. In so doing conflicts may flare up,
e.g. between pastoralists for whom perhaps large swaths of pasture is
reserved, and farmers who already had a keen eye on these lands to
expand their farm. Or the other way round, taking grazing land and
define it as reserve land etc. Moreover, according to customary law vil-
lagers have the right to make use of resources to be found in the com-
mons, the forests etc. The moment the Council sets these areas apart,
this may cause conflicts with the customary access rights. Some villa-
gers possibly will start a row, pitting communal practices against the
new Council regulations.
Through the certificate of ‘Customary Right to Occupancy’ holders
of land get a stronger position. Certificate holders seem to be eligible
for mortgages and also may lease out or even sell their plot, in the
form of so-called derivative rights.31 The (certificated) right of occupancy
as such cannot be alienated. In cases of such transactions a detailed
procedure has to be followed wherein the Village Council is the body
which has to check and approve the transaction. In case of bigger
IF NOT PRIVATE PROPERTY, THEN WHAT? 153
swaths of land, from 5 hectares upwards, the Village Assembly has to
approve too. As we will see below, this set up is complicated and possi-
bly will not be implemented rapidly.
In passing I note the important new procedure introduced in the Act
for solving doubts and conflicts about the existent patterns and bound-
ary of the traditional land holdings. Should one ask for a certificate,
but without ‘the boundaries in land fully accepted and agreed to’, these
new procedures have to be followed. These ‘village adjudication pro-
cesses’ are quite explicitly regulated and use techniques to secure the
participation and impact of all the villagers. This is an interesting pro-
cedure to solve amicably the internal conflicts as to the existing rights
and boundaries.32
Apart from this adjudication process a new body is set up to mediate
in conflicts ‘on any matters concerning village land’. This so-called Vil-
lage Land Council has no decision making competence, only a mediat-
ing role. A party who is not satisfied may go to a Court. Although the
set up of such an ‘elders council’ is another interesting move, its lack
of any judicial status almost certainly will hinder its development into
a local legitimate and efficient problem solver. Other ‘nearby’ courts
foreseen in the new Land Acts are severely underfunded or have ceased
to function (Odgaard 2006: 36). Unsatisfied smallholders will have to
go to distant and expensive courts.
Some Observations Regarding the New Design
On the one hand, then, the new legal design suggests that Village
authorities just respect the existing community-based tenure arrange-
ments as they are. The Council is supposed to administer the land in
accordance with customary law (s. 20 of the Village Land Act), that
means, as Alden Wily (2003: 23) says: ‘any rule that is established by
usage and accepted as having the force of law by the community’. All
village land is by definition and automatically under customary tenure
(customary right of occupancy). This is a drastic move towards large-
scale legal recognition of local ‘customary’ (community-based) land ten-
ure arrangements. The non-state character of local practices is fully
confirmed.
On the other hand, however, the new design also reconstructs local
practices. Firstly, Village Council and Assembly are not the same as
traditional authorities in charge of managing communal land tenure
arrangements. These novel bodies by the way are not brand new, and
already functioned quite some years before. I have no grounded knowl-
edge to judge whether or not the rank and file already perceives the
Village Council and the Assembly as fully legitimate authorities of
their own. Secondly, when assigning certificates or permitting transac-
tions on the land, the Council by law has to regard various officially
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laid down rules and obligations related to the use of the land or the
way it is transferred. Prohibition of gender discrimination is one of
these new rules33, ‘good use’ of the land is another one.34 These and
other conditions also come into play in case the Council wants to with-
draw a certificate from a holder misusing the land. So, there are new
rules imposed on customary ways of management of land.
Although local arrangements are supposed to be the cornerstone for
the new deal, a potentially intense reconstruction of local relations is
mandated too. In itself this reconstruction may remedy weak points in
the existing communal tenure arrangements. But in so doing chances
that the new provisions will be followed by the villagers might dimin-
ish considerably. Another frequent problem is to be found in the very
real possibility that local authorities do not have the capacity to develop
and apply standards as to what amounts to sound development of a
plot (Sundet 2005: 15, 16). So, there are reasons to be a bit sceptical
about the success of such top-down reform requirements imposed on
the communities (Fitzpatrick 2005: 462).
Secondary Right Holders
Another tricky topic concerns the position of some categories of sec-
ondary right holders. In community-based tenure arrangements often
poorer people can eke out a living by having some (restricted) access to
commons, by having the right to glean on his neighbour’s land after
harvest, or to graze his animal. Also women while not possessing title
of their own might have the right to work on and take advantage of
their husband’s lands or lands of their clan. Pastoralists often have the
right to graze their animals on communal or even family land. All
these rights are called secondary rights. One may wonder if and how
such rights, for instance, the right to use the harvested fields for graz-
ing can be and are recognised as title and if people would wish so, cer-
tified as such. The evaluation studies do not answer this concern. In
fact these secondary right holders will not bother and will continue
their practices perhaps until some plot holder opts for a certificate and
uses this to exclude everyone. If the Village Council does not care for
secondary rights, the certification of the right of the plot holder might
lead to the exclusion of the ‘grazing after the harvest right holder’.
In its own manner pastoralists’ rights to graze the commons and to
travel over the land of others are to be qualified as secondary rights
too. Often, like in Tanzania, these rights are neglected or deemed inef-
ficient and are not well protected in the new land laws.
Village Land
A quite important aspect of at least the situation on paper is the way
the perimeter, the extension of Village lands is determined and demar-
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cated. The villagers usually perceive not only farming land but vast
tracts of land around the villages, including forests, as ‘their land’, land
under their collective customary ownership. The demarcation process
therefore is crucial for the question whether or not it can be said that
managing powers really go to the villages. Here the situation, although
improved compared with earlier days, is rather delicate. The official de-
marcation procedure knows a high quality procedure to solve conflicts,
either a conflict between villages over their outlaying ‘commons’, for-
est, grazing areas, swamps etc., or between the village and government
officials. This includes an inquiry of a quasi judicial kind. Its conclu-
sions have to be accepted by the government (the minister) unless
there is a (non-specified) ‘overriding reason of public interest’. This lat-
ter possibility could frustrate the village wish to secure not only their
tenure of the lands they traditionally worked, but also to secure tenure
of the lands and forests they kept as reserve area.
But looming even larger are various other risks for mutilation of
what villages see as their lands. Firstly, between the two Acts there is
serious incoherence in the definition of the category of state land out-
side the villages – so-called general land. The Land Act includes
unused and unoccupied village land, the Village Land Act does not. So
this certainly will induce governmental executive agencies to take land
which villages would see as village land and give it to investors. Often
in these presumably unused areas pastoralists make their living and
they may suffer most.35 Particularly in villages that do not possess their
official demarcation of their village land, this kind of taking land for
investors is relatively easy in view of the unclear definitions (Sulle &
Nelson 2009: 46).
Secondly, historically when some villages were granted official land
deeds under the then valid legislation and policies, often forests, pas-
tures etc were not included, and it seems that this historic restrictive
boundaries sometimes are just copied in the new ‘Certificate of Village
Land’.
Thirdly, and even more importantly, the president of the country can
‘transfer any area of village land to general or reserved lands’ (mean-
ing: exclusively state land) in case of public interest e.g. to promote in-
vestments. Village authorities cannot block the transfer but at least
there is a rather strict requirement of compensation payment.
Possibilities, then, to take land for state’s purposes are abundant. It is
reported that already millions of hectares in some way or another have
been taken/acquired by the state for investors (Odgaard 2006: 22).36
A preliminary inventory of the way international biofuel companies
acquire vast tracts of land for growing palm oil, sugarcane, jatropha or
other basic crops reveals serious loopholes in the procedure to acquire
land from villages (Sulle & Nelson 2009: 48-54).37 Lack of sufficient
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legal knowledge and of experience in negotiating cause villagers to
accept conversion of chunks of their village lands into state land with-
out exactly knowing the consequences (permanent loss of their custom-
ary rights) and/or for extremely poor compensation and/or against idle
promises to receive employment, social services, etc. Moreover, the le-
gal requirement of prior compensation is often not met.38
Box 2. The Fourth Loophole
In a field report from 200539 we encounter yet another, fourth loop-
hole through which the Village land mass is amputated. Someone
desperately wanting to buy a village-registered property has to con-
front the absence of a functioning system of village processing of of-
ficial land tenure data. In fact he cannot get the desired title. The
only way out might be a roundabout procedure: he and the original
plot holder could try to convert his community-based right of occu-
pancy into a right issued by the state, a long-term lease right, called
‘Granted Right of Occupancy’. The plot becomes state land. After
that operation the new title can be transferred to the would-be buyer.
It seems that such individual conversions of community land to
state land is condoned by the national land authorities, although the
Village Land Act prescribes an elaborate procedure to do it properly
and legally. The land then is escaping the managerial grip of the Vil-
lage. However, to produce – after conversion – the desired official
‘Granted Right of Occupancy’, and then have it transferred to him,
the buyer has to follow an awesome series of bureaucratic steps
which takes more than a year full time work and a lot of money.
This loophole number 4, then, after all, is more of a theoretical loop-
hole, but it warrants attention because in many schemes of empow-
ering local communities and recognising their communal tenure
such loopholes are present.
Alden Wily (this volume: 104) points to yet another danger of under-
mining the village’s hold on land. Sectoral laws like the Wildlife legisla-
tion allow governmental authorities to issue permits to hunt on some
territory, even if these lands fall under Village Land, particularly Village
Land Forest Reserves under the new Forest Law, to be discussed now.
How is forested land, which is presumably part of the community’s
land mass, dealt with legally? Alden Wily’s account shows that Villages
have had quite some success in conquering the right to manage ‘their’
forests and do better than the poor management and conservation
efforts by official state forest agencies. She describes how on the basis
of appallingly bad results from state management and conservation
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practices, and in view of rising tension with and sabotage from the vil-
lagers, a fully participatory approach was put in place. These experi-
ments later on resulted in the new Forest Act of 2002. Villages can
have ‘their’ forests gazetted as e.g. Village Land Forest Reserves and
then obtain almost a full package of relevant management rights, like
the right to regulate the use of the forest, to exclude outsiders, to reap
the fruits of the forests etc. They may even apply for management
rights in adjacent state forests, or at least co-management rights, and
some villages have done so already. Conditions to be fulfilled to get the
managerial rights are the making of a management plan, the appoint-
ment of many committees, the drafting of formal regulations of all
kinds, in the form of village by-laws, and to respect their own rules.
Although there remain many weak spots and obstructing authorities, it
seems that here sectoral law at least is helping to sustain the main set-
up of the new village land law design, particularly the unresolved pro-
blem who owns the commons, including woodland.
Experiences
I now want to try to come to grips with the way the system works, with
the situation on the ground. Experiences with the new design are not
many yet.40 It is true that already many certificates of Village Land
have been issued but people applying for a ‘Certificate of Customary
Right of Occupancy’ are still rare. This does not come as a surprise.
Sundet (2005: 9ff) describes in a detailed manner how complicated
the village procedure for issuing a certificate of customary occupancy
is. At the moment there is still no capacity for village officials to do so,
and they just bring the request to higher level district boards (the dis-
trict land department), as was reported in a 2005 inspection field visit
to various locations. The certificates are presumed to be bundled in a
kind of file, a register, but if this file is not present in the village, up-
dating does not take place. The 2005 field visit had to conclude that
very few villagers ever asked for a certificate and that in case they had
the certificate, transactions were not filed. This takes Sundet (2005: 9)
to the conclusion that it is a very risky operation just to allow for certifi-
cation without making it compulsory for everyone. Certainly this latter
option would strain local and district capacities and funds even more,
but it might prevent the rise of a very small class of wealthy villagers
that have acquired the certificate (or used the loophole described above)
versus a broad mass of poor smallholders. Chances are now that the
richer villagers as well as shrewd people from outside manage to get
certificates even at the expense of their poorer neighbours, leaving the
smallholders in an insecure tenure position.
The official provisions on getting a mortgage on land on the basis of
‘Certificates of Customary Occupancy’ have turned out to be an illusion
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(Odgaard 2006: 21). Banks have no interest in this kind of small loans,
nor have the capacity to administer these. Or they fear non-payment
while evictions are not feasible. The 2005 field report contains a scary
story about a certificate holder who tried to get a loan for a tractor. In
fact, it is almost impossible to get one.
In view of the very slow advances in certification and in getting the
Village land management system in place, it stands to reason that the
ordinary ways of dealing with customary non-certified tenure are still
going on. Someone wanting to officially sell or lease out his land either
cannot do so in the legal way or has to resort to informal, extra-legal
dealings. Many villagers are not going for certification in the first place,
because they fear the costs, they foresee capricious decision making
and for other motives. This means that the ‘traditional ways’ continue
to be followed by the vast majority of villagers. In the field report of
2005 it is noted that in a village where certificates of titles have been
issued, ‘people continue making transactions privately. Sale between
friends or relatives, subdivisions between parents and children, are
mentioned as transactions which take place anyway without interven-
tion from the Council. Verbal agreements or intervention of a tradi-
tional leader are the make up of these many extra-legal contracts’.
Continuance of traditional tenure practices might also jeopardise or
at least not improve the position of women particularly regarding
their right to inherit land from their fathers in their home village. Od-
gaard (2006: 28ff) describes a case in which at least part of the home
community claims that women cannot get nor inherit land in their
home village as their own. At best they are allowed to borrow a piece
of land in case they return as a widow or as a divorced women. This
loan is not like property, a right of their own that could be be-
queathed to her children, etc. Particularly male relatives (like brothers)
take this restrictive view. They stand to lose part of their inheritance
should their sisters inherit too. Others however deny that this is
standing practice.41 At least there is ambiguity or outright manipula-
tion of so-called customary rules. Although these practices are at-
tacked also from inside and are changing, still the position of daugh-
ters remains weaker than that of sons. In the frequent cases in which
implementation of the new Village Land Act practically is not far ad-
vanced the very explicit prohibition of this kind of discrimination
bears no fruit.
In view of the above, a more general observation is in order. It is not
the first time that a new legal framework for local tenure arrangements
produces a situation of an untidy mixture of more or less official regu-
lation plus management by legally designated officials on the one
hand, and unofficial, communal practices executed by traditional
authorities on the other. One cannot help but be sceptical about the le-
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vel of tenure security the new design will bring to the villagers. Sundet
(2005:14) goes even further and predicts that the system will not be
implemented, and if implemented will provoke many land conflicts
and might not raise small-holders’ tenure security at all.
Finally, mentioning the position of pastoralists and their secondary
rights, one has to conclude that their position has hardly improved leg-
ally. Often their usual grazing grounds fall under the category general
land which bring these outside the orbit of possible protection from
the local village management.42 I choose the word ‘possible’, because
also within the village perimeters, the conflict between farmers and
pastoralists may lead to Council decisions to restrict pastoralist use of
some areas of lands, particularly – but not only – in areas that the Vil-
lage sets aside as village forest reserves. Although such decisions have
to be authorised by the Village Assembly of which all people are mem-
ber, pastoralists seem to be underrepresented and their voice not heard
(Odgaard 2006: 26-27).
Summarising the Case
This case of a daring and surprisingly exhaustive legalisation design
provides us with many lessons while it also provokes many challenges,
as is to be expected. An important element is the legal fact that cus-
tomary rights are recognised wholesale, even without a form of regis-
tration (which is only ‘declaratory’ and does not legally speaking create
the rights).
Furthermore, this full scale recognition of the community-based land
use rights is an important step, and so is the recognition of the manage-
ment role of the village. In the design care is taken to allow landholders
to enter into transactions with the outside world. Mortgages can be ob-
tained, formally speaking. Also, at least legally, outsiders can obtain title
within the village. So, a land market and a credit market are opened up
while village authorities have competences to control and regulate trans-
actions in order to prevent a whole sale selling out or losing village land.
A sectoral law like the new Forest Law provides for communal manage-
ment of nearby forests and tends to remedy somewhat the blunt contra-
diction between two land laws about the question what counts as Village
Land. To adjudicate boundary conflicts between plot holders and solve
further land related problems two new bodies and carefully balanced
procedures are offered. Discrimination of women is firmly ruled out.
That such an elaborated system also presents major weaknesses does
not come as a surprise. Let me summarise some.
Real Tenure Security
– Leaving certification of land tenure an option instead of a prescrip-
tion introduces the risk of local land grabbing by the better posi-
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tioned villagers and in the longer run breach of internal trust, thus
destruction of social capital. It is the well-known topic of the (de)
merits of sporadic versus systematic registration (Bruce, this vo-
lume: 40).
– Although things may change in due course, many of these new
rules and provisions remain a black letter such as the certification
procedure itself, the register, the procedure for conversion of village
land into state land, the conflict resolution procedures, among
others.
– Land and credit markets are not doing well. Although the possibi-
lity is opened up to do transactions with banks and with outsiders
who want to exploit land in the Village area, in practice this does
not work yet. It remains to be seen how the Village authorities will
control and regulate these transactions so as to prevent a selling out
of village land.
– The reform has almost left out some regulation of the commons.
Moreover between the two Laws there is a serious contradiction in
the way ‘Village Land’ is defined. Both elements carry the risk to
truncate traditional village land.
– Although elaborate procedures and prior compensation are stipu-
lated in cases of the taking of land for investors by national authori-
ties, these procedures are hardly respected, while village authorities
cannot formally block this taking of land for investments nor en-
force the paying of the required compensation.
– Sectoral laws sometimes support the new system (Forest Act) but
others wreck it (wildlife law).
– The position of women, although legally drastically improved may
still remain weak, this goes also for other secondary rights includ-
ing those of pastoralists.
– Customary practices among which secondary rights of the kind of
leasing, renting, mortgaging, sharecropping and further transac-
tions are not yet satisfactorily regulated and continue in a complex
mixture with ‘official’ practices under the new regime. It is likely
that under demographic and economic pressure this situation fa-
vours the wealthy and better positioned.
Accountability and Legitimacy of Authority
– Wide areas of discretion characterise the competences of the village
corporate bodies. In some respects important provisions are in
place such as the one to solve internal land holding conflicts, but it
remains to be seen how these adjudication platforms will function.
– The rather heavy-handed reconstruction of local land use rules and
of management institutions is overburdening the capacity of local
officials. Apart from the risk of non-implementation of the design,
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this highly conditioned recognition regime may damage legitimacy
of local authorities in the eyes of the villagers.
Legal Empowerment
– There are, as usual, huge power differences between village, politi-
cal and economic forces. Lack of sufficient legal awareness, knowl-
edge and legal aid cause villagers to accept conversion of big chunks
of their village lands into state land without exactly knowing the
consequences (permanent loss of their customary rights) and/or for
extremely poor (prior) compensation and/or against idle promises
to receive employment, social services, etc.
– Moreover, legal protection by courts and other means, provided for
on paper, often is not (yet) forthcoming or functions deficiently.
– Legal aid offices and similar NGOs have started their work but cer-
tainly not everywhere.
Ethiopia, the Individual Road43
In this country up until recently smallholders suffered from blatant
tenure insecurity.
Land governance by the Mengistu government (1975-1990) was
strongly top-down and smallholders did not have any official right to
their plot. Resettlements were rampant. The new government of 1990
did not change this situation very much, apart from a token constitu-
tional improvement.44 Smallholders still had no piece of paper to prove
their right,45 state authorities were still managing the land top-down.
Farmers were exposed to drastic measures such as periodic redistribu-
tion of land to cater for the landless and the youth (as in Amhara State
in 1997) and the taking of land for investment purposes and public
works without much ado and without compensation. Political patron-
age was and still is an overwhelming phenomenon leading to capri-
cious assigning or taking away of land. Local institutions of communal
tenure might have provided some alternative form of security to the
smallholders but these institutions had practically died out after the
long years of systematic repression of customary norms and leader-
ship, at least in the highland areas.46 Under these circumstances,
already before any change in federal land tenure policies, in several
regional states from about 2000 onwards a new land-holding policy
was introduced, calling for titling and a form of registration while
introducing some (minor) amendments to existing official land tenure
rules. The federal government did not move its position but retreated
in view of upcoming elections that for the first time ever promised a
real challenge, land law being a very hot topic. A new federal land law
was passed in the Ethiopian federal parliament in June 2005 in the
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middle of huge political turmoil over the elections of one month earlier
(May 2005).47 While being a highly politicised undertaking – the feder-
al law reaffirmed state ownership of land – it foresaw a titling and
registration procedure leading to ‘holding certificates’ containing plot
boundaries, quality and size of the plots as well as the names of the
holder(s). The regional states had to adapt their land laws to the federal
law. In Amhara state, the land law of 2006 is almost a copy of the fed-
eral one.
In this approach improved tenure security was not sought through
the introduction of private ownership of land but through clarification
and documentation of the existing land use and management rules, or
rather practices. The rules/practices as such did not change much: all
the land was still declared property of the state, land management
stayed in the hands of (recently decentralised) local bodies like the
council plus executives of the lowest public administration levels (the
kebelle) and the district (woreda). Farmers would keep the kind of use
rights they already informally possessed and would now be provided
with a land use certificate.
This then is an example of legalising land rights in the form of indi-
vidual (and family or household) rights as opposed to communal or
group rights. There may be some examples of a right granted to a
group of villagers to use and manage common good resources, the
commons, like grazing land, steep hilly slopes, some patches of
forested land. On the whole however, commons are not included in the
land law reforms, formally they are state property and are continually
subject to encroachment by outsiders.48
The Legal Framework
According to the new Amhara Land Law (2006) farmers possess use
rights hedged in with many conditions. Residence in the rural areas is
one; using the land properly and sustainably is another. Letting land
lay idle for more than three consecutive years can be motive for taking
the land and distributing it to others. Bequeathing the use rights to
heirs is now allowed freely.
The new formal position of some kinds of secondary rights holders
in the sense of sharecroppers, renters etc. is mixed. It is not allowed to
sell, exchange or mortgage the land but the holder may let or lease the
plot, for a short period of time. For longer periods the lowest govern-
mental entity, the kebelle,49 has to give approval. In some new regional
state legislation – but not so in Amhara – renting out for a longer peri-
od is allowed only in case the lessee uses ‘modern technology’, an un-
defined category, in practice meaning ‘using a tractor’.
It is the kebelle with its elected council and a variety of standing com-
mittees nominated by the council, including some villagers, that it is
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legally confirmed in its competence to take the decisions about assign-
ing, withdrawing of land, permitting renting out, and applying condi-
tions such as being a resident in the area.
The Registration Process
The kebelle administration is the body in charge of issuing the certifi-
cates after inspecting the plots, measuring these, determining rightful
plot holders and solving the many disputes, particularly in terms of
boundaries. After the large-scale redistribution of land in Amhara state
in 1997, much confusion about plot boundaries and/or plot holding
ensued, so in the new registration operation many conflicts flared up.
This conflict-ridden situation is compounded by the crude ways of
measuring the plots.
Each certificate contains the names and addresses of the household
head, his/her spouse, and siblings or other relations in the household
(as well as details of the land and its geographical position). A typical
example of locally grown rules without basis in official law is the ‘rule’
that persons not mentioned on the certificate will not have the right to
inherit the land.
From the case study done by Rahmato (2009b) one gets a good idea
of how the registration procedure was completed. A local village com-
mittee within the standing committee structure of the kebelle, com-
posed of local people – some with a reputation of wisdom – and local
bureaucrats do the work. Women are notoriously absent, with few
exceptions.
As happens often, the register is not kept up-to-date, so one may
expect the de facto situation on the ground to deviate considerably from
what is written down.
The Practice of Implementing the New Land Law
We now rehearse some experiences with the new system and inspect
perceptions and anxieties of smallholders interviewed by Rahmato and
his team.
State-Imposed Redistribution
Although in Federal Law collective redistribution of land is now hedged
in with conditions, it is not ruled out. The Amhara Land Law follows
this. Almost half of the (120) interviewed inhabitants of two kebelles in
the Dessie Zuria district (woreda) said that redistribution is likely,
which shows widespread distrust in the state’s intentions.
‘Informal’ Local Redistribution
Kebelle authorities during the registration operation decided to take
land from families with over a certain (small) amount of land and
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redistribute it to others. This is an unlawful practice but there is no ef-
fective remedy against it. Also after registration such practices ensue.
Once from a widowed woman part of her (small amount of) land was
expropriated to compensate a prestigious high-ranking person in the
kebelle for loss of land because of the building of kebelle offices. At the
local level she found no interest in her case, let alone a remedy and
thereupon went to the far away woreda court at great costs. She went
without lawyers or para-legal support and lost the case. The court said
that the kebelle authorities had assigned the land to that person and
therefore he is the rightful holder now. She did not pursue the case
further as the cost of doing so before the high court of Amhara state
(one day travel away) was prohibitive (Rahmato 2009b: 91-92, and per-
sonal communication).50
Another example of extra-legal local redistribution is the implemen-
tation of the ‘three years absence rule’. After three years of absence leg-
ally the plot of land can be redistributed, but there are reports that this
sometimes happens already after two years (USAID 2004: 16).
Discretionary Powers
The conclusion is warranted that the question what competences leg-
ally rest in the hands of the lowest level executive authorities is not
easy to answer. At least not from written official texts. Not only do the
written conditions for the holding of land – under sanction of withdra-
wal – grant wide discretion to the authorities, but practices of extra-
legal decisions about land management are frequent.51
Taking the Land and the Matter of Compensation
The same unchecked power is at work in the important matter of tak-
ing the land for public works, private investments, and other purposes
of a general nature. That land can be taken for public purposes is a
normal feature of any land law. But the way procedure and compensa-
tion for land taking are regulated in Amhara state, as well as the imple-
mentation, show many unclear areas.
First of all, a new Federal Law of 2005 allows the woreda authorities
to dispossess farmers and take land for private or public investment
purposes or any other destination which is more useful. Compensation
is mandatory indeed but as yet no regional state proclamations have
been passed regarding the way compensations have to be determined,
so ‘local officials on the ground simply make ad hoc improvisations’
(Rahmato 2009b: 78), often far below market prices.
Other experiences are even less promising for smallholders. Land
used for grazing was taken for road building without any compensa-
tion because it was asserted that common lands are state property.
Land from farmers with certificates was taken too and compensation
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was paid, but only for houses and buildings not for the land itself,
because even cultivated land was deemed to be state property.
Taking of land for development purposes (in local language: limat)
like road works, dams, irrigation projects, natural parks, foreign invest-
ment, forest exploitation, is still easy and cannot be blocked by the
farmers, but now some forms of compensation are provided for. But if
e.g. land is taken nowadays for water works, often compensation is not
in money but in kind, meaning that a piece of land of poor quality is
offered. Cash payments once again are only for improvements, not for
the land itself.52
Conflict Solving Institutions
People resent these discretionary and sometimes capricious practices
of applying the rules. Conflict solving institutions are not much of a
countervailing power. In case of persistent conflicts the local land
administration committee usually hears the case and tries to settle it.
Only then parties are allowed to adduce the so-called social court, a ty-
pical lowest level body within the state system. It is not an independent
body. After this the woreda (district) court can be appealed to, and final-
ly the state high court.
People generally do not feel they stand a chance against the deci-
sions by kebelle councils and committees like LAC, kebelle and woreda
public functionaries, social courts and district courts. These bodies are
packed with members of the ruling parties who have no incentive to go
against the government(s).53
It is reported that people still resort to customary authorities to get a
solution for conflicts that might arise with other villagers. These ‘el-
ders’ have no official status and their decisions have no formal legal
validity but apparently in some places they are still at work, as a left-
over from the times of resilient communal land tenure arrangements.
Position of Women
While generally women are often discriminated against, reports about
the fairness of the registration operation and its implementation are
mixed. In the registration committees hardly any woman is to be
found, and generally local officials are prejudiced, reasoning e.g. that
female households heads cannot work all the plots they have because
they are not supposed to do rough physical labour, so part of their land
may be taken (Rahmato 2009b: 92). But as to the certificates, they do
not particularly discriminate against women. As a report on Amhara
registration observed: 30 percent is registered under female title.54
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De Facto Legal Pluralism?
It is reported that customary inheritance practices like dividing up the
land and giving it to siblings during lifetime of the holders, are still
around in some places. As this is reducing land sizes below the subsis-
tence level, it is more than likely that local authorities informally or for-
mally fight these practices, e.g. by not giving permission to transfer the
use right title. I already mentioned the matter of commons and a possi-
ble community-based practice of management as well the role of tradi-
tional elders in settling conflicts between community members. In a
field study about registration in Tigray (Mitiku et al. 2005: 22) mention
was made of a wide spread practice of ‘mortgaging’ plots of land
although it is formally forbidden. It is not the usual mortgage however
(where the land stays in the hands of the borrower until possible
default). The land is given to the one who lends the money until the
loan is repaid, the profit from the land is considered to be the rent for
the loan. This is another example out of the wide category of secondary
rights. This transaction is called antichresis, and is even informally
registered. It seems that social courts at times do enforce these non-
official practices.55 As usual some de facto plurality of practices may be
observed.
Concluding
Expectations of the new registration were high. And ‘compared to the
situation in the recent past (…) there has been considerable improve-
ment in peasant attitudes with respect to tenure security in their hold-
ings than in the past’ (Rahmato 2009b: 60-61). A majority of the
respondents interviewed said that for instance they now felt more con-
fident in leasing and renting out land. But at the end of the day prevail-
ing land administration practices have not changed much and fears of
peasants of redistribution, taking of land without compensation, lack-
ing a defence mechanism against state arbitrariness have not been al-
layed. The respondents still perceive their rights to be easily taken away
from them. Rahmato (2009b: 82) concludes that robust tenure security
assumed to come from registration, only has a chance to come forward
when registration is an integral part of the effective granting of other
basic political and democratic citizens’ rights. These rights moreover
should be organised in such a away that the people can also mobilise
these rights effectively. Empowerment of the smallholders and account-
ability of public authority are essential circumstances to take into ac-
count while drafting legal designs with the aim to effectively provide
for real, effective land tenure security.
This situation is exacerbated by the very fact that in a country like
Ethiopia with its high spread of illiteracy, people hardly have any no-
tion of the law. Their awareness of their official legal rights is very low,
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they have no idea where to look for the law and for their rights. The
low level authorities do not have such knowledge either. Copies of the
land laws are not around, there is a blatant lack of NGOs and other
rights-advocacy organisations serving to empower local people and giv-
ing free legal aid, if needed.
Summarising the Ethiopian Case
Smallholders now for the first time ever get a registration document,
while the registration procedure is simple. Compared to the situation in
the recent past peasant attitudes with respect to tenure security have im-
proved. People feel for instance more secure about leasing and letting
land. Some rights such as the right to bequeath a plot to one’s own chil-
dren, are now officially confirmed. However, some weaknesses remain.
Security of Tenure
– Taking of land for development purposes, public works etc. is not
regulated adequately and takes place without much ado and without
adequate compensation.
– The commons are not involved in the new land laws and remain
therefore free for grabs.
– Non-recognised practices live on, like the antichresis way of ‘mortga-
ging’ land.
– Formally, redistribution policies are not ruled out and moreover
continue sometimes in informal practice on the local level.
– The position of women in matters of land rights although improved
slightly, remains weak.
Legitimacy and Accountability of Authority
– In the new land law(s) a wide discretion in land management is
accorded to the lower level of the public administration (sound use
of the land, the three years absence clause etc.), without much
opportunity to call them to account for their decisions. Capricious
and politicised decisions partly wreck the newly won tenure security.
Legal Empowerment
– Legal awareness is weak both among smallholders and the lower
level officials, legal empowerment and active legal aid NGO activity
is absent, while an independent and accessible court system is not
available yet.
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If not Private Property, Then What?
There is a lot to be learned from the cases of land tenure legalisation
we discussed. As I prioritise the communal road I want to summarise
some lessons learned about granting communal title as a means to
legalise land tenure for development.
Tenure Security
Demarcation procedures for community or village land bear the risk of
not including all the traditional land, particularly the ‘commons’.
Better protection of the community-based arrangements are provided
by designs that recognise land rights – both the communal title and in-
dividual use rights – as rights already legally valid without any further
registration or similar procedure.
Registration usually is a condition to be able to enter into transac-
tions on markets. It would be best to make this procedure obligatory
for all (Bruce, this volume). If not, land grabbing through political and
economic manipulation risks to frustrate the rights of the smallholder.
In the design it is necessary to cover all relevant tenure transactions,
like inheritance (under the living, under the dead), sharecropping,
‘mortgaging’, renting out & in. Rights of various user categories have
to be taken care of, such as the rights of pastoralists and women, sec-
ondary rights, as well as rights to use the commons.
Investment regulations and practices as well as regulations for tak-
ing the land for development projects and public works should contain
careful procedures for at least serious community consultations and
compensation payment, if not veto rights.
Sectoral laws should respect the competences formalised in the new
land tenure design.
The Land Management Authority, Composition, Capacity, Legitimacy and
Accountability
The legal design should define the land management authority in such
a way that it is or can easily develop into a locally legitimate commu-
nity-based authority. It should be a community-based approach with
ample popular engagement, based on a locally embedded learning-by-
doing approach (Alden Wily, this volume). Heavily reconstructing this
corporate entity bears the risk of recognising the community as the
owner of all the land but at the same time changing it into something
else.56 Okoth-Ogondo (2001: 3) discusses the drafting of third road
legalisation designs while being aware of the need to remedy e.g. dis-
criminatory practices, and stresses the need for this legal design to be
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responsive to these community values and processes. In this context he
is chastising the Tanzanian Village Land Act in that it vests the power
of management of village land in new local committees without set-
ting out ‘the principles upon which these committees will manage vil-
lage land’. ‘Nor are the community values to which administration
must conform prescribed’. Indeed, the question is warranted what hap-
pens with village authorities and their local legitimacy, when these
authorities ‘become agents of the state’ (Van Cott 2003: 25). Social capi-
tal gets lost. The capacity of the community to defend itself against
encroachments may be weakened.
Criteria how to use the land management competences would have
to be specified but as this will always leave a large area for discretion
some simple procedures have to be mandated for the regular issuing
of guidelines as to how the authorities will fill in their wide discretion
and through what procedures they take land management decisions.
Without generous support to local authorities, capacity problems will
thwart the neat set up of any design.
Legal Empowerment and Adjudication
Measures should be in place to empower smallholders, make them
aware of their rights, provide for free legal aid, and strengthen commu-
nity organisation to be able to have access to the new tenure rights and
defend these against outside-investors and against state officials (see
Mitchell 2009 about Land Rights Legal Aid and Cotula 2007 on Legal
Empowerment). Local conflict solving procedures have to be simple to
prevent overburdening of local functionaries. Official low level courts
have to be established, should be functioning and should be reachable
at a low cost.
Final Reflection
It is to be expected that in real life any new design walking a third road
will exhibit a de facto (empirical) legal pluralism of practices and autho-
rities. Transmission of the individual (or: family-) plots to heirs or
transactions like sharecropping or ‘mortgaging’ are often done in prac-
tice although formally ruled out, just to give one example. Because of
this grey zone, smallholders may be kept at the mercy of state officials,
particularly in case land is getting scarce and/or awakes interest of
investors. This leads to a hypothesis: the more the (state) law defines
norms, procedures, authorities and/or forces local authorities to recon-
struct and codify these, and the less one is building on the local institu-
tions, the more a kind of unruly, haphazard mixture will turn up, a
170 ANDRÉ HOEKEMA
mixture of local practices and decision makers on the one hand and of-
ficial norms and formal authorities on the other. It is likely that under
demographic and economic pressure this situation favours the wealthy
and better positioned villagers and undermines the power of resistance
that the community can muster against encroachment on their lands
through investment and other large-scale development projects.
Notes
1 A variation on a paragraph title in Sundet (2005: 15).
2 From 2001 onwards the Ethiopian government chose the first category, see the note
‘Rural Development Policy and Strategies’ by the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development (MOFED), Addis Ababa, April 2003. With thanks to Dessalegn Rahma-
to, who drew my attention to this document. Compare Hanlon’s (2002) well-framed
question, in the subtitle of his article, about the future of rural development in Mo-
zambique: ‘will foreign investors, the urban elite, advanced peasants or family farm-
ers drive rural development?’ Clearly ‘development’ is a contested concept that re-
quires socio-political choices.
3 As we will see this is partly due to a general tendency in development projects to go
for ‘participation’, to engage ‘stakeholders’, to reframe central state policy making
into public-private networks of governance.
4 It strikes me therefore that Hatcher, Palombi and Mathieu (2009) in a recent inter-
esting brochure practically only deal with providing for individual land rights and leg-
ally empowering the local smallholders to make them aware and capable of making
use of their improved legal position. In the brochure we find only two short remarks
about the provision of collective rights for women in Burkina Faso and collective for-
est management rights for the San in Namibia.
5 See variations on this definition and further details in my essay ‘Communal land ten-
ure: the concept and its historical defeat against capitalism’, in Hoekema (2008: 57-
87). See also Van de Sandt (2007: 24). A useful characterisation of ‘customary tenure’
or community-based (land) tenure to be found in Fitzpatrick (2005: 454). Also Pros-
terman, Mitchell & Hanstad (2009: 26).
6 This terminology is also used by Van der Molen who uses the term overlapping
rights. A thorough analysis of derived rights to be found in Lavigne Delville et al.
(2002).
7 Mitchell 2009: 358.
8 A name given in Latin American countries to local indigenous leadership.
9 Fitzpatrick (2005: 454), while analysing ‘customary tenure’ (as he calls community-
based tenure) stresses the ‘overarching ritual and cosmological relations with tradi-
tional lands’.
10 In the unabridged version of his keynote address to the African Public Interest Law
and Community-based Property Rights Workshop (Arusha, Tanzania, August 2000),
Okoth-Ogendo stresses reciprocity as the foundation for these obligations.
11 As suggested by USA former president Bush Senior applauding De Soto (Otto 2009:
178).
12 In this volume nobody mentions this explicitly.
13 See a clear example of this decreasing accountability in Fisyi (1992).
14 Many neo-institutionalists are pleading for rural land legalisation designs in which
formal land rights are being built on extra-legal arrangements. But usually this is not
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out of concern for the moral economy and the livelihood security implied therein.
There is a definite risk that their plea for a middle way between imposing private
property and doing nothing eventually promotes a form of legalisation in which the
moral economy gets lost. The institutional turn is part of a top-down, state-led recon-
struction of institutions for development through facilitating markets (see Newton
2004: 7, footnote 10). The goals of this new policy are often the same as before: liber-
ating land rights from communal bonds and fetters. The land has to become a com-
modity, rural land markets as well as credit markets have to be promoted, but to get
there it is better to take a step-by-step approach and not to force the situation. This
approach also dominates the recent turn of the World Bank towards more respect for
extra-legal local tenure institutions in programmes of legalisation of land tenure for
development. While acknowledging that non-state customary tenure regimes can pro-
vide sufficient tenure security, Deininger (2003) suggests a rather strong reconstruc-
tion of the local situation. He pleads for a remake of local practices, to change them
into clear-cut rules. He wants to renovate local authority structures into a more ac-
countable and transparent way of decision-making. Rule of law and good governance
do have to be brought to the local communities as well, but preferably in a step-by-
step approach and not all at once. This way of official upgrading of community-based
tenure arrangements has a double face. On the one hand, it means recognition and
acceptance of local ways of dealing with land and the legal introduction of a plurality
of property institutions, the local and the national ones. On the other hand, quite a
few of the central features of such arrangements are rejected and replaced by models
of governance that are carbon copies of the dominant regime.
15 Individualisation is an important tendency in quite a few of these communities. For
the indigenous self-governing territory of Jambalo´ in Colombia, territory of the Nasa
people (Paeces), Van de Sandt (2007) describes precisely the stark tensions among
the inhabitants of this territory between, on the one hand, a community orientation
in the organisation of (agricultural) labour and in the way the people perceive their
land rights, and on the other hand, a more individualised tenure of the plots and the
decision making on how to market surpluses and find new ways to earn some money
(his chapter V: ‘Nasa (Paez) governance and the indigenous communitarian econo-
my’).
16 An example is a UNDP project in Mongolia about sustainable management of
grossly depleted grasslands. A project document says: ‘The goal of this project is to
increase the welfare of herding families through the sustainable management of
Mongolian grasslands. The main mechanism to achieve the project goal is to
strengthen and formalise existing herding community institutions and to strengthen
the linkages between them and formal governance structure and the private sector’.
The project was mainly financed by the Dutch government (UNDP Project MON/
02/301, under ‘Background’, website accessed June 2006).
17 The spirit of this less command-and-control and more cooperative ‘horizontal’ com-
munity-based forest management is clearly analysed in Gregersen and Contreras
(2010).
18 Important conditions are the presence of an urgent public problem, a state (depart-
ment) that steps back from the command-and-control policy making approach, a
guaranteed (semi-) autonomous firm position of the non-state partners, a minimum
of belief in the possibility of positive relations between public authority and private
communities and last but least a minimum of stability in that particular society.
These conditions for successful new forms of community-based management of for-
ests, fishery, and other natural resources including land, are extensively studied by
the many participants in the International Association for the Study of the Commons
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(IASC), often reported in The Commons Digest, and further discussed in studies like
Ostrom (1990).
19 I haven chosen these for two reasons: Mozambique, Tanzania and Ethiopia are well
documented and moreover show an interesting continuum: both Tanzania and Mo-
zambique are examples of recognition of tenure rights on the level of a group, as
community rights, while Mozambique is ‘minimalist’ (Fitzpatrick 2005: 458) and
Tanzania rather reconstruction-oriented and demanding. Ethiopia follows the indivi-
dual track. The (brief) example from Sumatra serves to show a typical situation of
two parallel systems of tenure existing in a kind of legal limbo. This again is fairly ty-
pical in many third road designs (and not only in these, also – and even more so – in
full private property designs). But even more important, it shows the potential of
new community-based governance of natural resources.
20 Usually the re´gulo is partly a traditional authority, partly a kind of governmental offi-
cer, a figure once adapted to the needs of the former colonial power. Until the pre-
sent time they occupy quite an ambiguous position. In former days they have been
the object of bitter contests and ideological quibbling between the anti-colonial Freli-
mo party and the oppositional Renamo movement (Pimentel 2010).
21 For this case see Safitri 2009.
22 According to Dubois (1997: 15) in forest co-management schemes such informal si-
tuations are common. He attributes to this ‘loose situation’ the ‘prevalence of covert
arrangements between stakeholders at the local level, e.g. replacement of official
fines by bribes, or clientelism’. These deals ‘serve both parties: on the one hand, they
complement the forest agent’s insufficient salary; on the other hand, the briber can
use the resource at a lower expense by paying less that the official fees or fines’. This
resembles the situation in the Lampung forest users case.
23 Normally these designs are not so detailed.
24 These laws came into legal force in 2001.
25 This reminds me of the way in which in Mozambique communal land tenure is leg-
ally recognised even without any official certification. The important difference how-
ever is that in Mozambique rights are recognised on the level of communities, not in-
dividuals/family.
26 This is almost the same notion as we find in the 1964 Land Law of Senegal.
27 For the granting, conditioning, withdrawing etc. of rights to land located outside the
rural village land areas, the top-down and centralised governmental management sys-
tem is kept alive. This matter will not be pursued here, as I only dedicate my atten-
tion to village land and the interplay of the traditional ways of land management with
the new legal regulation.
28 Titling might also be done in the name of a specific group. So, common lands (‘the
commons’) including rangeland and forests could be titled in the name of the com-
munity itself or perhaps some group within it.
29 Formally speaking the village is not declared the owner of the village lands but its
manager.
30 Rights on state land, so-called ‘Granted Rights of Occupancy’, have 99 years as their
maximum duration.
31 Sometimes called derived rights (see box 1).
32 In cases of prolonged conflict the district authorities can take over the adjudication
process, which according to Sundet (2005: 11) undermines the legitimacy of the ela-
borate and meticulous village process.
33 The Village Land Act clause forbidding discrimination has become famous for its
length and thoroughness. In section 20 (2) of the law it says: ‘Any rule of customary
law or any such decision in respect of land held under customary tenure, whether in
respect of land held individually or communally, shall have regard to the customs,
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traditions and practices of the community concerned (…)’ and adds ‘(any) rule of cus-
tomary law or any such decision in respect of land held under customary tenure shall
be void and inoperative and shall not be given effect to by any village council or vil-
lage assembly or any person or body of persons exercising any authority over village
land or in respect of any court or other body, to the extent to which it denies women,
children or persons with disability lawful access to ownership, occupancy or use of
any such land.’
34 In French speaking Africa this latter one is the condition of mise en valeur.
35 Their grazing grounds are almost invariably deemed ‘not in use’ of badly used. This
view still prevails in the 2005 ‘Strategic Plan for the Implementation of the Land
Acts’ (SPILL) (See Odgaard 2006: 22 ff). Compare a 2008 official governmental view
on the role of smallholders as well as as pastoralists in the kind of development the
government wants. These categories of land users are seen as not using the land in
economically efficient and productive ways (Sulle and Nelson 2009: 35-36).
36 It is (to me) not entirely clear if the taking of the land follows the loophole of declar-
ing unused and unoccupied village land as needed for state purposes, or by using the
power of the president to convert already established village land to state land. Dis-
turbing reports have been issued as to the impact of large foreign investments in
gold mines in and after 1996, bringing testimony of massive evictions of villagers
from their lands and houses without serious compensation. See an unauthorised re-
port of a meeting ‘Raw materials versus Poverty’, Friends of the Earth, Netherlands, a
conference on the role of the World Bank in financing fossil fuel and mining pro-
jects, 12 September 2001. This report can be retrieved via: www.milieudefensie.nl/
globalisering/publicaties/publicaties-olie, accessed October 2010.
37 The other acquisition road is through a governmental investment agency (TIC: Tan-
zanian Investment Centre) dealing in state land (‘general land’).
38 Other loopholes in the compensation matter abound (Sulle and Nelson 2009: 54 and
52 respectively). Sometimes compensation is negotiated between a private investor
and the village authorities while the law prescribes negotiations and fixing of the
compensation between village and central government. The private investor often
gets away with the promise to pay after he has secured a bank loan to get the opera-
tions started. If this loan is not forthcoming the villages get nothing while their lands
are officially out of their hands for good. Or, the other way round, district govern-
ments claim a large portion of the compensation payment because they need it for
provision of services in the district at large. But districts do not officially manage vil-
lage land and cannot legally claim any ‘compensation’.
39 I found this report ‘Titling and Registration System in Tanzania Villages, visit to Dar
Es Salaam and Mbeya regions from august 4 – august 11, 2005’, in a bundle of re-
ports and reflections The costs of complying with the law over a fifty year period of pro-
ductive life,on the website www.tanzania.go.tz/mkurabita/PDF/annexes%20volume%
20III.pdf, accessed September 2010.
40 Sundet (2005: 1) writes ‘(the Acts) to a large extent still aren’t being implemented’.
41 The insecurity of women’s rights is a common feature of community-based tenure ar-
rangement. Vel and Makambombu (2009: 18) depicting customary land tenure on
the island of Sumba in Indonesia, conclude: ‘Several of the above cases have shown
that access to land for women is very limited in Sumba. Traditionally a widow is only
entitled to take care of her husband’s or her son’s land. Relatively wealthy women
can purchase land, but their tenure may never be entirely secure. In general women
cannot own adat land, and daughters cannot inherit land.’ The authors refer to one
exception: giving land to a daughter as part of her dowry.
42 This risk is palpable because the general policy in Tanzania keeps seeing the pastoral-
ist way of life as not sustainable and wants to sedentarise these people(s).
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43 I mainly draw on two articles by Dessalegn Rahmato (2009a and b).
44 Article 40 (4) of the 1994 Constitution of the federal Democratic Republic of Ethio-
pia, in an unofficial English translation, says: ‘Any Ethiopian who wants to earn a liv-
ing by farming has a right, which shall not be alienated, to obtain, without payment,
the use of land’.
45 Supposing that in those (recent) days they had any officially recognised right to their
plot at all.
46 In the lowlands, particularly in pastoralist areas, communal land tenure institutions
are still well alive and kicking (Afar area, Somali territories, various areas in the
Southern State etc.).
47 The draft law was presented to the parliament in its pre-elections composition, where
the government parties had a comfortable majority.
48 Because the system at least in the states of Tigray and Amhara only provides certifi-
cates in the name of individuals (or families) the matter of rights and governance
over common pool resources is not settled. Forests are in the hands of state authori-
ties.
49 A group of villages.
50 A USAID report (2004: 15) quoted kebelle officials saying that also with certificates,
redistribution was possible.
51 Sometimes by these invented rules local authorities are able to dampen unfair results
of official rules. Take the rule that restricts the right to access to land on being a resi-
dent. When a woman after marriage moves to her husband’s village and would nor-
mally lose her access rights, it is reported that sometimes the authorities respect her
original rights, so that upon returning, say as widow or divorced woman, a plot of
land is still available in her original village.
52 I am not knowledgeable about the way sectoral laws, like environmental law, forest
law, investment law etc. are coordinated with the new land law, but one may expect
important failures of coordination which compound the insecurity for smallholders
even after registration.
53 In the committee as well as in a social court a locally respected elder person may be
sitting alongside functionaries who are loyal to the ruling parties.
54 See Teklu (2005: 10). For male-only title: 32 percent, and joined title: 39 percent (end
of 2004).
55 In an official mortgage the borrower in case of default loses the land, that is trans-
ferred to the bank and/or to more successful farmers. This is promoting market-
based development. In the antichresis the land stays in the hands of the lender. Upon
paying the loan back the borrower can retake the land. But should the lender not
give the land back, the borrower runs into serious problems because his claim to get
his land back is not supported officially.
56 Fingleton (1998) puts the question in a succinct form: ‘how to recognize a group
without converting it into something else’ (see the foreword to this paper by Lawr-
ence C. Christy).
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